FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1966

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* **The Editors.**

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE PRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

By James B. Reston

THE conflict between the men who make and the men who report the news is as old as time. News may be true, but it is not truth, and they never see it the same way. The first great event, or "Man in the News," was Adam, and the accounts of his creation have been the source of controversy ever since. In the old days, the reporters or couriers of bad news were often put to the gallows; now they are given the Pulitzer Prize, but the conflict goes on.

The reasons are plainly that we are changing the world faster than we can change ourselves, and are applying to the present the habits of the past. We are imposing on a transformed world the theories and assumptions that worked in another time at home, and nowhere does this clash of past and present, theory and reality, seem more dramatic than in the application of American constitutional theory to the conduct of American foreign policy.

That theory is that the people know best. The first constitutional principle is that the success of any group of people in dealing with their common problems rests on their knowledge and understanding of the problems to be solved, and on their intelligence, judgment and character in meeting those problems. The conclusion drawn from this is that the intelligence, judgment and character of a majority of the people, if well-informed, will probably produce more satisfactory solutions than any leader or small band of geniuses is likely to produce.

This is undoubtedly sound doctrine for sinking a sewer or building a bridge or a school in a local community, but is it a practical way to conduct foreign policy? Are the people getting

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adequate information to enable them to reach sound judgments on what to do about South Asia, or the Atlantic, or the balance of payments, or China, or outer space? Is there any such information and any such people? And would enough of them pay attention to sustain a commercial newspaper or radio or television station that concentrated on these fundamental questions? These questions raise the old problem of the people's right to be informed and the government's obligation to govern effectively, which sometimes means governing secretly.

Two contemporary situations illustrate the dilemma. Over 300,000 Americans, many of them conscripts, are now fighting a war in Viet Nam. Most of them do not know how it started, and even many officials are extremely vague about how we got so deeply involved. It cannot be said that the people were well informed before their commitment to the battle, or even that their representatives in the Congress really debated the decision to wage this kind of war. On the other hand, the President is now conducting that war as Commander-in-Chief with television cameras on the battlefield recording daily for vast television audiences the most brutal and agonizing scenes of the struggle.

In the first case, there was so little information and so much executive authority that the President could do about what he pleased; and in the second case, the people have so much information about the violent incidents of the war that it is questionable whether the President of a democratic country can really sustain his policy over a long period of time while the public is being invited to tune in on the eleven o'clock news and see Johnny killed. Something is obviously out of balance.

In analyzing the relationship between public opinion and public policy, it may be useful to try to understand the practical everyday conflict between reporters and officials and how it developed. General Washington went to his grave hating the press, and with good reason. Longfellow said, "This country is not priest-ridden, but press-ridden." I once had an argument about the press with a parson who referred me as penance to the first three verses of the 19th Chapter of the Gospel according to Luke: "And Jesus entered, and passed through Jericho. And behold there was a man named Zacchaeus . . . and he sought to see Jesus . . . and could not for the press. . . ."

The United States had a press before it had a foreign policy. This is a large part of the trouble between its writers and its

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officials today. The American press was telling the country and the world where to get off before there was a State Department. The eighteenth-century American pamphleteers not only helped write the Constitution but thought—with considerable justification—that they created the union. They believed that government power was potentially if not inevitably wicked and had to be watched, especially when applied in secret and abroad, and they wrote the rules so that the press would be among the watchers. In their more amiable moods, they no doubt conceded that the press should serve the country, but they insisted that the best way to serve it was to criticize its every act and thought, and something of this pugnacious spirit has persisted until now.

The natural and historical differences between the American diplomat and the American reporter are still the main cause of their present trouble. The American diplomat before the Second World War was trained in the days of our isolation to be a silent observer of world affairs. He was as discreet as a priest; he was supposed to know everything and to tell nothing. Even in America, let alone Britain, your ideal State Department man was as handsome as Joseph Grew and as elegant as Dean Acheson, or vice versa. In contrast, the American reporter, circa 1930, was a very gabby and even rakish fellow who was usually trained in the police court, the county courthouse, or, as in my own case, the sports press-box (where, incidentally, you had the consolation of knowing who had won at the end of the day). He was not discreet, but skeptical and often even impertinent. His general view of public officials was that they were probably up to something bad which the Founding Fathers had somehow appointed him personally to expose.

The American reporter of my generation was brought up to believe in the cocky frontier tradition of "publish and be damned," but the American diplomat of the same age quickly came to believe that if he helped you to publish the facts, *he* was likely to be damned, and this was only one of the conflicts that soon developed between the government and the press.

The conduct of foreign policy is a process that never ends; the production of a newspaper or a television news program is a miracle that has to be accomplished somehow on the split second. The Secretary of State must think in generations and continents, but the reporter thinks in "stories," in "minutes" and often in "fragments." One profession is quiet, the other noisy; one slow,

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the other fast; one precise, the other imprecise. What makes their relationship even more difficult is that they are stuck with one another. They are married without the possibility of divorce, separation or even an occasional period of quiet. The government is always acting and the press is always blabbing and criticizing, and what makes this alliance even more galling is that it is unequal.

There are actually only a few hundred American reporters, editors and commentators dealing primarily with foreign-policy questions all over the world, and those reaching the largest audience are not the well-known commentators but the news agency reporters who serve most daily American newspapers and the radio and television stations as well.

Two points of history and geography are important to an understanding of the American news agency as the primary source of most foreign-policy news. Unlike Reuters in Britain, Havas in France and Wolff in Germany, the original American news agency, the Associated Press, was created not for private profit or government convenience but as a non-profit coöperative association to serve the newspapers that shared the costs. This had some significance, for since it had to serve editors of wholly different and conflicting views on domestic and foreign policy, it had to be as impartial, non-partisan and unbiased as possible. The result was that mutual distrust among American newspapers created the most accurate and trustworthy source of world news the world has ever seen, and with the advent of a second American world-wide news agency, now called United Press International, competition increased both the flow and the accuracy of the news.

The geographical point is more interesting and less encouraging. The American news agencies have to serve a vast continental country covering four different time zones, with some parts facing on the Pacific and some on the Atlantic, some looking north and some south, some living in arctic and some in tropical climates. Accordingly, news had to be written so that a news story on international trade could be filed at length for maritime cities interested in international commerce and briefly for agricultural towns concerned primarily with the price of corn. And vice versa. The news agencies had to devise a technique of writing the news so that each story could be adapted to the diverse needs and interests of widely varied communities.

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Accordingly, they invented the "headline" or "all-purpose" agency news story which could be published at length in the large city papers or cut in half for the middle towns or reduced to a paragraph for the very small papers. This solution to a technical problem had results nobody in the A. P. or U. P. I. intended and certainly nobody in the State Department wanted. It tended to sharpen and inflate the news. It created a tradition of putting the most dramatic fact in the story first and then following it with paragraphs of decreasing importance. Thus it encouraged, not a balanced, but a startling presentation of the news, based on what one of my irreverent colleagues calls the "Christ, how the wind blew!" lead. This was fine for the news of wrecks or murders, but was a limiting and distorting device as news of foreign policy became more and more complicated.

II

The conflict between journalists and diplomats is getting worse instead of better for a variety of reasons. The press corps in the major capitals is getting so large that it is often smothering the news rather than covering it. When I started covering the State Department for *The New York Times* in 1941, Secretary of State Hull saw the "regulars" every weekday in his office. He could explain his policies, often in the most vivid Tennessee mountain language, read from the diplomatic cables if he felt like it, and indicate, with full assurance that his confidence would be respected, what was on the record and what had to be off the record. A generation later, the Secretary of State has to meet the reporters in an auditorium where everybody is wired for sound.

The change in the nature of war has also complicated the problem of reconciling the traditions of press and government. The nation is engaged in an underground war, an economic war, an intelligence war, in every continent of the earth. This requires a vast American secret service operation in the armed services and the Central Intelligence Agency. What it costs and all that it does are not disclosed, and this is not only necessary, but it is something comparatively new in American life, at least on the present scale. The old tradition of the American press is that anything a government hides, except in open and declared war, is wrong and should be exposed, but a press demanding unlimited freedom for this principle could in some cases risk the nation's freedom. Yet the problem cannot be solved simply by saying that the

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operations of the intelligence services of the government are none of the public's business. I knew for over a year that the United States was flying high-altitude planes (the U-2) over the Soviet Union from a base in Pakistan to photograph military and particularly missile activities and bases, but *The New York Times* did not publish this fact until one of the planes was shot down in 1960. Was this a correct judgment? I think it was, but in other circumstances, the press is criticized for not printing intelligence and even military information.

The press, radio and television help create the atmosphere in which the nation lives. It is not an atmosphere that encourages calm reflection or wide perspectives, and it makes little allowance for the limitations of human frailty. We have transferred into the capitals of the world the American police-blotter definition of the news—which is the news of violence and contention, of the unusual rather than the usual—given it the voice of the radio and the eyes of the television camera and added the insistent shouts of the advertiser and the singing commercial.

There are, of course, advantages. The American people are given more information about events that affect their lives than any other people in the world. More Americans now see their public officials and hear them discuss public questions on television than ever before in the history of any sovereign state, but there are disadvantages, too. Casual conversation about delicate diplomatic questions is necessarily imprecise, while the language of diplomacy is supposed above everything else to be precise. Officials find the television interview more dangerous but more alluring than the private interview, for though what is said on television must stand as spoken, they can reach millions by television in no more time than it takes to talk quietly and privately to a single newspaper reporter.

In times of high controversy over policy, this constant public thrust and counter-thrust of criticism and defense, while inevitable in a democracy, has a serious effect on public officials. The more their policies are criticized, the more time they spend on defending their policies, until the words become as important as the acts and the defense of the policy takes on more meaning than the policy itself.

The energy devoted by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense to the public-relations aspects of foreign policy is almost beyond calculation. When they are being criticized,

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they seem all the more eager to argue their case in public. If we really knew the cost of all this physical and nervous strain on the principal officers of our government, we would probably be appalled. The pressure merely of being agreeable to critics in the press and the Congress must by itself be a trial, and it certainly leaves little time for reflection on anything except the particular crisis in the headlines at the moment.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from all this is that neither the press, nor the Congress, nor the Executive Branch has yet adjusted effectively to the new demands of the age. We are all following the procedures that were no doubt adequate when foreign policy was a secondary consideration. At the State Department, the men who are available to most reporters are not informed, and the men who are informed are usually too busy with the crisis to be available. On Capitol Hill, each committee is sovereign and assumes that Cabinet officers have nothing else to do but to repeat the same testimony three or four times to three or four different committees. And in the news-gathering agencies we go on doing more or less what we did a generation ago.

III

Personally, I do not believe that the constitutional assumption that "the people know best" is a very reliable guide to the conduct of American foreign policy today. Similarly even the modern techniques for reporting foreign news are not yet adequate to the subject or to the need, but we should be careful about reaching the conclusion that the remedy lies with a less assertive press. It is not the press that is extending its power to the detriment of a sound balance between public opinion and foreign policy, but the President, whose power in this field is greater than that of any head of government in the modern world.

The question we have to ask is not about the President's interests, but about the public interest. No doubt both President and press will abuse their power from time to time, but where is the greater danger to the public interest—in the present power of the press or in the present power of the President?

I believe the power of the Presidency has been increasing steadily since the Second World War, particularly since the introduction of nuclear weapons, and that the power of the press and even of the Congress to restrain him has declined proportionately during this same period.

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The Presidential power in the foreign field is in direct proportion to the size of the issue. The press can still embarrass him by premature disclosure of his plans, and the Congress can still oppose and even defy him on peripheral issues, but on the great acts of foreign policy, especially those involving the risk or even the act of war, he is more powerful in this age than in any other, freer to follow his own bent than any other single political leader in the world—and the larger and more fateful the issue, the greater is his authority to follow his own will.

As the leader of a world-wide coalition of nations engaged in constant contention with hostile forces in scores of different theaters of action or manœuvre, he is virtually assured of support once he proclaims his intentions. The Congress, of course, retains its power to deny him the funds to carry out his plans, but it cannot do so without repudiating him in the face of the enemy and assuming responsibility for the crisis that would surely follow.

President Johnson's use of the so-called Congressional Resolution on Viet Nam illustrates this point. The Congress did not initiate that resolution. It was written in the State Department and sent to Congress for approval on the morning after Communist P.T. boats made an unsuccessful attack on U.S. destroyers patrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin. It was not limited to the specific attack or even to the specific country at war. It asked the Congress to give the President authority to use whatever power "he" deemed necessary, not only in the Gulf of Tonkin or in Viet Nam but anywhere in all of Southeast Asia against any Communist aggression.

Obviously, the Congress complied, with very little debate and with only two dissenting votes. It could scarcely have done otherwise. It followed the procedure initiated by President Eisenhower in the Formosan and Lebanon resolutions of the fifties, and in similar situations in the future it is hard to imagine any Congress —even one dominated by the opposition party—doing otherwise.

The gravity of the issues since the advent of the cold war and atomic weapons has clearly enhanced the power of the President. In fact, I cannot think of a single major foreign-policy move any President wanted to make since the Second World War that he was unable to carry through because of the opposition of the press or of Congress.

President Wilson died believing that the balance of political

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power in America had swung so far toward the Senate that no President would ever be able to pass another major treaty. Yet President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, scattered treaty commitments all over the Middle East and South Asia with scarcely a dissenting voice in the Congress or in the press. President Kennedy waged one proxy war against Cuba, and risked a nuclear war with Russia over that same island without even asking the Congress. President Johnson sent more than 300,000 men to war in Viet Nam despite some sharp criticism from many of the nation's leading newspapers and commentators.

I do not say this is wrong, but merely that it is a fact of the nuclear age. In the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, President Kennedy was free to blockade Cuba, or bomb Havana, or, for that matter, to do nothing, on the excuse that we had missiles in Turkey, so why not Soviet missiles in Cuba? Eisenhower was free to send his bombers to Dien Bien Phu in 1953 to relieve the French, or to refuse to do so, just as he was free to go to the help of Hungary when it was invaded by the Red Army, or to pass by on the other side. President Johnson was obviously free to bomb North Viet Nam or not to bomb it, to negotiate with Hanoi or to blow it up, to mine the harbor of Haiphong or to leave it alone. No sovereign in history ever had such power or responsibility.

The press may report the news but the President makes it. If Senators are dominating the front pages with their protests against his foreign policy, and editors and professors are creating newsworthy disturbances on the university campuses and on the editorial pages, the President has a convenient remedy. He can divert public attention to himself. He can arrange a conference on an island in the Pacific, for example. Within 72 hours, he can bring the leaders of the nations on his side to a meeting that will arrest the interest of the world. Reporters and photographers will converge from all the capitals and fill the front pages with accounts of the proceedings, thereby overwhelming the less dramatic Senatorial mutterings.

This gives the President quite an edge. The reporters and commentators on the scene may see all this as an elaborate camouflage of realities and write their waspish critiques of the proceedings at his conference, but unless the great man is incorrigibly clumsy, which with the help of an experienced civil service he usually is not, the big front-page headlines will have much more effect than the witty chatter on page 32.

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The two Roosevelts were the Presidents who first understood the primacy of news over opinion. Teddy Roosevelt used to joke that he "discovered Monday." He recognized that editors had little news on Sunday night and that if he held back his Presidential announcements until then, he got a better display on the front pages on Monday morning, even with secondary news, than he got on Wednesday with really important news. Franklin Roosevelt, who was elected to the Presidency four times against the overwhelming opposition of the American newspapers, was even better at dominating the news. He concentrated on the reporters and the front pages and vilified or scorned the commentators and the editorial pages.

Every President since then has understood the point. Europe has a press that elevates opinion; America a press, radio and television that emphasize news. The Lippmanns, the Krocks, the Alsops, have their audiences, and the brilliant young American satirists, Russell Baker of *The New York Times* and Art Buchwald of the *Herald Tribune,* tickle the intellectuals and often come nearer to the truth than all the solemn scribblers, but news is more powerful than opinion, and this is the point the politicians have understood.

Thus the President almost always has the initiative over both press and Congress if he chooses to use the instruments of power now at his command. He is no equal partner with the Congress in the conduct of foreign affairs, if he ever was. He and he alone is in constant communication with almost every other leader in the world. He can reach his own countrymen from his television studio in the White House whenever great events justify a request for network time. When the Congress is squabbling in the wings over Rule 22 or the intricacies of repealing Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley Act, the President is constantly proclaiming the brotherhood of man, progress, generosity toward the weak and the elevation of the poor and underdeveloped.

There is a theory, widely advertised at annual meetings of editors and publishers, that the modern Presidential press conference is a restraining influence on the Chief Executive. According to this notion, the reporters are representatives of the people, like members of the British House of Commons, who have the power to make the great man answer questions, usually about his shortcomings or failures. There is a shred of truth in this, but not much more.

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President Johnson demonstrated his command of the press conference in a very simple way. He knew that the Washington press corps was full of specialists, some of whom had devoted most of their careers to the study of foreign affairs, or the federal judiciary, or science or military affairs, and therefore not only knew their subjects, but probably knew more about them than he did. If he announced his news conferences in advance, they would come running with their well-informed and awkward inquiries. So he simply did not announce his news conferences.

He called them when only the White House correspondents were around, and then usually on the weekends when only a few of them were on duty. He held them in his own executive office, where he was not on display before the cameras, but talking intimately with the reporters who travel with him all the time and are not only familiar to him but subject to his system of punishments and rewards, which can be embarrassing to a reporter on a highly competitive beat.

The point here is not that this is wicked, but merely that nobody need grieve too mournfully over the fiction of a poor, defenseless President badgered by a pack of insensitive and irresponsible barbarians. There is nothing in the Constitution that obliges him to conduct his office for the convenience of reporters. If he is experienced enough to get to the White House, he is usually nimble enough to handle the reporters who work there.

Every President develops his own defenses in this situation. Franklin Roosevelt scorned and ridiculed his questioners. He once pinned a Nazi Iron Cross on John O'Donnell of the *New York News* during the Second World War and ordered Robert Post of *The New York Times* to put on a dunce cap and stand in the corner. Asking President Truman a question was like pitching batting practice to the Yankees. He decapitated you and then grinned. President Eisenhower was amiably incomprehensible. President Kennedy, the real master of "the game," was a witty computer. He either overwhelmed you with decimal points, or disarmed you with a smile and a wisecrack. And President Johnson learned early to apply to the press conference the technique of the Senate filibuster.

President Johnson held only nine formal news conferences last year and has had only one this year. This, however, distorts the record and does not clarify his method. No President in the history of the Republic has ever devoted so much time to re-

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porters, editors and commentators. But he thinks of reporters in subjective rather than in objective terms, as individuals rather than as instruments of a free press in a free society; he sees them individually and at such length that the reporters themselves are often embarrassed to intrude so much on his other duties. It was not unusual last year for the President to sit casually in his rocking chair talking steadily to a reporter for a couple of hours, and sometimes even much longer than that.

This, of course, can be very helpful to the reporter concerned, but conversations of this length somehow imply, even if the President does not intend them to do so, a confidential, personal relationship that actually ties the reporter up more than it frees him to do his job. It is very difficult to sit and listen to a President explaining his terrible problems and narrow options without becoming sympathetic to the man and subjective about his policies. It is all the harder to remain detached about the range of topics discussed when he asks you what you would do in his place.

The power of the President to use the free press against itself is very great. If, for example, an influential columnist or commentator criticizes him for landing 25,000 Marines in the Dominican Republic to put down a rebellion, it is very easy for him to call in several other carefully selected commentators and give them the detailed argument for landing the Marines. He has all the vivid facts of the situation, and if he wants to put them out, he does not have to announce them himself. Other reporters will be perfectly willing to accommodate him, even though they know they are being used to knock down the story of another colleague.

The function of criticism itself has changed in an odd way during President Johnson's Administration. In the past, there has been a reasonable expectation among people writing political criticism that if they identified a problem, checked it out thoroughly, and proposed a reasonable remedy, publication of these things would be read within the government in good faith and maybe even considered worthy of executive action.

This is still true today on questions of policy, but if the topic deals with individuals in the Administration, the chances are that the criticism will perpetuate the situation criticized. For example, if you write today that a particular Cabinet member has been exhausted by overwork, and should be liberated for his own and the nation's good, you can be fairly sure that you have

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condemned that man to stay at his grindstone until everybody has forgotten that you ever mentioned him.

Also, if you learn that the President is going to do something on Friday and print it on Tuesday, this is likely to be regarded as an impertinence and a presumption which the President will punish by changing his plans. I once saw the speech President Johnson was going to make at the twentieth anniversary celebration of the founding of the United Nations and printed his plans for ending the financial crisis that was going on in the U.N. at that time. He was furious. He called in the Secretary of State the very night of publication, ordered the speech rewritten to eliminate the reported plans and made a different speech.

This is fair enough, but behind it there is a philosophic idea that has some disturbing possibilities. Bill Moyers, the White House press secretary, explained the President's view in these terms: "It is very important for a President to maintain up until the moment of decision his options, and for someone to speculate days or weeks in advance that he's going to do thus and thus is to deny to the President the latitude he needs in order to make, in the light of existing circumstances, the best possible decision."

No doubt this is true in many circumstances, but not in all. Is absolutely nothing to be printed about clandestine plans by the President to mount an illegal invasion at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba for fear of interfering with the President's option to humiliate the country? Are the people to be denied information about Presidential options that will involve them in a war they have to finance and fight? If all Presidential options are to be protected from speculation "until the very last minute," what redress will there be the next day after the President has opted to dispatch the Marines or bomb Hanoi, or publish a request to wage war as "he" deems necessary all over Southeast Asia?

These are hard questions, and the answers are not that the Commander-in-Chief must telegraph all his punches in advance. But at the same time, the doctrine of "no speculation" before action, even on non-military matters, is something new in the catalogue of Presidential privilege.

In such a world, no doubt he needs all the advantages and privileges he can get. He has to take responsibility for his actions and we do not. He is the principal actor on the stage, but he did not write the script and may not even like the role. Therefore, he tries constantly to use whatever devices he can to ease the agony.

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He manages the news, as the heads of all institutions do, by emphasizing his successes and minimizing his losses. He has his own photographers constantly taking his picture and releases those that convey the impression of strong leadership or compassion or whatever other mood he wants to convey at the moment. All this is understandable, but we should not be fooled: the trend of power is running with the President, the danger of excessive use of power lies not in the newspapers but in the White House, and even the most casual look at the influence of reporters and commentators today makes this fairly obvious.

IV

Never have reporters and commentators reached so many people in America with their news and views as they do now, or had so little power to influence the direction of the nation's foreign policy. The television network "stars" reach as many as 26 million viewers a night. They bring in their vivid reports on video tape from all the major capitals and battlefields of the world and occasionally even bounce them off man-made stars in transoceanic broadcasts, but the reaction of the public is quite different in the foreign field than in the national field.

A fundamental change has occurred in the attitude of the American people toward the government's conduct of foreign policy. In the old days, the people tended to believe the government was wrong until war was actually declared; now, confronted with torrents of ambiguous and often contradictory information about questions that could lead to war, the tendency is to assume the government is right. I believe the American reporters were nearer to the truth than the published government reports during the critical periods that preceded the indirect American invasion of Cuba in 1961 and the large American intervention in South Viet Nam in 1965, but the people paid little attention to those reports and the government was free to use its own judgment, which was not brilliant.

What influence the press has on the conduct of foreign policy often comes indirectly, not through the mass of the people, but mainly through the Congress of the United States. The relations between well-informed reporters in Washington and influential Senators and Congressmen are quite different from the relations between reporters and officials of the Executive Branch of the government. Officials in the White House, the State Depart-

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ment and the Defense Department, though polite and often friendly, almost always regard the reporter with suspicion.

Congressmen are different. Unlike officials of the Executive, they live most of the time in the open. They think the good opinion of the press is important to their reëlection, which interests them, so they see us and some of them even read us. Also, they are always making speeches and, like reporters, looking for mistakes to correct or criticize, especially if they are in the opposition. So the reporter and the Congressman are often natural allies. They exchange information in a discreet way, and sometimes in ways that are not so discreet. When the Administration comes to the Congressmen for its money, it has to answer their questions and justify its programs and in the process it discloses a lot of information which interests the press a great deal. Also reporters gather a great deal of information in foreign embassies from some of the finest diplomats in the world, and when this appears in the press, Congressmen often want to question Cabinet members about it, and can do so much more easily than the reporters who published it in the first place.

This relationship between reporters and diplomats is not only widely misunderstood but under-rated. Even well-informed and sophisticated Americans are often irritated by the toplofty pronouncements of American commentators, who seem to pass judgment on the Buddhists and Catholics in Viet Nam one day, explain the mysteries of Southern Rhodesia, the Congo and South Africa the next, psychoanalyze Senator Fulbright and Secretary of State Rusk on the third, and so on triumphantly through the week, without ever a doubt or a day of rest. It seems an impossibility and a presumption for any one man to know so much about so many things, but that is not the way it is.

Most of us are merely reporters of other men's ideas. Diplomats and reporters have one job in common: they have to report what is going on, the first to his government, the second to his paper or station. All the influential people in Washington may be furious about France but they will be polite to the French Ambassador. They will tell a thoughtful reporter what they really think about President de Gaulle's policy but they will probably pull their punches with Charles Lucet. Knowing this, the French Ambassador will often talk to a well-informed reporter. He will exchange information, but on one condition, namely that the source of the information is not disclosed.

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Therefore, if the reporter is passing on information gathered by the French in Saigon or by the Canadian member of the International Control Commission on Viet Nam, he cannot disclose where he got the information. He must pretend that somehow, in his infinite knowledge and wisdom, this is the way things are, for he is obliged to indulge in "compulsory plagiarism."

In the process a great deal of useful information and political analysis is gathered. The diplomats are the unpaid stringers for the reporters, the reporters the unpaid tipsters for the diplomats. Ideas that professional diplomats might hesitate to mention to the Secretary of State, and information and analysis which the reporter probably would not have gathered in any other way, thus get into the newspapers, hopefully without propaganda, and may sometimes even be read by the President—which may have been what the diplomat had in mind in the first place.

In such ways, reporters and commentators do no doubt have influence. They keep the debate on foreign affairs going. We can irritate the President, divert him from his tasks, stir up his enemies, excite the public and force him to calm things down, and sometimes even make a persuasive point which he may modify a policy to meet. But his power is at the center of action and we are at the edge, and my conclusion from this is fairly plain. We may be a nuisance but we are not a menace. And the way power is running to the President, it would be unwise, I think, to concentrate too much on weakening whatever influence we have left.

V

In the State Department, which is not unduly frivolous, the Foreign Service officers have a fable. The grasshopper, worried about getting through the winter, sought advice from the cockroach, who seemed to thrive on cold weather. The cockroach was sympathetic. On the night of the first frost, he said, find a warm spot back of a radiator in a bakery, turn yourself into a cockroach, and stay there happily until spring. "But how," asked the grasshopper, "do I make myself into a cockroach?" "Look," said the cockroach, "I'm merely giving you policy guidance."

Most critics of the press and government give much the same kind of policy guidance: change and be saved, they say. Transform yourselves into something quite different from what you are. Stop giving the customers just anything they want—any

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amusement, any violence, anything that sells beer or cosmetics—and give them instead information they need to know to be good citizens in a democracy. You were not protected by the First Amendment in order to be a cheerleader for the status quo or your own social or economic class but to serve the general interest.

We will only fool ourselves if we think we are going to compete effectively for the mass mind against the voice of the hawker, or bring about vast changes in the present ways of making, reporting and listening to the news, but some things might be done in some important places to reach and enlarge what Carlyle called the vital "remnant" of thoughtful citizens.

Newspapers are no longer the first messengers of the spot news, and television has deprived the newspaper of the great "picture" story. As a result, the modern newspaper is searching for a new role, or should be, and that role lies in the field of thoughtful explanation, which tends to make it more of an ally of the official than a competitor. We are no longer in the transmitting business, but in the education business. In fact, the mass communications of this country probably have more effect on the American mind than all the schools and universities combined, and the problem is that neither the officials who run the government, nor the officials who run the newspapers, nor the radio and television news programs, have adjusted to that fact.

We are in trouble on the news side for a very simple reason: we have not kept our definition of news up to date. We are pretty good at reporting "happenings," particularly if they are dramatic; we are fascinated by events but not by the things that cause the events. We will send 500 correspondents to Viet Nam after the war breaks out, and fill the front pages with their reports, meanwhile ignoring the rest of the world, but we will not send five reporters there when the danger of war is developing, and even if we do, their reports of the danger will be minimized, by editors and officials alike, as "speculation" and hidden back among the brassiere ads, if they are not hung on the spike.

I believe we in the news business are going to have to twist ourselves around and see these wider perspectives of the news, the causes as well as the effects, what is going to happen in addition to what governments do. It is not governments that are transforming the world today, but the fertility of people, the creativity of scientists, the techniques of engineers and econ-

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omists and the discoveries of physicians. Almost all governments in the world today are merely rushing around trying to keep up with the consequences of what is happening outside their own official offices.What the Roman Catholic Church does about birth control, for example, is probably going to be bigger news than what the Indian government does about it. The movement toward the unification of Europe did not start with governments but with private citizens like Jean Monnet. And it is being carried on by European businessmen—who like the larger markets and the fluidity of labor across national frontiers—rather than by governments.

Ideas are news, and we are not covering the news of the mind as we should. This is where rebellion, revolution and war start, but we minimize the conflict of ideas and emphasize the conflict in the streets, without relating the second to the first. If the Secretary of Defense says, for the thousandth time, that the United States has enough hydrogen bombs on airplanes and submarines to wipe out both China and the Soviet Union, even after they have destroyed every major city in the United States, he is assured a big boxcar headline on the front page of every big city newspaper in America and a prominent place on the Cronkite and Huntley-Brinkley shows. But if some thoughtful professor makes a speech demonstrating that the destruction of the human race can be avoided, he may easily be ignored even in his home town.

What few practical suggestions can we make that may have some chance of acceptance in a few places? First, we are not likely to get more serious correspondence in the daily newspaper until we stop making analytical articles compete for space with spot news. There is always more spot news, much of it trivial rubbish, than any paper can print. It should not be impossible, however, to get the publishers of the big city newspapers to set aside a few columns of space every day for articles on the big issues. They do not make the recipes or the comics compete for space with spot news. They print them daily "for another reason," for a certain group of their readers, and the same thing could be done for their most thoughtful subscribers.

Second, the networks could do much more than they are now doing if they would put aside an hour each weekend to review the important news of the week and put it into some historical perspective. Congressional hearings which aim not to legislate

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but to educate have immense possibilities. Let the responsible committees of Congress explore the problems of population, of the Atlantic Alliance, of the balance of payments, of education and poverty—say one great issue every month or so—and let the networks carry the principal parts of the testimony for an hour at the weekend.

Third, much more could be done in the field of adult education on foreign affairs if the right kind of case studies were prepared and made available to study groups in the churches, service clubs and other non-government organizations. Some of this goes on, but the method of study is vital to its success. The problem, I believe, is to present the great issues as a series of practical choices: to let the people look at the alternatives as the President has to look at them and try at the end to decide between the hard and dangerous courses. We need simple case-study outlines containing first a statement of the facts; second, a definition of one course of action, followed by arguments for and arguments against; and so on through definition of a second course, and a third and a fourth. The difficulty with the presentation of foreign-policy news to the people today is that it comes out a jumble of important and trivial things and personalities, so that the people cannot quite get the questions for decision clear, and end up either by giving up, or choosing up sides for or against the President. Even the Sunday newspapers might find room in their endless pages and sections for a syndicated case study of the issue of the month, but if not there, the foundations might take the project on.

Fourth, if I may engage in a little heresy, it may be that news and analysis of news in a democracy are too serious to be left to newspapermen. The United States has been involved in the world now for two generations. We have developed in the process a very large company of men and women in the universities, the foundations, international business, communications and the government, who are well-informed on world affairs—some of them better informed on many subjects than any other people in the world. Unfortunately, they are not sharing with their fellow-countrymen a great deal of what they know.

The great opportunity of the daily newspaper is that it reaches people when they are paying attention. Galbraith can write a learned, amusing and provocative book about his diplomatic mission in India, which would probably come out when every-

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body's mind was on the Congo or the sad decline of the New York Yankees, and if he was lucky, 50,000 people would read it, but if he took a day in the middle of the Indian-Pakistani war to analyze the conflict for the newspapers he could have an attentive audience of easily 20,000,000.

We need more open pages, preferably next to the editorial pages, where the best minds of the world could give their analysis of current developments; where the vivid passages out of the best speeches and periodical articles and editorials of the world could appear; where we could find the philosophers worrying not about the particular bill of the day but the issue of the decade. These could, if edited by thoughtful minds, be among the liveliest pages in the daily newspaper and bring some sense of balance and history to contemporary events. The "Letters to the Editor" columns of most newspapers—this is not true of New York—have been dominated by publicists and crackpots for years. We should be able to do better than that and make them into an exciting forum for the exchange of ideas and even for criticism of the papers themselves.

These modest suggestions for broadening and deepening the flow of serious news in America are not really beyond the capacity of the big papers and stations, and they are not, in my view, against their long-range commercial interest. Also, if we let our reporters use their minds as well as their legs on serious inquiries and then print their findings, we will undoubtedly attract and keep more sensitive and perceptive men and women. At the same time, we should attract more and more of the intelligent young readers who are pouring out of our universities in an ever larger stream and expecting from their newspapers a much more detailed and sophisticated account of world affairs.

On the official side, too, some improvements are desirable and even possible. The attitude of the President toward the reporters is vital. If he regards them primarily as a problem and therefore tries to manipulate them, they eventually convey their suspicion and even hostility to the people. If, on the other hand, he regards them as an opportunity and tries to explain his problems to them, they can be a valuable educational force. It is the President, however, who has the initiative and the capacity to define the rules and set the tone of public discussion. A revival of the calm philosophic talk or the quiet "conversation," as typified by Roosevelt's fireside chat, could help keep the public mind on

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the larger questions and minimize the capacity of others to divert attention onto narrow personal issues.

There has been a decline, too, in recent years in the relations between the experts in the State Department and the reporters. The reason for this is that the experts know the President likes to dominate public announcements and are afraid that they might disclose something that would detonate his temper. And since the most useful information comes, not from the top leaders, but from the men who brief the leaders, this chokes down a very valuable stream of information.

No government in history ever received such a torrent of information from abroad as the United States Government does at present. Washington is inundated every day with reports on every imaginable problem. A good deal of this information is interesting and unclassified and could help nourish the flow of knowledge into the newspapers and periodicals of the nation, but it is not made available mainly because nobody thinks of making it available or because the idea has grown up that all this "belongs" to the government.

It should be possible for officials and reporters to do much better than they have done in discussing these problems and opportunities together. There is a great deal of chatter about it with the White House Press Secretary on the presidential press plane flying between Washington and Texas, but all suggestions for more formal committees to analyze and correct obvious shortcomings, or alternatively for the press to establish some way of correcting itself, have usually ended in useless vapor.

"If there is ever to be an amelioration of the condition of mankind," John Adams wrote in 1815, "philosophers, theologians, legislators, politicians and moralists will find that the regulation of the press is the most difficult, dangerous and important problem they have to resolve. Mankind cannot now be governed without it, nor at present with it."

I am more hopeful. There is some reason to believe that the old conflict will diminish in time. Powerful forces are working for coexistence. In his own interest, the reporter is having to become an educator, and the more he concentrates upon explaining the news instead of being first with the news, the more the official will want to coöperate with him.

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THE PEOPLE'S MIDDLE KINGDOM

By John K. Fairbank

"COMMUNIST China"—how far Communist? How far Chinese? And what is the difference anyway? How are we to evaluate the impact that decades of war and violence and revolutionary zeal have had upon the China of today? Do Peking's leaders use the terminology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism but express sentiments inherited from the Middle Kingdom? Are they unconsciously in the grip of their past, even when most explicitly condemning it? Certainly there is a resonance between China today and earlier periods. But how great is the actual continuity?

American expectations of Chinese behavior have groped along two lines—the approach by way of Moscow, the Soviet example, and the approach by way of history, Chinese tradition. The two overlap considerably, but both are faulted by discontinuity. China today is not just another Russia. It is very different indeed. Nor is the People's Republic just another imperial dynasty. Times have changed.

History can only help to synthesize these two approaches and suggest the degree of overlap. Chinese traditions, the Soviet example and the accidental conjunctions of events can all be given meaning in a chronological perspective. But history is invoked by all parties—by our Marxist adversaries, so addicted to their "world history," and by our own policy-makers, particularly when we have to be aggressive. Even the stoutest pragmatists can hardly leave it alone. Yet it is an art, not a science, a game any number can play except historians, who feel too ignorant to play with self-confidence.

The first difficulty for all China-pundits is the very high level of generality at which the game is played. Surely "Chinese history" offers "lessons" as diverse as the experience of a quarter of mankind during 3,000 years. But we are all entangled in the old Chinese custom of viewing the Chinese realm, *t'ien-hsia* or "all under Heaven," as a unit of discourse. We still characterize dynastic periods—Han, T'ang, Sung, Ming, Ch'ing, etc.—as homogeneous slices of experience even when each lasted two or three hundred years. It is like a tenth-grade course on "Europe since the Fall of Rome." At such a level of generality, platitude

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is unavoidable. Statesmen who need an analytic scalpel are handed a sledgehammer.

Our second problem is the subjective factor. Appraising the impact of Communism on China is like studying the life of a man who got religion. He lives in the same house, with many of the same habits, and looks much the same. His conversion is greater subjectively, as judged by what he says, than objectively, as visible in his conduct. Yet his life has presumably taken a sharp turn and will never be the same again.

The degree of change in recent decades in China cannot be measured quantitatively but only by drawing a qualitative picture of a traditional model. This may then be compared with a similarly abstract contemporary model. Changes of "content" will by definition be greater than changes of "pattern."

II

China as seen in the middle of the nineteenth century was most remarkable for its great cultural self-consciousness, a sense of its own history and superiority. This ethos or self-image was held and perpetuated by the ruling class, best described as literati. The ruling stratum included nearly all people of substance and status, preëminently the holders of degrees gained through the official examinations or, in about one-third of the cases, through purchase. From these degree-holders or "gentry" were selected the actual officials, who totalled some twenty to forty thousand, depending on how one counts, in any case a remarkably small number considering that they governed a country of three or four hundred million people. The literate ruling class included on its lower level a large penumbra of landlords and merchants, since men of wealth could buy degree status by their contributions to government. At its top level, it included the aristocracy created by the dynasty and the dynasty itself with the emperor at its apex.

Mobility into and out of this ruling stratum gave it strength and durability. The government's philosophy was to preserve itself by recruiting the able. The ruler's chief task was to find men of talent. Unusual talent could rise.

This old Chinese government was hard for Westerners to understand because it really operated at two levels, one official and the other informal. On the official level the emperor and his bureaucracy kept a monopoly of all the symbols of authority,

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and sat on top of all large-scale activities. The government not only dominated education through the examination system; it had long since broken up the Buddhist church and kept Taoism and Buddhism decentralized in isolated units across the countryside. The secular faith of Confucianism was expounded under official auspices in the Confucian temples. The officials kept all large merchant enterprises under their control by the simple device of squeezing the merchants, and absorbing them into the official class when they got big enough. All large-scale public works were, of course, governmental. The emperor patronized the arts and had the greatest collections of both art and literature. He censored literature with a heavy hand to suppress anti-Manchu works. The emperor as a high priest conducted sacrifices to the forces of nature at the temples of heaven and of agriculture at Peking. He was also the high exemplar of the religion of filial piety so stressed in the Confucian classics. His prerogatives covered everything and made him potentially the strongest monarch who had ever lived.

Yet this formal government by its small size was necessarily very superficial. It sat on top of the society without a rival, but it did not penetrate the villages. They were the scene of an informal or unofficial kind of government, headed by the gentry degree-holders in each locality. This local élite coöperated with the few local magistrates to maintain the social order. They were examination-oriented, always eager to encourage talent that might rise to power. Meantime, they stood for stability and felt an obligation to keep city walls, moats, bridges, roads and temples in repair, to encourage private schooling within the family clan, and even in time of need to organize public relief and raise militia to maintain order.

This local-gentry tradition has only begun to be studied. It included a good deal of local initiative and clan spirit, if not indeed public spirit. Gentry scholars compiled thousands of local histories or gazetteers and family genealogies. They had a secular faith in the Confucian social order. They denounced all improper conduct, heterodoxy and the subversiveness of missionaries with their doctrines of egalitarianism. Gentry and officialdom were at one in supporting the "three bonds" that held Chinese society together—the subordination of children to parents, of wives to husbands, and of subjects to rulers. They did not believe in individualism or equality as abstract principles, but stressed the

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duties of all good men functioning in their proper niches in the social hierarchy.

The main object of government at both the official and unofficial levels was to perpetuate itself and the social order by living off the peasants and, at the same time, maintaining their welfare. The peasantry being illiterate were politically passive, since political action in this bureaucratic society was through the written word if at all. The peasant village happily never saw an official and dealt with his taxgatherers only periodically. Though illiterate, the villagers of course had a rich culture of folklore and custom, religious faith and superstition, and complex interpersonal relations within and between families. Our picture of this folk society is still seen largely through Confucian glasses. It was, of course, pre-modern and cut off from the outside world. The peasant economy used a highly developed manpower technology that had accumulated over millennia. In good crop years life went on with much stability and many satisfactions; the Confucian ideals of social order had thoroughly permeated the society. Even bandits could follow the norms long since mirrored in some of the vernacular novels. Secret societies had their own ancient traditions. Both Buddhism and Taoism had a message for the old wives, and everyone knew that talent, assiduity, frugality and loyalty to family and friends could help one get along.

This traditional society was mature within the limits of its pre-modern technology and so had a high degree of homeostasis or capacity to maintain a steady equilibrium. It was therefore ill-suited to modernization. The Jesuits pictured it to the European Enlightenment as an example of social harmony guided by ethics. But the law, for example, as Western merchants discovered at Canton, was administered purely as a tool of state and society, not to protect individual rights. It penalized a multitude of infractions of the social order, but obliged the magistrate to add in extra-legal considerations in each case. The letter of the law was obscure or contradictory, and held in low esteem in comparison with ethical principles. Going to law was also bad news for all concerned because of official exactions. Litigation was thus a *pis aller,* and the law was no help to economic growth.

Much more could be said about our traditional model. Sinologues East and West, ever since Ennin visited T'ang China from Japan in 838–847 and Marco Polo served there under the Mongols in 1275–1292, have never ceased trying to describe the curi-

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ously different Chinese way, a topic as enduring in Western culture as utopianism and the limits of state authority. One's main impression in retrospect today, I think, is of the strong Chinese feeling for "the social order," not "individualism," as the basis of welfare and the good life.

III

Down through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, China's evolution continued along established lines. The Ch'ing dynasty rounded out its frontiers across Inner Asia by subjugating the Western Mongols, Sinkiang and Tibet. The Manchu rulers at Peking further perfected their control over domestic administration with all its checks and balances. China was at peace within, and the population apparently grew by leaps and bounds. Meanwhile, the Europeans moved into the successive phases of their modern revolution, both in science and technology and in national political development. The commercial and industrial revolutions began to overrun the earth. China, at the end of the line, was soon beleaguered.

By the late nineteenth century, the inadequacies of the traditional Chinese model were very plain to see. There was no ideal of progress, no sanction for economic gain and growth, no independence for the merchant or legal protection of his enterprise against official exactions. China was not able to transplant modern industry as Japan was doing, and consequently could not build adequate military power. Her great society fell behind. Westerners became entrenched in the centers of foreign trade, the treaty ports, and continued to dominate the processes of modernization.

Most obviously, this was a political problem. The Ch'ing dynasty failed to assert its central control over the economic and social processes that modernization encouraged. Partly it lacked the resources and skills, partly the idea, which the Japanese leaders had got from abroad. In the last analysis the Ch'ing leadership lacked the desire to remake China's traditional society on a foreign model. This was an innate disability, due to China's long history of superiority in her East Asian world. Sitting at the feet of the barbarians was more than Chinese pride could take.

At the same time, however, China's political weakness in the late nineteenth century was an accident of history, due to the declining vigor of the dynasty and the rise of rebellions borne on

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the back of population pressure. The Taipings and other rebels of the 1850s and '60s almost finished off the Peking régime. It made its peace with the foreigners in order to survive and conquer the rebels. Thereafter it had to accept the foreigners as partners in modernization. But unlike the Japanese, the Ch'ing leadership never really accepted the idea of mastering the foreign-invented processes of modernization and so controlling China's fate, as the Communists are now attempting to do. Instead, unable like Japan to modernize the state and abolish foreign privilege, China fell victim to foreign exploitation in the eventual age of imperialism at the turn of the century.

Traditional China collapsed over a long period with many bangs and whimpers. The emperor's supremacy over all men was tarnished by the post-Opium War treaties of the 1840s and denied by the second settlement of 1858–60. Yet tribute missions continued to come to Peking until 1908. The transition was gradual. China did not send ministers abroad until the 1870s, and then only grudgingly. She entered the family of nations only part way. Thus her imperial claims to supremacy in East Asia were maintained side by side with the unequal treaties that put China in a semi-colonial position vis-à-vis the West. This mixed order lasted 50 years.

The imperial institution, keystone of the old social order, finally came under attack from Chinese nationalism. Since the Manchus' incapacity to meet the modern challenge had led to China's humiliation, the revolutionaries of the 1900s, by a non-sequitur, denounced the monarchy as the source of China's weakness. In 1911–12 they threw out bath, bathtub, baby and all. Abolishing the monarchy had the effect of decapitating the society and created a serious vacuum of leadership.

Meanwhile the teachings of Confucius had equally suffered attrition. New learning from the West undermined the old faith. Missionaries gained few converts but their preachings of egalitarianism, individualism, science and democracy were lent credence by the superior firepower of foreign gunboats. By the time the peripheral states that had normally been tributary to the Chinese court had become Western colonies, it was plain that the old order was doomed. In 1905 the examinations were abolished in favor of a school system that, however, developed only slowly. As the gentry class disintegrated, new classes began to arise. Meanwhile the economy had been oriented more toward foreign

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trade through the new treaty ports, urbanization had grown with new factories and communications, and learning from abroad, especially from Japan, had become the accepted panacea. By the end of World War I, China had lost not only her secular faith of Confucianism, but also the formal government headed by the emperor with his broad prerogatives, and even the informal leadership of the local-gentry élite. The swollen numbers of the peasantry were living precariously. Talent had some new outlets but few established channels. Warlords in regional bases were wrecking the processes of government. Foreign influences were everywhere and the great tradition was in the melting pot.

IV

The humiliating weakness and confusion of the warlord era gave the Westerners of the last generation a stereotype of China as "a heap of loose sand" or "a mere geographical expression." It also impelled patriotic youth to support a revival of central power. A new nationalism swept China in the 1920s. The over-riding consideration was how to achieve national self-respect. Western influences were providing a stimulus for individualism, for the emancipation of women to control their own marriages and become educated, for the study of science and adoption of technology to achieve "progress." There was a recognition of Western superiority in many ways. All sorts of ideas flooded in and were taken up. But the over-riding and deep-down concern was for the national glory. One could not be Chinese without having a dedicated conviction of the innate worth and superiority of Chinese culture. A strong state to provide a home for it was the first essential.

This new nationalism converged with or overlapped the traditional urge to reunify the state after the collapse of a dynasty. The 40 years from the end of the Ch'ing in 1912 to the Communist takeover of 1949 is about the standard length of a dynastic interregnum in earlier instances. There had been comparable periods of disorder at the end of the T'ang, the Sung and the (Mongol) Yuan dynasties. The consolidation of Ch'ing power took 40 years from the seizure of Peking in 1644 to the last suppression of rebels in 1683. In every such period, there eventually arose a universal demand for a return to peace and order under central authority. By the end of World War II in China, this had become a widespread longing.

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The rebuilding of central power was, of course, not merely a Communist achievement but began with the Kuomintang. Sun Yat-sen based his revolution on the foreign edge of China, using the funds of overseas Chinese merchants in Malaya and Hawaii, recruiting the patriotism and eloquence of students abroad in Japan and Europe, mounting his ten putsches from around the edge of China with arms smuggled in to secret societies allied with him. Yet he found that the democratic West could give him all the equipment and methods of modernization except the essential one of organizing power in post-dynastic China. He found constitutions of little use, warlord armies unreliable no matter how good their weapons, and parliamentary parties as friable as the politicians who joined them, without constituencies and without loyalty to any common authority. By 1919 Sun was convinced that his revolution, if it was to make any comeback at all, must be led by a reorganized party. He found a model for this in Leninism, and Soviet delegates helped him organize the Kuomintang in the early 1920s at the same time that they helped the Chinese Communist Party come into being in 1921.

The competition between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in the 1920s, which has almost monopolized the attention of historians, was never as close a race as some have liked to think. There was no real competition at first between Sun Yat-sen's many thousands of middle-aged revolutionaries and the few dozens or hundreds of young Communist students. By 1927 the Nationalist reunification had succeeded up to a point and the social revolution of the Communists was deferred. Apparently China was ready for the former but not for the latter. The new student class and the merchants in the cities were most aware of the foreign "imperialist" presence and most moved by the new nationalism, whereas the crisis in peasant life and the breakup of the old family system in the villages were not yet in the forefront of concern.

The first move in rebuilding a central government was the establishment of a party dictatorship and a party army to support it. This was achieved under the national government at Canton in the early 1920s, in Sun Yat-sen's last years. Many of the Cantonese and other leaders in his group accepted Lenin's theory of imperialism and were united by anti-foreignism but abjured the class struggle within the nation. Out of Canton, as head of the Northern Expedition to unify China, came Chiang

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Kai-shek. It is now evident that his rise was due not merely to a talent for political-military manipulation, but also to his devotion to the primary cause of the day, national reunification. For this he saw the indoctrinated party army as the essential tool, acting on behalf of the Kuomintang dictatorship. China's nominal reunification under the Nanking government in 1928 thus marked the first great institutional step of substituting party dictatorship for dynastic rule.

This transition, with all its modern potentialities, now permitted the state for the first time to penetrate the villages. Twentieth-century China had inherited a polity that was highly authoritarian but superficial. Modern totalitarianism has been achieved by expanding the old authoritarianism down into the body social—politicizing, activating and manipulating a populace that was formerly inert in politics and parochial in its interests. Among so vast a public, this has been a slow process. In addition to the practical concerns of livelihood that induce modernization, it has been motivated by national pride. One result of mass participation has been a dilution of quality and lowering of standards in the first instance. If we compare the upbuilding of China's new order with the old structure sketched above, we will be struck by the simultaneous revival of old patterns and creation of new content to fit into them.

V

The transition from dynastic to party rule, at least in theory, had taken only 16 years, from 1912 to 1928. It shows considerable continuity in the midst of discontinuity. Dynasties and parties have in common, first, a definable and ongoing group of power holders, whether it is a harem-produced swarm of princes or a central committee thrown up by the intra-party political struggle. Secondly, this ongoing group selects, not without much interplay of pressures, the top executive and assists him in running the government. The top man, Chinese-style, has to be both a sage and a hero, enunciating the ideology, making the final decisions and ruling in person, not just reigning. He must be a model of propriety and the patron of art and letters, even a poet, as well as the arbiter of disputes and maintainer of morale. His ideological pronouncements are important because his rule is still very personal, by moral teaching more than by legal process. Personal loyalty still plays a role.

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Finally, the structure of government is still similar. The military are quite separate from the civil administration but both are headed by the One Man. Meanwhile there is a third, separate echelon of supervisory personnel. In the old days it included palace eunuchs as well as dynastic family members and the whole establishment of the Censorate, both at the capital and in the provinces. Both Chiang and Mao have sat on the ancient tripod of civil bureaucracy, army and supervisory agencies, which now include secret police and informers as well as the party apparatus.

Discontinuity, of course, is most evident in the substitution of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism for imperial Confucianism, of a dialectic doctrine of struggle instead of harmony. Yet we should not overlook the pattern of orthodoxy so evident in both cases: the faith in a true teaching revealed in classical works, the role of the One Man or Leader as their expositor, the recruitment of talent as tested by the orthodox teaching, and the constant indoctrination of the entire government apparatus as a means of giving it unity and keeping it under control. Talent is still recruited and examined, a bureaucratic career still requires qualities of loyalty, obedience and finesse in personal relations, and heterodoxy is still condemned and attacked.

One principal change comes from the expansion of politics. Every village now participates in the political life that was formerly reserved for the ruling class. Peasant passivity has given way to activism by all citizens. Where a dynasty used to claim it ruled the Middle Kingdom with the Mandate of Heaven, now the "people" are said to make their own destiny through their chosen (?) instrument, the Chinese Communist Party. One of Mao's departures from Marxism-Leninism is to assert that the Party leads China's regeneration not only on behalf of the proletariat but also on behalf of a coalition of major classes—in effect, the whole people.

Without attempting further to describe it, one can only conclude from the outside that the content of the new orthodoxy is a far cry indeed from the comparatively static doctrines of Confucian self-discipline within an immutable social order inherited from the golden age of antique sages. Having supplanted the forces of nature or "Heaven," the "people" are now viewed as the vital makers of history, brimming with creative capacities. The Maoist leadership with its insight can liberate these long latent

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"productive forces." The new China is science-minded, "people"-minded, dynamic and convinced of its own creativity.

Yet this new order still subordinates the individual. Chinese youth escaped the family only to come under the small group, the production team, the party and the nation. From the first Mao has warred against individualism as the germ of bourgeois thinking. Civil liberties piously listed in state documents are reserved for the "people," not for those viewed by authority as "enemies of the people." An accused has few judicial rights—how can his petty interest outweigh that of all the rest of the Chinese people? Law still lacks any sanctity or even a codified and publicized content and reliable procedure. People's courts and procurators steer by political considerations as well as by Mao's normative pronouncements and administrative regulations. The authoritarianism of the traditional state left little sanction for individualism, and the Communists do not propose to supply any now.

Just here, however, history perhaps has a message for us. The old China, in daily life below the official level, was humane in many senses of the term. The ideal "superior man" (*chün-tzu*), whose learned and proper conduct entitled him to public prestige and leadership, was not merely a servant of state authority. When not in office he pursued self-cultivation (*hsiu-shen*), calligraphy and poetry, even philosophic meditation. The old Chinese compulsion to train oneself in literacy and other accomplishments was not purely repressive self-discipline but created one's capacity for friendship and personal enjoyment. Confucian humanism had a long tradition, albeit within a collectivist social order, and peasants who today join in politics, as only the "superior man" used to do, may sometimes also aspire on a mass scale to the self-cultivation that was once the hallmark of the gentry élite. The historical adage that revolutions after their excesses swing back toward past norms has received some support from Soviet revisionism, and Peking's fulminations against it make it seem a bit more probable for China in due time.

Continuity is thus a matter of degree. So much remains of the old landscape and its many problems: the Yellow River still flows 500 miles across the North China Plain, silting its bed above the level of the fields. There are still the precarious rainfall in the Northwest and the danger of drought and famine, the weaknesses of a capital-poor and labor-intensive farm economy, the need to

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keep up morale and "nourish honesty" (*yang-lien*) as of old among so far-flung a bureaucracy. Chairman Mao's vision of betterment must still be achieved inside a society that has a deeply ingrained inheritance, more profoundly imbedded than either we or even Chairman Mao, from our opposite sides, may realize. It is represented, for instance, in the Chinese ideographic writing system, which it seems cannot be changed into a more flexible alphabetic or other purely phonetic system.

Even the most iconoclastic new leaders, facing these problems, will be tempted to revive traditional ways of meeting them, like the well-worn device of mutual responsibility that sets neighbor spying on neighbor within a street committee. Whatever the leaders may hope, the people by their responses, less creative than the leadership, may revive old ways under new names. Certain continuities like pride of culture may well up in a resurgent nationalism that no man can control. It is in this context that we must view Peking's recent series of remarkable disasters in foreign relations.

It is a truism that the Long March generation now in power have been spiritually in combat all their lives and are psychologically struggle-prone. By 1949 their heaven-storming militancy had picked the United States, the biggest thing in sight, as their implacable foe. By 1960 they had added the Soviet Union. This imprudent and irrational course has been justified by Mao and explained by outside observers partly on ideological grounds. Mao's doctrinaire extremism has not only challenged the Chinese people to superhuman efforts, it also keeps the Leninist faith intact.

But the vehemence of Peking's denunciations of the two outside worlds that now encircle the embattled People's Middle Kingdom (*Jen-min Chung-kuo*) seems more than "ideological" in the usual sense of the term. Such impassioned scorn, such assertive righteousness, also echo the dynastic founders of ages past.

Founding a dynasty required a man larger than life, and several great dynasties were put together by individuals with some touch of paranoia. The unifiers of the Ch'in in 221 B. C. and the Sui in 589 A. D. pulled the empire together in fevered bursts of energy. The founder of the Ming who threw out the Mongols in 1368 also had illusions of grandeur, cut off heads, liked to have errant ministers ceremoniously beaten in court, built vast walls and palaces, and got all East Asia to send him tribute missions.

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This fanaticism was in the minority tradition of emperors who conquer by the sword and organize manpower to build great public works—a Great Wall, a Grand Canal—rather than in the majority tradition of those who consolidate and rule through the bureaucracy. Dynastic founders were often great blueprint artists who reorganized Chinese society according to dogmatic plans and visionary doctrines. They were usually followed by consolidators who tidied up the régime and eventually let the people relax.

Mao's hostile extremism today toward an outside world that he only vaguely discerns must be seen as a function or offshoot of his extremism within his own country. Remaking China, remolding all of its people, building a modern state power, are an all-absorbing task. No one else in world history has ever tackled such a big job, for no other country has ever been so big and so materially backward. Mao's considerable achievement—everyone fed, everyone marching—is a triumph not of cool calculation but of vision and will, as he is not the last to proclaim. In this violent process of constant and induced "struggle," ideology is a factor in its own right but also a tool of that more protean collective impulse we inadequately call "nationalism." We could equally well call it sinocentrism in modern dress.

Xenophobic contempt for foreign cultures became a standard part of China's long-conditioned response to the power of the Inner Asian barbarians. Until 1860, barely a century ago, China's leaders had suffered many times under foreign rule but had never met an equal, much less a superior, foreign culture. The old political myth of China's superiority was based on solid cultural realities even when inspired also by a need to rationalize military weakness. Today, to expect Chinese patriots to acknowledge a double weakness, both cultural and material, in both basic principles and practical devices, the *t'i* and the *yung* discussed by early reformers, is asking too much. They will sooner claim they have what China needs and condemn the outside world as evil, fit only for salvation through Maoist-type subversion.

In short, Peking's intractable mood comes out of China's history, not just from Lenin's book.

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OUR ALTERNATIVES IN EUROPE

By Herman Kahn and William Pfaff

NATO's "disarray" has been made into a crisis by President de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French forces and facilities from the integrated structure of the Alliance. For the other NATO powers, and for the United States, this has provided a shock, but—in some ways—a salutary one. The fundamental issues of Europe's future, of Soviet-Western relations and of American policy are now more likely to be addressed. Before the French action these issues would likely have been evaded. Now there still is time to think relatively slowly and carefully about the objectives of the European-American alliance and of the United States itself in Europe's affairs.

But some of the possible responses to the immediate Gaullist challenge could foreclose certain options in dealing with these larger issues. Decisions may be made now in haste, with consequences that might not be easily disentangled later. In responding to France's NATO action, it is most important to keep open our long-range policy options, to practice moderation in the face of what appears to be provocation and to use the time thus gained to reappraise our needs and interests in the Europe of the 1970s.[1]

What would be the likely result of a harsh response to France? One pessimistic but reasonable supposition—not a prediction but a cautionary illustration of certain issues that must be considered—might be as follows:

With American urging, the NATO powers adamantly resist changes in the Alliance. France then circulates proposals for an all-European political settlement with the Soviet Union—including a plan for German unification or neutralization—which are held to be acceptable in Moscow. These proposals are said to signify the "end" of the cold war and a normalization of political relations among all the nations of Europe—a normalization chiefly resisted, French and Soviet spokesmen note, by the United States, which indeed presses West Germany to reject these overtures, to require the removal of all French forces from Germany

[1] This paper grew out of a program of studies to which Frank Armbruster, Max Singer, Edmund Stillman and Anthony J. Wiener, all of the Hudson Institute, made important contributions.

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and take economic reprisals against France. The French, in turn, grant de facto recognition to the East German authorities as the provisional government of East Germany, subject to the negotiation of a German peace treaty and political settlement. This antagonizes many West Germans not merely against the French but against the United States, since they argue that West Germany was compelled to act against France as the agent of American anger or frustration, and yet must pay the principal costs in a weakening of its diplomatic position, the effective demise of the Hallstein Doctrine and severely strained relations with its most important neighbor, France. They argue further that by asking Germany to "choose" between France and America in the period between 1962 and 1966, the United States has in fact played as large a role as President de Gaulle in wrecking the Western European Union and its basis in Franco-German reconciliation, a development which many had regarded as an achievement of permanent significance in European history.

The United States—following this hypothetical but by no means fanciful projection—simultaneously recommends to the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Great Britain new logistic and other military programs that can alleviate to some degree the difficulties the French have created for NATO. But all of these countries continue to discount the Soviet military threat to Western Europe, particularly so long as there are American military "hostages" stationed in West Germany. Many in these countries believe that it makes little difference whether these American troops make up an effective military force; their mere presence in Germany effectively deters the Soviet Union from any hostile actions or serious pressures—thus "solving" the European defense problem. They conclude that Western Europe's essential interest is served by keeping those American hostages in West Germany, and that any more elaborate European military measures within the NATO framework—particularly any that might tend to "extend" NATO or enlarge its political content—are not only unnecessary but contraproductive, tending to exacerbate troubles with the French.

As a result, relations within NATO deteriorate further, and as American pressures and European domestic controversies mount, several of the European members tacitly or openly opt out of the Alliance. This leaves NATO as, effectively, an alliance of the United States with West Germany, Britain and Canada. And as

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Great Britain subsequently makes further reductions in the British Army of the Rhine, the defense of Europe becomes almost entirely a matter of U.S.-West German coöperation. While there are attempts to disguise the German-American alliance in a NATO framework, the façade thus provided is unconvincing. Over a period of time a feeling against this abridged NATO gains strength within Europe (as well as elsewhere in the world), representing a convergence of European autonomist, nationalist and neutralist sentiments with the political left, as well as anti-German, anti-American and "anti-nuclear" attitudes.

One outcome could simply be the final break-up of NATO, with Western Europe, less Germany, taking up essentially the Gaullist position. Another outcome could be independent European settlements or agreements with Russia—in effect, a limited, if tacit, Russo-European alliance against West Germany and the United States. At the very least, the United States would find that its principal commitment was to the one European power which is necessarily "revisionist" in policy, ambivalent in its attitude toward its legally unratified eastern borders, and thus a fundamental source of concern to the other European states. The United States would find itself transformed into an "outsider" so far as Europe was concerned. The West Germans, for their part, would find themselves isolated in Europe, their only close friend an overseas power, and with little prospect of unification on favorable terms or of a full role in the development of Europe's political future.

Needless to say, the outcome of this scenario may be exaggerated, nor do its episodes necessarily follow from any particular American policy. But the possibilities it illustrates cannot be safely dismissed, for a sequence of responses of the sort suggested is not implausible.

II

If, then, a program of frank opposition to France clearly increases dangers of this kind, what are the alternatives? We have already suggested that the United States cannot and should not simply acquiesce in the French challenge. Is there a middle way? This problem is perhaps best approached from the starting point of American interests in Europe. The first of the fundamental objectives that have inspired U.S. policy in Europe for at least half a century is to prevent the domination of Europe by any hostile

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power. Since 1947, this has meant a U.S. commitment to aid Western Europe against Soviet armed attack, and subsequently, nuclear blackmail.

Most Americans and West Germans believe that neither an American guarantee (nuclear or conventional) nor the simple presence of American troops in Europe (as "hostages") provides a sufficient defense. Some Americans believe that the United States Seventh Army and the twelve German divisions in existence today provide a local superiority over the twenty smaller Soviet divisions now deployed in East Germany. Most American and West German analysts would agree that such a local conventional superiority over the Soviet forces stationed in East Germany is desirable as a means of controlling a crisis situation and of checking escalation to the nuclear level.

Even those who do not believe NATO forces enjoy local superiority (in the absence of Soviet reinforcement) attach great importance to the presence in Europe of 200,000 U.S. soldiers as a "trip-wire" of considerable deterrent effect. Most Europeans believe that the West European states, if they were wholly independent of American military aid, would be vulnerable to Soviet pressures, blackmail and, potentially, to Soviet conquest. On the other hand, many believe—among them the present writers—that, given the desire and will, Europe could provide adequately for its own defense in a broad range of circumstances.[2]

In addition to its concern for defense, the United States has major political interests in Europe. We are anxious that Western Europe be independent of inordinate Soviet influence as well as of Soviet domination, and we are also concerned that as an end in itself Europe be politically stable. This has meant that we have interested ourselves in the success of popular government in Europe and in good and coöperative relations of the European states among one another and with ourselves. These interests are justified because the European nations are major world powers,

[2] For example, recent discussions on proposed multilateral forces have brought out the fact that for substantially less than a billion dollars a year for five years it is possible to procure a force of 200 missiles stationed at sea and that such a force probably presents a greater threat to the Soviet Union than, say, Soviet strategic forces presented to the United States throughout the fifties and early sixties. This is not to say that there may not be important weaknesses in such forces but rather that almost all strategic forces have (or have had) important weaknesses, which do not necessarily decrease their credibility to the vanishing point. This means that, if with our technology we help them to the extent of about 20 percent of their current budgets, any one of the major European powers could acquire a very substantial nuclear force—one that would likely be substantial enough to deter Soviet attack.

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even if not, individually, superpowers; because good U.S.-European relations are an important factor in securing and sustaining American freedom of action in other parts of the world; and because of our economic and cultural interests and involvements in Europe, and our concomitant concern for the well-being of the European cousins with whom we have our closest family and emotional ties and a shared civilization. Finally, our interest in the stability of European politico-military affairs is inspired by the fact that twice in this century we became involved in major wars that originated in Europe.

Existing U.S. policy has generally been directed to the political and economic as well as the military integration or unification of Western Europe as a means to European security. Some have seen unification as a step toward the political unity of the West as a whole, or even of the world. Thus the achievement of some more qualified form of integration or federation of Europe, and of Europe with America, has also been held to be an intrinsically desirable goal, especially as national rivalries in Europe have been seen as a fundamentally disruptive force in modern history; hence their suppression, or accommodation in a larger political framework, is indispensable to the future stability of Europe, and indeed to the future stability of the world.

If this is a generally acceptable statement of the avowed and implicit American policy objectives in Europe, we can approach the problem of NATO policy with a sense both of the positive goals to be sought and the dangers to be avoided. The provisional program sketched below is consciously designed to leave open a number of future options, and yet to involve the least divergence from the established lines of American policy of the recent past.

Our interest in protecting Europe makes it inescapable that we allow (or invite) France to remain included in NATO guarantees, designating her a non-integrated member with a newly defined "associate" status. France would be covered by the collective defense provisions of Article V, but would be largely excluded from other NATO privileges and obligations not specifically mentioned in the treaty. After 1969 France should be invited to enter into new defense arrangements with the NATO powers as a group or individually, but in fairness to the other allies the United States should hold that a refusal to integrate is not compatible with full membership in the organization. If the allies wish to preserve NATO, they cannot allow France to enjoy an excep-

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tional status and yet enjoy the full benefits of the Alliance. On the other hand, the new bilateral arrangements could provide concessions to France of objective value to all parties and of help in preventing an intensification of the quarrel.

Thus, while France should be treated with absolute correctness, dignity and courtesy between now and 1969, her participation in any NATO activities not specifically defined in the NATO Treaty (basically the North Atlantic Council and the Military Commission) should be refused. This should be treated as a matter-of-fact distinction deriving from France's own decisions. We should make clear that we expect NATO to work fully with France, and vice versa, if a crisis or a sharp deterioration in international relations occurs; and that in the meantime we find it acceptable, if regrettable, that in the absence of tension and crisis France prefers not to bear the responsibilities of an integrated defense. We should also make it clear that NATO can tolerate French withdrawal, and is able to make contingency plans for coöperation with an independent France in time of crisis—precisely because of the active coöperation and effort of the other members. The point should also be stressed that NATO can help to solve problems within Western Europe, even if the Gaullists are correct in assuming that the cold war is no longer likely to create any major military threat in Europe.

We should preserve the structure of NATO by avoiding burdensome new demands on any of the full members except Great Britain and West Germany. All full members should be included in all meetings and consultations, and there should be a conscious cultivation of general participation and voting on policy issues. All of the "peripheral" NATO activities, such as the NATO Defense College, various professional meetings, the Hague Defense Center and the like, should be restricted to the full NATO members with their roles enlarged. The full members should be given sound reason to feel that they are getting important benefits and paying little, while every reasonable effort should be made to emphasize Great Britain's role as one of the three major members. The United States and West Germany should be prepared to make serious concessions to support the British Army of the Rhine and to make it possible for Britain to keep 50,000 men in Germany. The defense of Germany should not become, or seem to become, a matter of a U.S.-West German "special relationship."

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Toward West Germany, the United States should take this position:

1. The American contribution to West German security is not contingent upon any particular German policy with respect to France, European unification or Atlantic partnership. It is based on American friendship for Germany, but also on objective American interests with respect to the security of Europe as well as the security of West Germany. That is to say, Germany should regard our contribution as "free" and without strings.

2. The import of this assurance is that Germany must think through its own problems and make the fundamental decisions affecting its own future free of any sense that it must "pay" for the American guarantee. The United States is determined not to allow its contribution to German security to jeopardize in any way that country's future relations with the other European powers or its own unification.

3. Therefore, whatever the course of events leading to a "normalization" or settlement in Europe—whether negotiated or not—we are prepared, if Germany wishes, to commit four American divisions to be stationed in West Germany with a strictly defined mission of defense against aggression for a finite period—say twenty years.[3] This too is "free." On the other hand, should the present West German Government or any successor government request it, we will immediately withdraw those forces.

4. Whatever West Germany's immediate decision with respect to relations with France, or its future decisions with regard to European unity, German unification or relations with the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact powers, these must be fully independent West German decisions, and must be conveyed as such to the German public and to the world.

Under this proposal, then, the defense of Europe would rest chiefly upon German, American and British capabilities. These are probably competent to deal with Soviet forces currently sta-

[3] A similar position might be adopted with respect to the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The present American position is that any such treaty must contain a provision that would allow West Germany to join a multilateral or international nuclear force provided that one of the existing nuclear nations also joins that force and gives up its national nuclear forces to international command. Because of this situation, it seems likely that West Germany may find itself widely criticized for blocking the achievement of a non-proliferation treaty, yet without deriving any advantage—never actually being offered membership in a multilateral or other international force. We should weigh the advisability of an American declaration that our position will be maintained whatever the opinions—pro or con—of the West German Government, on grounds that a nuclear restriction on Germany which is unconditional and unlimited in term is both unenforceable and an error.

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tioned in East Germany. That competence should be maintained, with the NATO force so equipped as to be able to fight a full-scale conventional war against those Soviet forces for about 30 days. There should also be an ability to develop reinforcements if the Soviets slowly increase their forces in East Germany.

This program is not put forward as necessarily the best of all the alternatives open to the United States, but rather as a series of sensible and moderate steps compatible with present American policy toward the Soviet Union, the extent of the détente, European estimates of the immediate and long-term Soviet threat, the American commitment to NATO's preservation, and the existing American policy toward Germany. It obviously is concerned to avoid the most immediate dangers of the present situation, which we see as (1) a severe weakening of Western defense in Europe, and (2) the creation of conditions in which Germany could become estranged from the other European democracies. It represents a temporizing policy. The fundamental issues—of German unity, European settlement, American-European and American-Soviet relations—are left unresolved, and the conditions for their eventual solution are left open. This seems to us the decisive advantage of this program over those alternatives which include reprisals against France or a hardening or "fixing" of U.S.-German relations.

III

But to buy time on fundamental European issues can become an error, if buying time becomes a policy by default. It may be that the program we have outlined could be prolonged beyond the immediate period of NATO crisis, and it might prove preferable to the longer-range policies we note below. However, we are inclined to believe that, without a serious redefinition of American goals in Europe, this program is likely to prove inadequate to serve America's future interests in the conditions now developing in Europe. Of course, a policy involving little change may be chosen over other alternatives merely because it *does* involve little change. But a conciliatory and temporizing policy makes sense only if the options it keeps open are seriously examined; only then can they be rejected—if they are rejected—on sound grounds.

The general long-range policy options available to us include three (not wholly exclusive) lines of action:

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(1) to pursue a reformulated "Atlanticism" that leaves a "vacant chair" for participation by a future French government;

(2) to seek "partnership" with a genuinely autonomous United Europe able to defend itself;

(3) to seek actively a formal European settlement which would involve the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet forces from Europe, a settlement (probably provisional or conditional) of the German question, and the replacement of the major existing military guarantees and constraints in Europe with political arrangements competent to secure the interests of all parties.

The first of these programs could mean as little as increased strategic and political consultation among the members, or enlarged programs of joint military staffs. Or it could mean working for a true North Atlantic legal community, involving major political concessions by the members and undoubtedly sacrifices in sovereignty. This might well involve precedents of international coöperation and unification which could have important influence on the non-Atlantic states. In any case it would join together almost a half billion people, with most of the world's assets and technology, into a tightly coördinated force for peace and prosperity. An accomplishment of this kind may have been possible in the late 1940s or even in the 1950s; the plan has had eloquent advocates. It may not be possible now. While it is true that nothing is so powerful as an idea whose time has come, there is a corollary, that nothing is so weak as an idea whose time is past. So far, the United States has not shown itself prepared to make the political sacrifices this program entails. It is not easy to believe that the obstacles which were insurmountable in the past will prove easier to overcome now, when NATO itself is in jeopardy and European-American relations are strained. And while an Atlantic policy can be formulated in ambitious terms of interdependence and genuine partnership, it could also, in practice, prove to be simply a continuation of what we have been doing in recent years. This, on the evidence of those years, would seem to be a mistake.

The second of our general policy options would be to encourage, and to accept the implications of, a united Europe—even one which excluded much direct American influence and involvement, or whose development was partly motivated by anti-Americanism. Such a Europe might be described as Gaullist, but probably would arise from a nexus of European forces in which Gaullism in

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France is merely one element. It remains to be seen, of course, whether a politically united Europe can actually develop—on these or any other terms. But if the United Kingdom were to enter the Common Market—apparently a possibility once again—the European movement might regain momentum. The United States will have an effect on the kind of Europe which emerges, but a Europe which possesses a common political authority is most likely to develop in conditions of some tension with the United States and will claim an autonomous role that we will find inconvenient. Thus the issue for the United States is whether to seek a new relationship to this Europe, redefining the terms of European-American partnership and accepting a diminution of the influence which we have enjoyed in European affairs since the end of the Second World War. To maintain that influence, or an American policy which tried to do so, would seem to be incompatible with a successful European union.

Such a Europe could, particularly in the transitional stage, enjoy the protection afforded by a unilateral American guarantee obligating the United States to declare war on the Soviet Union if the Soviets invaded Western Europe. However, such a guarantee would not necessarily imply a full-fledged missile strike on the Soviet heartland, though it would surely imply a willingness—at the minimum—to risk tens of millions of Americans and to spend hundreds of billions of dollars.

Such a unilateral guarantee would recognize two important military facts. One is that we probably do not need European help if we ever get involved in war with the Soviet Union on non-European issues. The second is that it might be the height of folly and perhaps of immorality to drag Europe into such a war. There are said to be, after all, six to seven hundred I.R.B.M.s trained on Western Europe. It is difficult to invent a plausible sequence of events in which the Soviets would have any "rational" motivation to fire any large part of this force. Nevertheless, these missiles represent a physical potential for obliterating most of the population and economy of Western Europe; they are most likely to be used—if used at all—in a situation in which the Western Europeans volunteered their help in a non-European confrontation of the super-powers.

Such a unilateral guarantee would also make clear that the United States intends to keep a free hand in Asia and elsewhere and that, while we are very interested in the advice and opinions

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of West Europeans, they should neither expect nor be entitled to exercise a veto on our actions outside Europe. This relationship is in contrast to partnership concepts which create expectations of joint agreements and joint obligations. But the existence of such an independent Europe need not destroy a very important part of Atlantic community—the unity that grows out of having a common culture and common interests in much of the world.

The third of our general policy options, and one that is not necessarily inconsistent with the first two, is to seek a European settlement. It is now two decades since World War II ended, yet the status of Germany remains unsettled. U.S., British and Soviet troops are deployed in Central Europe, Berlin is occupied by right of military conquest, and constraints still exist on the full freedom of the East European nations and Germany. These war-born conditions are anomalies, as nearly all would acknowledge, in the Europe of the present day. They exist because we have not found the way safely to release the knots which war and cold war have tied. Yet many of the factors to which these conditions originally responded are overcome or have vanished. The Soviet-American military confrontation in Germany coexists with a détente which, on other issues, has seen significant coöperation between the two superpowers. Both the United States and Russia have new and pressing concerns in Asia. The discipline of the Communist bloc is gravely shaken, and many in the West see NATO as a significantly outmoded instrumentality. West Germany is increasingly and rightfully troubled by the anomalies in its situation and the seeming lack of any means by which, alone, it can remedy them.

Conditions exist now for a European settlement which did not exist a decade ago when the various schemes of disengagement were put forward in the West and in Poland. In the mid-1950s the Soviet bloc was in crisis and Western Europe was still without the means of independent defense—to take only the two largest of the factors which, in circumstances of virulent cold war, stood as obstacles to any settlement.[4] All this is dramatically changed.

[4] The nuclear defense of Europe is feasible in several ways that support or supplant any American guarantee. This is not the place for detailed discussion, but it is worth noting that the programmed British and French nuclear forces can provide plausible deterrents in a wide range of possible situations. Moreover, many of the usual objections to multilateral forces, particularly those involving control of the trigger (authority to launch an attack) and control over the safety catch (authority to prevent an attack), can be greatly reduced if one distinguishes between the mission of strict and proportionate retaliation, and acts of nuclear escalation. How this distinction might be applied in practice is discussed in H. Kahn, "On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios," p. 264 ff. (New York: Praeger, 1965)

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We can here only suggest that, from the American point of view, the possible terms of such a settlement would have to assure reliably: (1) that Western Europe is physically and politically secure; (2) that the East European states are politically autonomous; and (3) that the German problem is resolved on terms which are tolerable to the two Germanys and do not place unrealistic or unenforceable constraints on either Germany, or create the conditions of future instability in Central Europe.

This last condition would probably imply a regularization of Germany's division for a specified period of time, with foreign troops withdrawn and effective guarantees against change of any German frontier (including both the inter-German border and, substantially, the Oder-Neisse line), and undoubtedly nuclear or other military limitations or "neutralization," but for a fixed term. Or German unification might be possible on a shorter time scale, but again with constraints that are tolerable to the Germans, effectively enforced, and fixed in term, with Germany left fully autonomous and with complete independence of action at the end of a given period of years.

Specific terms for a European settlement are, of course, hard to develop and to negotiate. Nevertheless, the argument for renewing the effort is a very powerful one. A settlement will eventually come—or happen—and American interests which can be ensured by intelligent action now might be sacrificed in a settlement in which the European powers, or the Soviet Union, took the initiative. Indeed, it is not impossible that the whole American political relationship to Europe could be damaged by events in which we remained passive or defensive. The one thing that seems likely is that U.S. and Soviet troops will not be garrisoning Berlin for another quarter of a century.

Despite our capacity to influence events, there are possible outcomes of the European situation which might be reached in spite of the United States. In the absence of American initiative, the European powers and the Soviet Union might take actions to achieve a settlement in which the United States would be expected to acquiesce (and probably would, since our physical presence in Western Europe, excluding Berlin, is at the pleasure of our allies). Such an outcome would, of course, amount to a West European repudiation of United States policy and would undoubtedly provoke a serious crisis in American attitudes. This

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is not, perhaps, a very likely development in the short run, but it is plausible within the decade if we are immobile in our policies.

IV

There are other forms which future events in Europe might take. The European reunification movement might regain momentum, with or without coöperative relations with us, drawing the East Europeans into an association that outmoded today's security arrangements. Or French visions of a Western Europe led from Paris might be realized in circumstances of a momentous West German turn away from the United States, and the French might then deal with the Russians in ways that were disadvantageous to the United States. Or there might be a renewal of Russian expansionism under a régime of young and ambitious men, making Europe once again a political battlefield and NATO valuable, if not indispensable, to Europe's defense. Or, finally, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting out of a concern for nuclear stabilization and in resistance to the unsettling forces of European nationalism, might actively or implicitly attempt to impose some kind of tacit "condominium" on Europe. This doubtlessly would be resisted by Europe, but it also might succeed, at least for a time.

More plausible is the emergence of a de facto settlement of the German problem deriving from concessions on unification by the two zones on terms which East and West find tolerable—or impossible to challenge without incurring serious costs. Even more plausible is a de facto European settlement which arises simply out of the attrition of passions and threat in Europe, or in consequence of great-power preoccupations in Asia, or a shared mood of "neo-isolationism" among the big powers, or the progress of what might be called "psychological disengagement" between the U.S.S.R and the United States. Major Soviet and American troop withdrawals might then take place over time and without formalities; both East and West European states would assume greater political responsibility and exercise increasing independence of action; and NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be renegotiated as traditional alliances, with the German problem left unresolved but also drained of much of its passion and tension. This outcome for Germany—prolonged division without intolerable tension—is not, one might add, as improbable as it often has seemed in the context of recent history, especially if Europe as a

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whole were to move in the direction this projection assumes. Obvious anomalies in the present situation would have to be remedied—most important, the question of Berlin. But a Berlin solution should not be beyond the wit of German and other European statesmen if the U.S.-Soviet confrontation within Germany were removed as a factor or reduced over the course of time.

But attractive as they seem in many respects, and even plausible as they seem in conditions of American drift or immobility, these de facto settlements have one grave flaw in them from the American viewpoint. They preëmpt decisions in which this country has a need—and right—to be heard. Our interest in Europe is not merely its security from Soviet aggression. As a nation which twice has been drawn into great European wars we have earned the right to concern ourselves with the stability of Europe itself and with the stability of the arrangements by which Soviet power is withdrawn. We have commitments to the West Germans as well as to our other NATO allies which not all European settlements would assure. If it is true that, as a consequence of the events of 1932–1945, Germany must inevitably pay a price in any European settlement, we have undertaken that that price shall not include sacrificing the political freedom of the West Germans. If the Europe that in fact emerges in the 1970s is to be stable, secure and sound in its relations with the United States, we shall need to play an active part in creating the conditions for its emergence, discarding, it may be, programs that have served their purpose and are outmoded, but acting intelligently and vigorously in a changing situation. The alternative is the role of reaction, which can harm us and do Europe and the world no good either.

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THE QUALITY OF AID

By David E. Bell

WE still have much to do to adapt our arrangements for administering foreign aid to the fact that a successful aid program must be a process of partnership. Foreign aid is not something a donor does *for* or *to* a recipient; it is something to be done *with* a recipient. This is the reason for the growing emphasis on self-help by aid recipients. There is by now a strong consensus—although far from complete unanimity—that foreign aid in all its forms will produce maximum results only in so far as it is related to maximum self-help. This is the opinion of leading public officials and development scholars in developing countries as well as in advanced countries.

The broad concept of partnership and self-help applies to technical assistance projects, in which the purpose increasingly is to establish effective permanent institutions in the developing countries. Therefore foreign technical advice and training are made available only if those receiving aid commit themselves to establish the necessary administrative and legal framework, provide necessary budget funds, make available appropriate trainees and, on a specified timetable, take over full management and support of the enterprise.

As for technical assistance, we need to upgrade substantially the quality of our work. Aid donors and recipients need jointly to set higher standards of excellence for their joint work. I think more needs to be demanded of aid recipients by way of serious commitment, major improvements in policies, responsibility for funding and providing personnel. And I think more needs to be demanded of aid donors: higher quality resources, applied over longer periods, with persistence, imagination and a greater sense of personal involvement and pride in the outcome.

The concept of partnership and self-help applies to capital projects as well. Here, too, there is increasing agreement that completing a physical structure—a factory, a dam, a stretch of road—is not enough. What is needed in a developing country is the capacity to plan, execute and maintain capital projects, and the commitment of funds, talent and other resources to sustain them.

Also, more emphasis ought to be placed on the word "develop-

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ment" and less on the word "banking." I certainly do not mean to slight banking values; unless a project meets sound technical and economic standards, it will end up as a net drain on a developing country's economy, not a net contribution to its growth. But funding is in a sense the lesser part of the task. The greater part is to deal with the capital project in its broader setting, and to take full advantage of the opportunities the project presents for institutional changes—through training, through policy improvements, through the development of competence in operations and maintenance—so that a particular project will make a maximum contribution to national development.

Some of our A.I.D. people in the field feel so strongly about this point that they have suggested it is a mistake to think—as we customarily do—of technical assistance and capital assistance as separate categories. They suggest that the objective invariably should be to develop institutional capacity in the developing country, and that technical and capital aid should be related in whatever combination is needed to achieve the desired results. I am not yet ready to accept this idea wholly, but I believe it is very much worth thinking about as we try to improve the process of aid administration.

In recent years the concept of partnership and self-help has progressed in other ways. Both bilateral and multilateral aid donors have increasingly expressed interest in broad questions of development policy in the receiving countries—questions such as whether fiscal and monetary policies are inflationary; whether all foreign-exchange resources, received both from exports and from foreign aid, are being applied under a sensible set of priorities; whether educational, tax, land and other reforms that may be needed are in fact under way. And aid recipients have increasingly recognized the propriety of such an interest by the donor countries. We are past the stage in most countries where an interest in matters of this type by an aid donor is considered an unwarranted invasion of the recipient's independence. What is involved here are not political "strings" but elements of a partnership based on the shared objective of achieving the most rapid possible progress toward a self-sustaining and satisfactory rate of economic growth.

This partnership relationship is inherently delicate, but it is strongly founded on mutual interest and self-respect. The aid donor recognizes that the recipient, as an independent country,

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must and will make its own decisions on budget and fiscal policy, foreign exchange, educational priorities and other national policies affecting development. And the aid recipient recognizes that the donor, as an independent country, must and will decide whether aid requested for a given project or purpose will in fact be likely to achieve the results desired, given the policies that the receiving country proposes to follow. We in the United States consider that it is entirely up to an aid recipient what development policies it wishes to adopt. But it is equally up to us, as an aid donor, to decide whether the circumstances presented in a country will permit external assistance to yield significant results.

The meeting ground between these interests of recipients and donors obviously should be a broad measure of agreement on what policies in fact make the most sense for a particular country at a particular time, and it is in this area that there have been some very important developments in recent years. I would mention three, not in any particular order of importance.

First, the United States has increased its competence for dealing with the broad questions of development policy in aid-receiving countries. A.I.D. Mission Directors and their staffs in the field have a higher degree of understanding and sophistication. With the support they can call on from Washington, they are able to deal flexibly with the broad range of development issues which they encounter. None of us is fully satisfied with the quality of our work, but there is no doubt it has increased significantly over the last several years. And we see evidence of a parallel increase in the competence of the ministries and agencies of other donor governments, such as Britain, Germany and Japan.

Second, in Latin America an international organization, the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), has been established for the specific purpose of reviewing progress under the Alliance. This Committee, made up of six Latin American members and one from the United States, reviews the situation in each Latin American country at least once a year, and makes judgments and recommendations concerning the improvements that aid-receiving countries ought to make in their policies, and the extent and nature of the assistance that donors should provide. The CIAP is a promising arrangement, providing sound technical judgments by an agency in which the Latin Americans themselves play the leading role. We hope that similar arrangements may be developed for other regions.

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Third, the World Bank is expanding its use of consortia and consultative groups, and using them as a basis for reaching common judgments among donors and recipients as to the policies that are appropriate for particular developing nations. The Bank now has set up more or less formal groups for eight countries, and several more are likely in the future. These are promising instruments for achieving three objectives at once: to increase the quality of development policies in an aid-receiving country; to increase understanding among aid donors as to its actual situation and real requirements; and to increase the quality—and if appropriate the amount—of the aid made available to that country.

In summary, while there is much change and improvement under way, there is still far to go—for both students and practitioners—before it can be said that we are soundly administering foreign aid in accordance with the concept of partnership and maximum self-help.

II

A second element of consequence in current thinking about foreign aid is the growing emphasis that is being given to pluralism in the developing countries. I believe there is now ample evidence and a growing consensus supporting the proposition that those countries will develop fastest which rely most heavily on multiple sources of private and local initiative and energy—in contrast to countries which rely most heavily on central direction and control.

Let me make perfectly clear what I mean. I am not talking about a distinction between planned and unplanned development. National planning in a developing country seems to me essential, not only to establish national policies on fiscal and monetary matters, educational priorities and so forth, but also to establish those policies and systems of incentives which will in fact bring forth maximum private and local initiative. A sensible national development plan in my opinion can and should be aimed at building a pluralistic society.

Furthermore, I am not talking about a simple distinction between public and private activities. There are many examples in developing countries of private activities which are centralized and monopolized to an extent that greatly hampers growth. There are at least as many examples of national governments

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which are overcentralized, thereby stifling the enormous potential energy of local government. My point, therefore, relates to the great importance in *both* the public and the private sector of establishing arrangements and incentives which will call forth the initiative and energy of small units, groups and individuals.

There can be no doubt of the importance of this concept, but we are only beginning to examine its implications and to build them systematically into our programs and administrative processes. For example, we have not given enough weight to the goal of simplifying tariffs, rectifying exchange rates, and liberalizing import controls. These measures would permit hundreds and thousands of private businessmen and farmers to make better decisions and take more rapid actions, resulting in quicker and sounder investment and growth. Steps of this kind have in fact had such results in Greece, in Korea, in Pakistan and in other countries. It is important not only to simplify regulations and replace physical controls with those working through the market, but also to avoid frequent change in the rules, so that large numbers of decision-makers can act with reasonably firm expectations about the future.

Second, it is likely that we can and should learn more than we have from such successful cases as the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction on Taiwan, the locally based rural works program in East Pakistan, and the credit unions and rural cooperatives in Latin America. They can teach us how to help rural communities organize and apply their latent energy to their own problems and thus achieve high rates of growth in agricultural production and rural living standards.

Third, we can do much more to establish direct connections between private organizations and individuals in the advanced countries and the problems they can help to solve in the developing countries—as A.I.D. has done with considerable success in helping to establish savings-and-loan systems in several Latin American countries, primarily by supporting the efforts of leaders in the United States' savings-and-loan industry.

Fourth, we could do more to help establish and support private American organizations designed for specialized tasks in the developing countries: for example, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, established by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. to work with labor unions in Latin America; or the International Executive Service Corps, established by a group of private business

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leaders to provide American volunteers to work with individual business firms in developing countries.

These are only illustrations—of which a far longer list could easily be prepared—of ways in which it should be possible to administer assistance in more imaginative and more flexible ways, so as to induce and support private and local groups in developing countries to deal with their own problems. This is extremely important because these measures can stimulate not only economic and social progress, but also the development of more democratic societies.

III

My last major point relates to research and evaluation. It is my impression that the organizations which carry out aid programs do not have a distinguished record of building into those programs strong elements of research and evaluation. Certainly this is true of A.I.D., the agency I know best.

This is unfortunate on at least two counts. First, foreign assistance is a relatively new activity and plainly we have an enormous amount to learn about how to conduct it effectively. We have lost much valuable time and have failed to learn from much valuable experience, because we have not had adequate research and evaluation programs. Second, the process of foreign assistance is inherently dependent on research. It is often described as a method of transferring know-how, but this is plainly wrong; it is instead a process of developing know-how—a process of finding out what will work in Nigeria, not of transferring what has been found to work in Nebraska. If we understood our own business better, it might well be that the whole process of foreign aid would be seen as a research process, aimed at learning how to move a particular society, with its special and unique characteristics of history and culture and physical geography, toward specified objectives.

However that may be, there can be no doubt of the importance of incorporating far stronger programs of research and evaluation into our aid administration. We in the Agency for International Development have been trying to make some headway in this direction. For example: (*a*) For the last three years, we have organized special summer research projects on the economic aspects of development, drawing together faculty members and graduate students from a number of universities for a summer of

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research work that benefits them and greatly benefits us; (*b*) Over the last four years, we have gradually built up a program of research grants, financing such varied activities as trying to increase production of high-protein grain legumes in Asia, and developing a new mathematics curriculum for elementary schools in Africa. In this we have had the guidance of a distinguished advisory committee of research scientists chaired by Dr. Walsh McDermott of Cornell University; (*c*) A year ago we persuaded Colonel George Lincoln, of the West Point social science faculty, to spend his sabbatical examining A.I.D.'s systems of evaluation, and recommending improvements in them. Colonel Lincoln's report, based on extensive field work in Latin America, is a valuable guide that is now being applied throughout the Agency.

In these ways and others, A.I.D. is taking steps to improve its own performance. We still have far to go, particularly in finding how we can build into every aspect of our work the spirit of research on development problems. We also have done far too little in a systematic way to help create research competence in the developing countries themselves.

Whatever part of the aid business one examines, wherever one looks in the developing countries, one sees large and challenging opportunities for improving the administration of aid so as to achieve more rapid economic, social and political progress. Our mood should be restless, inquiring, impatient—for there is much to be done.

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FOREIGN AID AND THE BRAIN DRAIN

By James A. Perkins

OUR foreign policies are often much more closely related to our domestic policies than we realize—and not alone through the political struggles over appropriations, or even over Congressional approval of international agreements. Indeed, our foreign policies can come so sharply into conflict with our domestic policies that, unless this conflict is both understood and resolved by governmental leaders, domestic pressures can completely undermine and even nullify our foreign programs.

There is in our contemporary national life a disturbing illustration of this basic rule of statecraft, and it is one which is being discussed more and more widely, with a growing sense of concern. This is the conflict between the objectives of our foreign assistance programs and the requirements of our expanding economy —between our efforts to train people in the less developed countries and our drain of foreign specialists to fill important jobs here in the United States.

In the developing countries we are concerned, of course, with increasing the pool of modern men with modern skills and modern attitudes so central to the prospects for those nations. But on the domestic front our need for these same skills has led us to enact immigration laws that actually encourage the importation of these same men and women. Is it possible that we are draining off this precious talent faster than we are helping to create it? Is it a serious problem? Can anything be done about it—or is it just one of the macabre ironies that illustrate the Biblical prediction, "That unto every one which hath shall be given; and from him that hath not, even that he hath shall be taken away from him"?

We must start our exploration with a reminder of the recent history of development theory. Actually, we are talking about a body of literature and a level of sophisticated analysis that is very recent. Indeed, we are talking about the last decade, because the experience with the reconstruction of Europe actually blinded us to the realities of development assistance. This point is worth a mention and can, perhaps, be best illustrated by a personal experience.

In April 1945—just a month before V. E. Day—I was visiting

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the temporary headquarters of our military governor in Ludwigshaven. Word came that the general manager of the local I. G. Farben factory respectfully suggested a visit to his plant to discuss ways in which its rehabilitation could serve the mission of the occupying powers. Intrigued, we got into our jeeps and drove to what had been one of the great industrial plants of prewar Germany, now a square mile of rubble. By some miracle a small building had survived, and into this tottering structure we were escorted. I still gasp, more than twenty years later, at the recollection of being introduced to a full complement of managers and directors of this factory, reassembled even before the bombs had stopped falling. Laid out before us was a detailed presentation of what rehabilitation would require in tons of coal per day and of how the plant could be converted to produce material and equipment needed by the military establishment of the United States.

When the first shock of this political neutrality had passed, one had to realize that here was a vivid demonstration of the real power behind the miracle of European reconstruction: the presence of the skilled and experienced manpower ready and anxious to restore the status quo ante. These men, sitting down together in that drafty derelict of a building, were able to construct order out of chaos because they knew how things had been and could be again; they knew what raw materials were needed and where they could be found; and they knew what public policies would be required to allow reconstruction to proceed uninhibited.

There is no question that the Marshall Plan and the enlightened laissez-faire policies of the military governors greatly hastened the process of European reconstruction. These two factors may also have saved an impatient Europe from more politically extreme solutions. But the rebuilding of the European infrastructure and the new visions of economic and political integration that ensued were made possible, first and foremost, by modern men whose experience with the prewar economic structure could serve as a blueprint for action. Europe did not have to be invented; it only had to be remembered.

The truth is, however, that this lesson was only partially learned. The visible need and the visible accomplishment of repairing the capital plant of Europe—the factories, bridges, trains and trucks—obscured the fact that the real engine of reconstruction was not concrete and steel but modern men working

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both in industry and the civil service. And so while Europe has gone on to build a more and more impressive economic base, adding the incentive of great dreams to the drive of reconstructed memories, it has until very recently neglected to build a modern system of education to replenish its human skills. The French educational planner Raymond Poignant shows in a recent report that the Common Market countries, with a population approximately equal to Russia and to the United States, produce less than a third as many university graduates as Russia and less than a quarter as many as the United States. In the United States the idea of the common school combined with the Land-Grant college has given us almost a century's head start on our European friends in education and training for the broad range of skills and attitudes needed by a modern and fully developed society. Given the increasing dependence of advanced technological societies on university graduates, this disparity is bound to depress the possibilities of European growth. Perhaps no wind of change in Europe is more important than the revolution, just started, that will inevitably lead to the democratization and modernization of its schools and universities. Until this reform is completed, the European educational system will be the bottleneck that shuts off the development of Europe's manpower and shortens the life of its great dreams.

The Europeans, however, were not the only ones to be dazzled by the apparent success of concrete and steel. Our own development policies in the '50s and early '60s, whetted in part by the ambitions of the emerging nations themselves, were built on the assumption that if infrastructure were indeed responsible for European recovery, then bridges, roads, dams, factories and power plants should claim first priority in the underdeveloped world, too.

The answers in foreign assistance have never been simple, and they become no simpler the more we learn. Surely the business of assisting in the modernization of a traditional society is far from perfected. But we have made several discoveries in the last fifteen years. We now realize that societies and nations are all in different stages of development. We know that every country must have savings for capital development and that foreign assistance is almost a necessity for those too poor to save in adequate amounts. We have also found that social structure may be a barrier to the release of developing energies. One of the most

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important things we have learned is that investment in capital equipment is not the single magic lever that, once provided and pulled, starts an unending cycle of growth. The machinery—political and social, as well as economic—neither tends nor reproduces itself. The pivotal force around which any modernization process must move is talented, skilled, developed man.

This lesson has been increasingly the theme of students of the development process. The Ashby Report on higher education in Nigeria was a landmark in its emphasis on trained manpower and the education system required to produce it. The interest of some of our economists—Lewis, Mason, Schultz, Harbison, Ward and Galbraith—is bringing a new level of sophistication to the subject of manpower development. In the social field there have been important contributions by anthropologists, such as Cornell's Holmberg, Sharp, Opler and Leighton, who have spent fifteen years studying the impediments to development imbedded in the customs and taboos of those whose modernization we would further. And the work of such men as Beeby, Curle and Havighurst, analyzing the problems of literacy, secondary education, university reform and adult education, has become crucial in assessing the role of education in the making of modern man.

As we have had experience with the development of man from a primitive, tribal state to integration in a complex, advanced society—a process that many of us have observed in a single lifetime—we have learned several things about his attitudes and the factors that influence him along the way. It is important to the subject at hand that we look more closely at this evolution, so that we can better understand what a fragile process it is and how precious is the man who emerges from it.

II

The first thing we must make clear is that men vary as much in their development as societies do. Just as societies are strung out along the chain of advancement, reaching from the economic and social levels of the Upper Volta and Brazil to Japan and the United States, so are men distributed along an arc that ranges from unquestioning primitives to the restless, driving managers of advanced technological enterprise. And just as it is possible to describe with some accuracy the levels of economic development, it is possible to identify certain stages of human development.

One strong caveat to this analysis should be recorded at the

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outset. It is not assumed here that the members of any given society fall into clearcut categories. There are many ways, as Kalman Silvert has pointed out, of "mingling structural with value factors"—a task I will leave the reader to work out with Professor Silvert. The skills and attitudes conducive to modernization vary within a society. This is as true in the most highly developed nation-state as in the most backward and isolated village. We all know that in our own nation talent is distributed throughout the whole social structure; that high I. Q. is not solely the prerogative of the economically privileged; and even that any one man can be modern in some respects, traditional in others, and in still others ruthlessly and shockingly primitive.

Bearing this caution in mind, let us examine the characteristics and social evolution of modernizing man.

Surely this evolution must start with the desire for change. The man who never questions the status quo, who believes that his destiny is inevitably controlled by fate or the natural world, who commits himself to the faithful repetition of habits of work and patterns of life his ancestors knew—such a man, at whatever end of the economic spectrum he may be found, cannot assist or contribute to the modernizing of his world. A man capable of change must be prepared to abandon the past as a guide to the present and to replace acceptance with dissatisfaction, even though the path ahead may be unclear.

This first big step in human development must be nourished by exposure to change. And here education, mobility and visible example can be potent forces indeed. The education that gives young people skills can also give them a sense of new-found powers and leave them impatient with the ways of their fathers and the primitive life of bush, village or *favela*. Literacy opens up still other avenues of communication that can bring in visions of the world outside. Sometimes there may be a radio or a television set to stimulate the imagination.

The new mobility can also bring change. The peasant who travels to the city market may find his route changed by a new road and the city transformed by a new airport. He is confronted with cars, machines, people in strange dress, and he returns with unfulfilled desires and comparisons for his own life. He may do nothing more about them than to chew an extra supply of narcotic leaves—but he may also decide that his son had better go to school.

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A pervasive influence to which the whole emerging world has been and will increasingly be subjected is the example set by the outsider—the foreign missionary, the military man and the businessman, and now the Peace Corps worker and the consultant. For good or ill, these people are in direct contact with those in a traditional society who would learn not only specific skills but new attitudes toward work and improvement. The example the outsider sets may stimulate or jar, but it can be a vigorous force for change.

Not everyone is exposed to change, nor does the exposure always affect everyone the same way. But those who do respond are ready for stage two—the stimulation of desire for improvement. Dissatisfaction with the status quo is not enough by itself to lead man toward a constructive social goal. He must have hope fed by achievement. The man exposed to a bit of city life, educated enough to read the newspaper and understand the national radio broadcasts, and touched by envy of status and power, can as easily sink back into apathy or drift aimlessly through life as he can step up the ladder of social change. The difference is concrete accomplishment, however small, and the prospect for more accomplishment. His larger hopes must be encouraged by the realization of his smaller ones as he moves toward that well-publicized revolution of rising expectations.

The third stage, granted to those who have survived the incentives of the second, comes when man begins to look at himself as an individual, with unique talents and particular needs to express them. At this stage he is indeed prepared to make the break with his family, tribe and village and to develop himself into a productive unit for the service of those around him. But this is a far more sophisticated business, because the desires of the individual and the needs of his society may be only imperfectly meshed. They may, further, be frustrated by the social structure and the mores of the society itself. By now, however, the new man has become a much more independent and even abrasive factor in society; he will not be content with just any education or any set of skills if he cannot see, sooner or later, a connection between his new training and the fulfillment of his new desires.

It is at this stage that a traditional system of education will come under intense pressure for reform, both from its dissatisfied consumers and from those who feel responsible for social improve-

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ment. Support of traditional educational systems—those based on aristocratic notions of who should be allowed to have an education, on ancient patterns of lecture-response, on outmoded and irrelevant curricula, on part-time faculty—can in fact be counterproductive, for such education will only discourage our new man and block his progress. It is also for those at this stage of development that the setting of educational priorities is so important. Exclusive emphasis on literacy programs may be the key factor in giving a sense of achievement to our dissatisfied man in stage two, but if educational priorities have not been worked out carefully—if all the investment of money and talent has gone into literacy training—there may very well be no one available to teach the skills needed by those who have reached stage three. And it is certain that without attention to those in the third stage of development, there will be a severe shortage of teachers for the next generation of illiterates.

Given a degree of literacy, mobility, outside example, hope confirmed by experience, and a system of education that will teach him the skills he needs, our new man is well on his way toward modernization. He has also become a force for change. But he soon discovers that his biggest task remains. He has found his independence, and now he must find his place. It is not enough to protest: the modern man must participate, and participation involves new structure, new rules and new human relations. At this point, the process of assistance becomes complex indeed, for here individual training must be supplemented by social understanding of ever increasing difficulty.

In this fourth stage, the process of choice becomes complex as well. For it is here that the economic man must face the problem of organizing the society around him in a way that will somehow protect his interests. He may choose the short run, an authoritarian rule that will abridge the tedious process of educating his former friends and family. He may see the advantages of the long run, a more open society that will make development more difficult but perhaps more sure. Whatever his predilection, he will have to develop a social philosophy that justifies, at least to himself, the exercise of authority with respect to his interests. In short, to become an effective economic man he must become a political man.

During all this process of growth and development, he will have undergone profound changes. He will have a life indepen-

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dent of his family, tribe or village. He will come to value ability rather than status, talent rather than lineage. He will recognize the importance of professional skills. He will have renounced one set of ties only to accept another—but the difference is important: the old ties were involuntary, the new he chose freely himself. He will become during this process a modern individual with a new sense of identity. In his more ebullient moments he will feel that at last he can determine his own fate; in more realistic times his optimism will be tempered by the obvious intractability of mankind. Whether he realizes it or not, he will be a modern man, and his country's development and hope will turn on his energy and judgment.

Even from such a rough analysis, it must be clear that the man who survives this difficult climb is rare indeed. Some may make it in one generation; for others to reach stage three or four may be the achievement of many slow and painful steps by many generations before them. Our current focus on this precious pool of men and women is well considered. Only such people can manage a modern state. Only they can assume the large responsibilities of a modern government and bring to it the efficiency and dispassion such a government requires. Only these people have the attitudes and the ambitions necessary to master the new and important callings of science, medicine and the arts.

III

In our programs for assisting these new men, we are doing some things right. The current drive toward literacy is sound, for without widespread literacy the world will be forever anchored down by those mired in stage one. The emphasis on training teachers for secondary schools is vital for the development of those moving into stage three. Our support of strong universities makes possible the widening of horizons so necessary to the whole educational system.

Our exchange programs, aimed at increasing the traffic of persons to this and other countries, are on the right track as well. No more yeasty influence exists in the modernizing countries than those men and women who have had an educational experience in Europe or the United States. They will always know their life can be different, and they will have ideas about how it can be changed. They will always feel that they are part of a larger society. One has only to spend a day in the Department of

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Agriculture in Thailand, for example, to realize that there is a direct connection between the overseas training of its top officials and the progressive activity of the department as a whole.

It is at just this point, however, that our foreign and domestic policies come into conflict. For one of the gravest problems facing the underdeveloped world is the fact that all too many of its best-trained men and women leave home and never return to the departments of agriculture or the schools or the hospitals. If we accept the fact that those who climb the ladder of change are a minority at best, that the climb was difficult, and that the presence of these people determines whether or not a foreign assistance program will succeed, then we must understand that it is far more critical for the less developed world to lose them than it is for the more developed world to gain them. Yet it is just this loss we not only countenance but encourage. While with one hand we give laboratory equipment, train teachers, send our own teachers, build buildings—all on the very simple propositions that the modernization of the underdeveloped world is in our immediate and demonstrated self-interest and that the critical component of a modernizing society is its modernizing men—with the other hand we take away not only the raw materials but the very people who have been so carefully trained to develop them.

The basis of this conflict lies in the fact that growth is the law of life for mature economies as well as young ones. The needs of the developed world are both varied and insistent, cutting across the requirements of the less developed countries in almost every direction. A mature country wants access to raw materials which it can transform into finished products itself. The supplying country believes, with justice, that it must learn to convert its own raw materials if its workers are to advance their knowledge and use their skills. Again, every responsible advanced nation is concerned about such things as gold outflow, balance of payments, trade and dollar gaps, and seeks to protect its growth by favorable import quotas and other aggressive action in the world market. At the same time, a young and growing economy needs growing markets, and the pressure to export increases as the economy matures. The less developed country does not just want to buy cars, it wants to make them; eventually it may even want to export them. The conflict can be severe enough between countries as sophisticated as Canada and the United States when,

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for example, one wants to sell finished paper and the other insists on importing only the pulp. At what a disadvantage, then, is Peru or the Congo in the face of the insatiable American or European colossus.

In all of this, an overriding interest—and responsibility—of a developing nation is to create the jobs and the incentives for those who are moving up the ladder and demanding more sophisticated employment. But it is precisely these people who find employment in the United States so much more financially and professionally rewarding. And it is just their talents and skills that fit so well into our own shortages. The result is that we have gradually changed our immigration laws to reduce the inflow of unskilled help, so badly needed in the last century, in favor of the skilled help we now require. It is no longer the call to "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses;" now we ask for your alert, your privileged, your brainy, your talented. Our machines can do the menial work. Today the emphasis is on technical skill, sophisticated training and adaptability to modern society.

The conclusion is inescapable. The United States as a mature but still growing nation has an apparently unlimited demand for precisely those people most desperately needed by the countries we are spending billions of dollars annually to help. The figures are by no means complete either for the flow of assistance or the counterflow of brainpower. But the statistics that have been developed on the so-called "brain drain" present a somber picture. According to one UNESCO report, 43,000 scientists and engineers emigrated to the United States between 1949 and 1961, "many" of whom came from the less developed countries. Of the 11,200 immigrants from Argentina alone between 1951 and 1963, nearly half were technicians and professional people, 15 percent were high-level administrators and 38 percent skilled workers. In 1964–65, 28 percent of the internships and 26 percent of the residencies in U. S. hospitals were filled by foreign graduates—nearly 11,000 in all—and 80 percent of the foreign interns and 70 percent of the foreign residents were from developing countries. The drain from Asian nations, particularly Taiwan and Korea, is the most serious: it is estimated that over 90 percent of the Asian students who come here to study never return home. In Europe—especially in Britain, which is inadvertently bleeding the Commonwealth of its most highly trained men—the situa-

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tion is much the same. As John C. Shearer correctly puts it, "The movement of high-level human resources may, to a great extent, account for the persistent and ever widening gaps between rich and poor areas."

Here is the cruel fact of life: we are in competition with the results of our own assistance policies. While we support the idea of foreign development, our domestic needs may be quietly making hash of our best efforts abroad. In that case, foreign aid might simply be a misnomer for domestic assistance with overseas implications. What can we do about it?

First, we must find out the facts. No one seems to know, even roughly, what our actual support of manpower development adds up to. We know even less about the drain of foreign talent, either in numbers or cost. We should get these figures and then make them visible for public scrutiny and debate.

Then we must concentrate on a variety of measures that will encourage this precious pool of manpower to put its talents to work at home. This part of the job will call for both imagination and understanding. We must recognize, on the one hand, that the United States is a land of opportunity and hope, a country whose doors have traditionally been open to those seeking a new life and a new challenge. It is in many senses a generous nation as well as an omniverous one. Its government and its educational institutions have adjusted themselves with considerable care, perhaps even some success, to the needs of the many (now officially 82,000, but more likely well over 100,000) foreign students who come here in increasing numbers each year. And now these institutions are adding to this care their concerted efforts to induce these foreign students to return home.

But we must also recognize the fact that we can make it too easy for the talented and the skilled to come here and to stay, and that there are ways we can help to make "home" a more attractive place to be. We can, for example, close up some of the more selfish loopholes—the special waivers that allow students to stay here in our own "national interest," particularly if they can teach a foreign language or be useful to the defense department; the cynical exploitation of foreign students by the diploma mills; the all-too-easy solutions to our need for teaching assistants, laboratory aides and medical workers, offered in the name of scholarships and fellowships. We can increase the productivity of our own medical and professional schools to relieve our de-

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pendence on foreign nationals. We can, as many students of this subject have suggested, raise our entrance requirements for all foreign students, limit the admission of undergraduate foreign students, tailor their education more carefully for problems they will meet at home, and place far more emphasis in our aid programs on the upgrading of universities abroad.

Perhaps even more important will be the incentives that we can help the developing countries create to draw the interest of their best people. Gregory Henderson of Harvard has suggested the use of return scholarships and a special Peace Corps effort to put foreign students to work in their native countries. Some American business firms are beginning to search out qualified foreign students in this country for employment at home. Recently, a group of business leaders established a fellowship program for the training of students "who have a definite intent to return to their home countries at the completion of their fellowships." Where the emigration occurs because there is a temporary oversupply of university people—as is the case currently in Taiwan and India—arrangements might be made to lend this surplus to other less developed countries or to retrain these people for tasks that fit the level of their own country's development.

Whatever the specific measures—and with a little imagination the list can be endless—we must understand that modern men, wherever they are, have the same needs. The United States has come to be a mecca—and Europe hardly less so—because it provides a continual education, stimulation, mobility, contact with new ideas, opportunities to create and to serve. But the world has now become small enough and its remotest corner accessible enough so that these modern men can reach out to one another from any point on the globe. The university that keeps its avenues of communication open to alumni wherever they may be, the business that gives its foreign employees a chance to move around and bring home new ideas, the less developed country itself that uses its trained manpower to the full—all contribute to this lifelong process of the nourishment of modern man.

This country must now take the lead. We must work to increase the bargaining power of the less developed countries so that the drain is not a disaster. And we must call forth our highest powers of statesmanship to contain our short-run domestic interests in favor of our longer-range interest in the welfare and progress of man.

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THE NEW SOVIET PLAN: GUNS STILL BEFORE BUTTER

By Timothy Sosnovy

THE published figures of the new Soviet Five Year Plan attracted wide attention in the world press. This is understandable. Implementation of the plan will result in an increase in Soviet economic and military might and will provide a base for the extension of Soviet political and economic influence. Although the new plan has not been finally adopted—it is scheduled to be approved later by the Supreme Soviet—one may assume that in all important respects the plan is set.

The Sixth Five Year Plan (1956–1960) was abolished in September 1957 because it was found to be unrealistic. The Seven Year Plan (1959–1965) which replaced it was not fulfilled in the majority of its main objectives—national income, agriculture, standard of living, labor productivity, etc. Virtually no data have been published on the results of the plan, the only admission being that "fulfillment of the plan was hampered by serious shortages" and that "certain difficulties were encountered in expanding the economy."

The Eighth Five Year Plan (1966–1970) has three distinctive features. The first is that it is more realistic and takes previous experience into account. In the preceding plan, national income was to increase by 65 percent, to be achieved in 7.4 percent yearly increases; actually, the increase was about 4.4 percent annually. The planned increase in the output of agricultural products during this period was set at 70 percent, about 8 percent per year; the actual increase in the seven-year period was only 10 percent, or less than 2 percent per year. In other words, agricultural output barely kept ahead of population growth. In 1965 the grain harvest, for example, amounted to 120.5 million metric tons, as compared with the planned figure of 180 million tons.

Under the new Five Year Plan, the national income is scheduled to increase by 38 to 41 percent, or about 6.7 percent per year, while the volume of industrial production is supposed to show a 47 to 50 percent rise, or about 8 percent per year. In agriculture, the 1970 target figure is arrived at by increasing the 1961–1965 average yearly production by 25 percent. For grain production, the planned overall increase is 30 percent in com-

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parison with the previous five-year period, the target being 167 million metric tons in 1970.

The second new feature of the plan is the effort of the new leaders to conciliate the collective farmers, who up to now have been treated like second-class citizens. The dismal failures in agriculture are forcing the leaders to make far-reaching promises to "narrow the gap between the standards of living of the rural and urban population," "overcome the differences in social and economic benefits and in living conditions that exist between city and village," and "introduce guaranteed monthly wages to the collective farmers."

The third new feature is the abandonment of the slogan, "Overtake and surpass the U.S.A." The goal in the previous Seven Year Plan was to exceed the current level of American industrial production in a number of important types of production, and to equal it in others. In addition, total and per capita output of farm products was to exceed that in the United States. At the same time, it was emphasized that by 1965 the countries of the Communist bloc would produce more than half the world's industrial output. In the new plan, not a word is said about any of this, although in his speech at the Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party, Premier Kosygin referred to the competition between the two systems as a historically inevitable process. In actual fact, the countries of the Communist bloc are at present producing about one-third of the world's output, although they claim to be turning out two-fifths.

It is interesting to note that two years ago Professor V. Starovsky, Chairman of the Central Statistical Administration of the U.S.S.R., accused American economists of misrepresenting the facts, of deliberately distorting the actual situation, in their statements concerning the decreased rate of growth of the Soviet economy.[1] Today, however, these statements are generally recognized as factual. Soviet economists have calculated that as a result of lowered growth rates during the six-year period 1959–1964, the Soviet national income actually fell 41 billion rubles ($45.5 billion) below what it would otherwise have been.[2]

There may, then, be some truth in the accusation directed at Khrushchev—namely, that his errors of voluntarism, subjectiv-

[1] *Pravda,* March 14, 1964, p. 2–3.

[2] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Problems of Economics), No. 2, 1966, p. 8. At the current official rate, 1 ruble equals $1.11.

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FULFILLMENT OF THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN (1959–1965) AND BASIC TARGETS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1966–1970)

BASIC PRODUCTS	*UNITS*	*OUTPUT* 1965 *Fulfillment*			1970	
		Plan	*Amount*	*%*	*Plan*	*% increase over plan 1965*
Steel	mil. metric tons	91	91	100	129	41.7
Coal	mil. metric tons	609	578	94.4	675	10.8
Petroleum	mil. metric tons	240	243	101.2	355	47.9
Gas	mil. cubic meters	150	129.2	86.1	240	60.0
Electric power	billion kwh	520	507	97.5	850	63.4
Cement	mil. metric tons	81	72.4	89.4	105	29.6
Fertilizers	mil. metric tons	36	31.3	86.9	65	80.5
Grain	mil. metric tons	180	120.5	66.9	167	−7.2
Sugar	mil. metric tons	10	8.9	89.0	10	—
Meat	mil. metric tons	6.1	4.8	78.7	6.2	1.6
Whole milk	mil. metric tons	13.5	11.5	85.2	17	25.9
Butter	thousand metric tons	1,006	1,066	105.9	1,160	15.3
Cloth	mil. sq. m.	10,620	7,500	70.6	9,800	−7.7
Shoes	mil. pairs	515	486	94.3	630	22.3
Metal cutting machine tools	thousands	200	185	92.5	230	15.0
Motor vehicles of all types	thousands	856	616.4	72.0	1,510	76.4
passenger cars			201.2		800	297.6
Housing construction						
a) in urban areas	mil. sq. m. floor sp.	94.3	79.5	84.3	96.0	1.8
b) in rural areas	mil. houses	1.0	0.5	50.0	0.5	−50.0

Sources: *"Kontrol'nyye tsifzy razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR na 1959–1965 gody,"* (Planned Figures for Development of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1959–1965), p. 30, 34–36, 39, 40, 43–44, 51, 69, 98; *Pravda,* February 3, p. 1–2; February 20, p. 1–4; April 10, p. 2–5, 1966.

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ism, and other sins (by whatever name) caused the present economic difficulties, although this contradicts Marxist doctrine concerning the role of personality in history. But one thing is clear beyond doubt—the Soviet economy (as well as those of the other countries of the Communist bloc) is in trouble. The planned economy is undergoing severe trials. Successful fulfillment of the Eighth Five Year Plan will depend to a considerable extent on whether the projected reforms designed to stimulate the Soviet economy can be effectively implemented.

II

In the new Five Year Plan, the Soviets are investing some 205 billion rubles ($227.5 billion) in the productive sector of the national economy (industry, agriculture, transportation and communication). Of this amount, two-fifths (126 billion rubles) have been allocated to industry—88 percent of it to heavy industry. Electric power, machine-building, chemicals and metal-working will receive priority. Considerable expansion is projected in such new fields as electronics, electronic engineering, atomic power engineering, electronic computers and synthetic materials; clearly these are particularly important to the current and potential growth of the country's economic and military strength.

Will these hundreds of billions of rubles be more effectively used than in the past? First, we need to review briefly some of the causes of inefficiency in the Soviet economy.

The country's labor force has been ineffectively and wastefully used. Contrary to popular belief, every year millions of industrial workers transfer from one plant to another on their own initiative, and of these one-third change their profession.[3] Soviet economists have estimated that in 1963 this resulted in the loss of 54.5 million man-days in Soviet industry and 10.4 million man-days in construction. The cost to the economy was 2 billion rubles.[4]

Bad management, wastefulness and excessive overhead expenses have reduced the effectiveness of investments. Also, the consumption of many types of raw materials, fuel and electric power per unit of production has been excessive; in the machine-building industry, for example, waste metal amounts to nearly half, by weight, of the finished parts. Finally, there have been

[3] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1965, p. 29.

[4] *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Planned Economy), No. 6, 1965, p. 44; *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1965, p. 27.

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gross miscalculations in planning, especially in the area of capital investment. Unfinished construction in 1964 amounted to 27.1 billion rubles, or 68 percent of capital investment; reduction of this figure to 50–55 percent would release over 6 billion rubles. The excessively long periods of time required for industrial construction and the slowness in organizing have resulted in an annual loss of another 10 billion rubles.[5]

A variety of measures are planned to increase industrial efficiency. Administration of industry on a territorial basis through *Sovnarkhozes* (Councils of the National Economy), introduced in 1957, is now being discontinued, and All-Union and Union-Republic ministries for the administration of particular branches of industry are being recreated on the old pattern. Measures will be taken to improve planning, and greater emphasis will be placed on the role of the State Planning Commission and on centralized planning in general. However, the directors of industrial plants will gain increased power and autonomy. This will be reflected in a decrease (to eight) in the number of economic indicators in the industrial plans approved for the plants by higher government agencies. With respect to labor, for example, only the plant wage fund will be subject to official approval; each plant will independently plan the number of workers, the labor productivity and average wages without the necessity for approval by higher government agencies.

Special funds are being set up with which to make maximum use of incentives for all workers, from common laborer to director. Wage increases will be determined to a large extent by the performance of the given plant—increased output, improved quality of the products, higher labor productivity, greater earning capacity and higher profits. Basically the same principle is involved in the introduction of payments into the general funds of the plant—a transition from non-reimbursable allocations for capital construction to long-term crediting.

These new reforms are in the nature of a compromise, having two mutually exclusive objectives: to make the director the central figure at the plant, with greater independence and leeway; and to give greater weight to centralized planning. The difficulty of translating these reforms into solutions of specific problems is illustrated by the case of a pillow factory which requires pillowcase material 61–62 centimeters wide, whereas the textile factory

[5] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1966, p. 7–8.

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makes pillow-case material which is 80 centimeters wide. *Pravda* reported: "Correspondence concerning this problem has been going on for no less than seven years between the [pillow] factory and the Union-Republic and All-Union planning organizations. Not the slightest progress has been made." Will the director now be able to solve this type of problem? Will there be some changes in the *modus operandi* of the various planning agencies? What will be the role of the innumerable ministries and committees in such a situation?

It is unclear in what way improvement will come about in the operations of the higher planning agencies, whose function is to establish a balance in the national economy, to determine its proportions, capital investment, etc. There is no doubt whatsoever that the administration of industry on the territorial principle through *Sovnarkhozes* has been a failure. However, this does not necessarily mean that reversion to centralized ministries will bring about an improvement. The liquidation of these same ministries in 1957 was hailed with the slogan, "Away with the congested bureaucratic maze of Moscow ministries!"

There are many questions as to the effect of the new reform. To what extent will industrial plants be able to establish direct contractual relationships, as has been done in light industry? How will the operation of the State Committee on the Supply of Materials and Equipment be set up? How fast and how successfully will the new wholesale prices be put into effect? And so on.

In one of his articles, Professor E. Liberman, economist at the University of Kharkov, caused considerable misunderstanding by his use of the word "profit" as an indicator for evaluating the performance of an industrial establishment. It must be emphasized that where the right of private ownership of the means of production has been denied and where neither a market nor market relationships exists, the term "profit," like a whole series of related terms (price, credit, etc.), is merely a technical term, without the socio-economic implications which it has under the conditions of a market economy.

Professor Liberman's primary contribution consists in the fact that in 1962 he loudly declared (and for the first time) that all was not well with the operation of the Soviet industrial establishment; the ensuing discussion has led to the present reform, on which the Soviet leaders are placing great hopes.

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III

The present difficulties in Soviet agriculture stem from many and varied causes: the sharp increase in state purchases of grain and other farm products, endless reorganizations, meddling by incompetent administrators in the work of the *kolkhozes,* restrictions placed on the collective farmers (curtailment of personal plots, restricted use of livestock, etc.), and a reduction in the cash payments and payments in kind for their services. In this situation, as previously, the peasant has resorted to the time-tested method of passive resistance. He becomes more occupied with his personal plot than with the work of the collective, or he leaves for the city to engage in construction work. The population of the *kolkhozes* in the R.S.F.S.R. alone decreased by 3.1 million persons, or 27 percent, during the period 1959–1963.[6]

It is now being recognized that the carrot may be more reliable than the stick in dealing with the collective farmers. Hence, under the new plan there will be reforms in agriculture and new concessions to the *kolkhozniks*. The government is establishing a uniform, fixed plan for the purchase of grain, livestock, poultry, milk, eggs and wool, with scheduled increases from year to year through 1970. To increase incentives, higher prices will be paid for all these products. After fulfillment of the grain purchase plans, however, the *kolkhozes* will be forced to sell additional quantities of grain to the state, albeit at increased prices. The new plan promises an increase of 35–40 percent in payments, either in cash or in kind, to the collective farmers from the economy at large, and restrictions on the use of personal plots and livestock have been removed.

Plans have been made to invest 71 billion rubles in agriculture —including 30 billion from *kolkhozes*. The supply of mineral fertilizers will be doubled during the years 1966–1970, and 1,790,000 tractors, 1,100,000 trucks and 550,000 combines are to be provided. The supply of electric power to farms is also to be doubled—an impressive increase until one considers the fact that at present Soviet agriculture consumes less than 4 percent of the total amount of electric power produced. Similarly, the plan calls for the construction of 500,000 houses per year for the rural population; but this only matches the number actually built during the preceding plan period, which fell 50 percent below its goal.

[6] *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 6, 1965, p. 26.

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By these measures the government hopes for a 40–45 percent increase in labor productivity on the state and collective farms. Undoubtedly, the planned capital investment in agriculture, the increase in agricultural machinery and in mineral fertilizers are all important in improving the agricultural situation, but the decisive factor is still the farmer himself and his relation to the *kolkhoz*. The problem for the régime is how to induce the farmer to devote the same effort to the public lands as he does to his own plot. These personal plots of all kinds occupy less than 2 percent of all the arable land in the U.S.S.R., but produce 70 percent of the potatoes, 42 percent of the vegetables, 44 percent of the meat, 45 percent of the milk, 76 percent of the eggs and 22 percent of the wool. About two-thirds of the output of fruit and berries and about a fourth of grapes also come from personal plots. At the same time, the quality of this produce is much better than that of the same crops grown on collective and state farms.

The fact that the rural population lives under much worse conditions than does the urban population should not surprise anyone, but the magnitude of the gap is striking. During recent years some 8–9 billion rubles have annually been withdrawn from the total net income of agriculture for use in the development of other branches of the national economy.[7] For the last thirteen years the urban resident bought 3.8 times more goods per capita than the person living in the countryside.[8] At the same time the rural population had to pay higher prices for the same goods. It consumes only 2 percent of the country's total output of electric power for consumer needs. Water supply lines, sewerage and gas works are rare occurrences in the country. In 1964 the volume of consumer services in urban areas was 4.3 times higher than in the rural areas.

Will these and similar anomalies be eliminated? No doubt the establishment of a stable, fixed plan for the purchase of farm products, the increase of payments to farmers for agricultural products, greater freedom in the use of personal plots and livestock, etc., will change the agricultural situation for the better, just as happened when the reforms were instituted after the death of Stalin. Much will depend, however, on how sincere the government is in its promises, particularly as regards the "introduction of guaranteed monthly wages to the collective farmers."

[7] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 4, 1965, p. 13.
[8] *Ibid.*, No. 7, 1965, p. 32.

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But no miracle will take place. The tragedy of Soviet agriculture consists in the fact that the collective farmer does not feel that he is the master of the *kolkhoz*. The results are well known: with almost half the population living in the country and about one-third of the labor force occupied in agriculture, the U.S.S.R. continues to have serious problems in meeting the needs of its population for foodstuffs, and those of its industry for agricultural raw materials.

IV

One aspect of the Soviet national economy deserves particular attention: the low quality of production. The Soviet system of national planning has resulted in poor quality of industrial goods, consumer goods and all types of construction work, particularly housing. In the R.S.F.S.R., there are special "brigades," comprising 30,000 men, who are working the year round on the elimination of defects in completed construction projects.[9] Legal prosecution for the manufacture of defective goods or low-quality products has not so far achieved any significant improvement. The situation results in countless losses to the national economy and hurts the Russians' chances of expanding foreign trade. The Soviet government recognizes these deficiencies and the Eighth Five Year Plan attempts to cope with them.

The new plan stresses the necessity of making the most of science and technology in developing the national economy. One obstacle, however, is that in many cases the education and technical competence of workers in the middle age bracket, whose schooling coincided with the war, are inadequate. Since this particular age group is at present the most numerous and most highly skilled, progress in areas of increasingly complex technology may be much affected.

The problem of "unused reserves" or "superfluous labor force" —to use the Soviet terminology—deserves special attention. Despite the wide application of automation, the number of workers in industry is not decreasing, but actually increasing at rates which are not warranted by increased production. Many plants are employing workers who are not needed and are often used for tasks which have no relation to production. According to official statistics for 1961, the loss of work time resulting from this kind of inefficiency at the establishments of the Councils of

[9] *Pravda*, July 7, 1965, p. 2.

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the National Economy alone amounted to 231 million man-days.[10]

Under the new reforms, plant directors will probably make use of the right granted them to determine independently the structure and size of the labor force, within the limits established by the annual wage fund. This will, of course, have a favorable effect on plant performance, but some of the workers will lose their jobs. At the Moscow automobile *Kombinat,* reduction of the labor force amounted to 7 percent as soon as the new system went into effect, while in other industries the percentage of dismissed workers was as much as 20 percent.[11] This means that 2 to 3 million workers are in danger of losing their jobs. The situation is complicated still further by the fact that in 1966 about 3 million young men and women will leave school and enter the labor market. The oft-reported labor shortage in the Soviet Union is no more.

There is talk in the Soviet press of providing support to workers who lose their jobs because of automation. It is pointed out that the cost to the state of keeping superfluous workers on the payroll is very high and that they are hindering efforts to increase labor productivity. Providing material aid to those who have lost their jobs, it is argued, is therefore fully justified economically.[12] However, to take this course is to admit that unemployment exists, and so far the myth that the U.S.S.R. "has had no unemployment since 1930" has prevailed.

V

Let us now consider the standard of living of the Soviet worker. One indicator of a worker's standard of living is the proportion of his total income that is spent on food; the higher this proportion, the lower is the standard of living. In the 10 years 1951–1961 the food budget of the Soviet worker has decreased from 49.3 percent to 46.9 percent. Although the figure may now be somewhat lower, it is still one and one-half to two times higher than that of a European or an American worker.

Also, the promises of the Seven Year Plan to increase wages and salaries 40 percent, to implement a 35-hour work-week for most employees, and to raise minimum salaries to 50–60 rubles a month were not fulfilled. The new plan makes new promises: a

[10] *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 6, 1965, p. 28.

[11] *Kommunist,* No. 18, 1965, p. 69; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Economic News), June 30, 1965, p. 6.

[12] *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 6, 1965, p. 29–30.

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considerable increase in the output of consumer goods, particularly durable goods (including color television), reduction in taxes and a five-day work-week, still of 41 hours. Wages and salaries are scheduled to increase by 20 percent, from the present average of 95 rubles to 115 rubles monthly in 1970.

The proposed plans in the service sector, which includes construction of housing, public utilities, cultural and personal services, are lagging far behind the actual need. At the end of 1965, 50 percent of the urban population was living in state-owned communal apartments, sharing the kitchen, bathroom and other facilities. On the average, 69 square feet of living space were available for each person, while the average housing density was 2.33 persons per room. After fulfillment of the proposed housing plan, somewhat more living space will be available per person by 1970, but it will still be far below the stated health norm of 97 square feet per person.

The situation with regard to municipal facilities is no better. Less than half the city streets have water mains, while the sewerage system is only about half the length of the water supply system.[13] As a result, millions of urban dwellers are living in houses without running water or plumbing.[14] Cities, particularly the large ones, are poorly provided with municipal transportation. For example, according to a recent survey in Novosibirsk, a city of 1 million, each inhabitant spends 246 hours per year waiting for the bus.[15] By the end of 1970, the situation will have improved only slightly.

There is an acute shortage of service establishments such as stores, laundries, barber shops, dry cleaners, various repair shops, etc. For example, laundries employ only 0.11 persons per 1000 population as against 1.7 in the United States; retail establishments employ 16 persons per 1000 population as against 76 in the United States.[16] The new plan provides for considerable expansion of services—for example, dry-cleaning shops will increase by 500 percent—but who can tell whether such arbitrary figures will serve to meet or exceed the demands? It is planned to increase the production of passenger cars from 200,000 in 1965 to 800,000 in 1970. This would mean theoretically that about 5 percent of

[13] *Planovoye khozyaystvo,* No. 2, 1966, p. 36.
[14] *Soviet Studies,* July 1965, p. 111.
[15] *Izvestiya,* April 18, 1965, p. 2.
[16] *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 6, 1965, p. 30.

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Soviet families would be able to own a car. A serious deterrent, however, is the fact that the present price of a car exceeds the average wages of a worker for a period of three years.

VI

The new Five Year Plan sets out two basic tasks: "strengthening of the defensive might of the country" and "a substantial rise in the standard of living of the people." [17] Which is more important? Which is given preference? In short—"guns or butter"?

At the Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party, Brezhnev emphasized the importance of closing the gap between the rate at which the means of production is increasing—52 percent (58 percent in 1961–1965)—and the rate of increase in the production of consumer goods—46 percent (36 percent in 1961–1965). But this needs to be examined in the light of investments in the various sectors of the national economy, as shown in the table below.

It will be noted that in the new Five Year Plan investment in the service sector has been reduced sharply in relative terms—to

INVESTMENT OF STATE AND COÖPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN VARIOUS SECTORS IN COMPARABLE PRICES (BILLIONS OF RUBLES)

Types of Investment	*1918–1958*		*1959–1964*		*1966–1970 (plan)*	
	Amount	*Percent*	*Amount*	*Percent*	*Amount*	*Percent*
Total investment in the national economy—including:	214.4	100	203.2	100	280.0	100
Productive sector (industry, agriculture, transportation, communications)	149.0	69.5	132.6	65.3	205.0	73.2
Investment in industry including:	102.9	48.0	83.8	41.2	126.0	45.0
Heavy industry (producer goods)	90.9	88.3	72.8	86.9	111.0	88.1
Light industry (consumer goods)	12.0	11.7	11.0	13.1	15.0	11.9
Service sector (construction of housing, public utilities, cultural and personal services)	65.4	30.5	70.6	34.7	75.0	26.8

Sources: *"Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1958 godu, Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik"* (National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1958, Statistical Yearbook) Moscow, 1958, p. 622–625; *"Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu, Statisticheskiy Yezhegodnik"* (National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1964, Statistical Yearbook) Moscow, 1965, p. 515; *Pravda,* April 10, 1966, p. 4.

[17] *Pravda,* February 20, 1966, p. 1.

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26.8 percent. Had the relative share of the service sector stayed at the level of 1959–1964, the total investments in it would have amounted to 97.2 billion rubles, instead of the presently planned 75 billion rubles; in other words, the investments would have been greater by 22.2 billion rubles.

Thus, the consumer's interest is relegated to second place. This means that there will not be any "substantial rise in the standard of living of people," as indicated in the plan; the funds to be invested in the service sector are completely inadequate to the needs of the population. For instance, if by the end of 1970 every urban family were to be provided with housing on the principle of "one person, one room," instead of the present rate of 2.33 persons per room, then an additional investment of 100 billion rubles would be required in the service sector.

The relative share of investments in light industry in the new plan has hardly changed at all from the figures of the two previous periods. This fact has various consequences. For heavy industry it means a substantial increase in output. For light industry—that is consumer goods—it means a limited increase of about 12 percent.

Thus, the answer to the question "guns or butter?" has not changed since the First Five Year Plan (1928–1932), when the principles of Soviet investment policy were formulated. However, token efforts have been made to satisfy the people, particularly in the production of consumer goods which do not require a large outlay of capital—such as television sets, washing machines, refrigerators, etc. This is much less expensive than satisfying the need for proper housing, good public utilities or automobiles. Should the new plan succeed, it is estimated that by the end of 1970, 53 percent of Soviet families will own television sets, 41 percent will own washing machines, 31 percent will own refrigerators, and 14 percent will own motorcycles or motorscooters.

We are familiar with the promises of Soviet five-year plans. It is of course impossible to predict whether the Eighth Five Year Plan will be more successful in achieving its stated goals, but one can say with certainty that it will not raise the living standards of the Soviet citizen to the level of the advanced industrial countries of Europe. Considering the Soviet economic potential, this is both a commentary on the inefficiency of the system and a result of the basic decision that guns still come before butter.

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ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM IN A DEVELOPED COUNTRY

By Rudolf Bićanić

WHAT is happening in the political and economic arena in Jugoslavia today should not be haughtily dismissed as the result of disruptive ideological disagreement among self-righteous Marxist factions. Nor is it a reflection of the evil influence of foreign propaganda, Communist or anti-Communist. Nor has it grown out of mischievous activity of reactionary forces eager to achieve the restoration of the old régime.

Some of the problems facing Jugoslavia are particular to Jugoslavia, and in them history and geography speak. But many of the most pressing are those which every community of nations is experiencing today in both East and West, problems of international regionalism or of supranational centralism. Other countries, too, face problems such as inflation versus stability; maximizing growth or the standard of living; authoritarian discipline as a convenience of the few or democratic self-government as the responsibility of the many. And there also are many other problems which are specifically socialist. All the complexities of the modern world are bound to take a special form in a multinational commonwealth of 20,000,000 people seeking to build socialism beyond the present level of $500 national income per head per year.

The casual observer is often puzzled. Only a few years ago Jugoslavia was presented as an example of a country with one of the highest growth rates in the world; now the foremost aim of economic policy is to reduce investment. For more than a decade the socialist economy struggled against bureaucratic command; now an administrative price freeze has had to be introduced It was the first country in the world to initiate workers' management in factories and business enterprises and to abolish the wage system; now there is division about whether this means too much or too little democracy. The 1963 Constitution formally declared a one-party state; yet the top political leaders now emphatically demand that the economy be de-politicized. National problems were said to have been solved; and now the country is pregnant with increased tensions among the constituent nations, tensions newly created and socialist in origin. Efforts to find solutions to

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all these problems are now concentrated into two words: *The Reform.*[1]

It has been said by highly responsible people that this Reform has very great significance, greater even than the introduction of workers' management which has so far been considered the most original contribution made by the Jugoslav brand of socialism. The new policy became possible only when a major political battle between those favoring centralist solutions and those in favor of self-government had cleared the way. First, in 1963, a new Constitution was adopted which confirmed the principles and enlarged the legal framework of self-government, further decentralized the country along federal lines and enhanced democracy within the socialist system. It took two years of inside discussions before the Constitution was adopted. Then, in 1964, at the Eighth Congress of the League of Communists the same policy was restated in clear political terms, as issues became more polarized and clarified. Finally, in 1965, the federal parliament decided that the Reform should be carried out, which meant putting the third stage of socialist development into operation.

The immediate purpose of the Reform was to combat an increasing pace of inflation; to remove a deficit in the balance of payments; to get idle capacity in industry going; to reverse the increase in unemployment; to raise a standard of living so unfavorably low compared to neighboring countries in the West; and to find a form of government able to give the country a consistent economic policy. These short-term objectives were necessarily linked to some longer-term measures of structural change in the economy such as: to overhaul the whole price system; to revise growth and investment policies; to put the productivity of the economy on an internationally competitive level; and to liberalize foreign trade in order to remove the structural causes of its continual deficit. The whole economic system introduced in 1954 had become obsolete, and the new Constitution of 1963 laid down new principles for the economic and political system, the main aim of which could be described as to base the whole economy and society on workers' management. Thus the Reform is an integration of short-term and long-term economic objectives and the implementation of the 1963 Constitution.

To make clear what this means we must review the develop-

[1] One of the most systematic and comprehensive presentations of the causes of the Reform and of the measures taken in it can be found in K. Džeba-M. Beslac, "Privredna reforma. Sto i zašto se mijenja." Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1965.

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ment of the Jugoslav economic system in the two previous stages. First came administrative socialism of the Stalinist type from 1945 to 1952, inaugurated in the Constitution of January 1946. This was followed by what was known as the "New System" of 1953 to 1964, given legal blessing in the constitutional reform law of 1953. The third stage was formulated in the new Constitution of 1963.

II

1. *The mechanism of social control.* In the Stalinist centralized type of economic system, government machinery was completely merged with party organization and business management into one monolithic system, run by authoritarian, centralized command through the medium of directives. That is, orders issued from those above to those below in the hierarchical system were not binding on those above, but had to be implemented without question by those below. This inefficient system blocked initiative from underneath and placed responsibility for numerous operational decisions—and mistakes—on top party leaders. It was finally discontinued at the end of 1952.

Under the decentralized New System the government apparatus was separated from business management, and workers' management was introduced into business organizations, which were authorized to run current operations. In the government, the bureaucratic element was separated from the political party organization, and ultimately the position of the top party functionaries was separated from that of the head of the government. Ministries were abolished and only a small number of administrative state secretaries remained. Instead of being subordinated to ministries, the socialist enterprises formed their branch associations, federated into business chambers, to organize coöperation and represent their interests. Parliament, although consisting of Communist Party members only, nevertheless became less and less a rubber stamp. In this tripartite ramification the position of the party organization was that of arbiter, without formal responsibility for running current affairs; this made criticism and even personal changes in government possible without directly engaging the authority of the Party. In spite of this, however, the de facto influence of party officials remained great, and this led to a split between the real decision-makers and those who had to bear the responsibility for implementing decisions.

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The Reform emphasized the fight against government bureaucracy, which continued to wield great influence at all levels, notwithstanding the self-management legislation. Moreover, a further division in the mechanism of social control was taking place. The aim now was to de-politicize decision-making in business management, not only in regard to current operations but also in the field of investment and with regard to branch size, location and financing.[2]

The main criticism of the politically minded was that they pushed their special interests with no regard for economic optimums; interfered in the selection of top personnel of business enterprises, taking political reliability as a justification for promotion in spite of managerial incapacity; and put pressure on enterprises, demanding expenditure beyond what the law ordered for extra-economic funds and fiscal benefits. The federal authorities were not immune to criticism either.

Those who oppose de-politicization claim that it is a sign of the decomposition of Communist control. Its supporters claim it is a prerequisite of the increased division of social functions necessary in a developed society.

2. *Property relations.* In the centralized system all business organizations, industries, banking, transport, commerce, mining, building—everything except small-scale handicrafts employing up to five persons—became state property. A drive to nationalize agriculture also took place at an accelerated rate.

In the decentralized system, all nationalized property remained, but its character changed from state to "social" property, which meant that management was taken out of the hands of the state administration and (in 1950) given over to the workers' councils, whose power gradually increased. In 1959 nationalization of houses and building sites took place, but the forcible collectivization of peasant property was discontinued in 1953, and only purchase or economic coöperation was used to increase further the

[2] Tito said, "It is my opinion that we must absolutely discontinue the practice of political people deciding where and what should be built, and how much. This is something the enterprises and factories should decide. . . . The building of new factories will also be decided upon through the intermediary of the banks. But political factors should keep out. We political people can give only general lines of an investment policy; you must make the decisions." (*Borba,* December 31, 1965.) Vladimir Bakarić, President of the Assembly of the National Republic of Croatia, stated explicitly that, before the Reform, "Power in Jugoslavia was in the hands of quite a social segment ranging from party to leading business officials (*rukovodilaca*): all these lost their power when self-management was introduced in factories and enterprises." (*Borba,* March 6, 1966.)

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socialist sector in agriculture. The basic fact was that, with the two exceptions of peasant holdings (limited to 10 hectares) and small handicrafts (limited to five workers) it was no longer possible to increase the size of the socialist sector by expropriation, but only by savings from the income produced by the workers themselves within the socialist sector.

The Reform faced the following situation: The rural exodus had increased more quickly than the effective demand for labor in the socialist sector, which led to considerable unemployment, a reduction in labor productivity and an increase in the cost of housing and communal services in towns. Ever-increasing imports of food for the growing industrial population and for millions of foreign tourists increased the demand for agricultural products which the socialist agricultural sector and existing peasant production were not in a position to satisfy. Prices of agricultural products therefore rose and a change in the policy toward the unused capacity of peasant holdings became necessary. The growing tourist business argued in favor of further use of the private sector in the catering trade.

3. *The position of the enterprise.* Under administrative socialism, enterprises were totally smothered by state administration. All materials were supplied to them, prices and costs were determined by ministries, sales were transformed into allocation orders, all profits anticipated were paid into—and consequently all deficits covered by—the state budget. The enterprise became a technical unit of government administration.

In the decentralized system, socialist enterprises were free to operate their current activities according to their own decisions and at their own risk. They sold their products on the market, bought raw materials, decided on the employment of personnel, contracted loans and made their own annual plans. They had to cover costs by proceeds from the market, and shared the benefits with the social community (federation, republic and commune). This sharing underwent several changes, from profit sharing to income sharing, until finally the wage system was abolished and instead the workers' councils were given the right to dispose of part of the income of the enterprise allocated to its funds, while another part of the income was allocated to the workers as their personal income. This distribution was, on an average, as follows: 60 percent of the income of the enterprise went to the social community, 27 percent to the workers, and 13 percent to the funds

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for self-financing. But investment resources remained centralized, and so did decisions regarding the founding of new enterprises—a matter left to the political authorities.

Under the Reform a much bigger share of the income was allocated to the enterprise—*i.e.* 70 percent for investment and workers' personal income. The fiscal burden on the enterprises was diminished: the income tax on enterprises was abolished, the capital tax was reduced from 6 to 4 percent of working capital, the turnover tax, hitherto paid by producers, was changed into a consumers' sales tax collected by the retail trade. The workers' councils were left to decide what proportions of the income at their disposal should go to the self-investment fund and to workers' personal income. Only 30 percent of the net income, instead of 60, was to be taken by the social community. This was to satisfy a long-standing complaint of the enterprises that those which had proved they were able to earn were punished by having their income taken away, while those incapable of making an income were rewarded by being given investment funds and subsidies from the central funds.

Whether enterprises are going concerns must be tested on the market. Prices are to be those of the world market, and enterprises which cannot stand such competition, with normal customs protection, will have to make efforts to do so, and reorganize, or close their doors. As many industrial enterprises were built on too small a scale and below minimum technological standards, and suffer from lagging production or incompetent management, this requirement of the Reform means a major structural change. No doubt the final responsibility will rest with the workers' councils, but a great deal of research, help and advice will be necessary; the workers' councils cannot be burdened with something which they are not capable of doing.

4. *Savings and investment policy*. In the system of administrative socialism all savings were incorporated into the overall state budget, and investment decisions were made by the top political bodies in the centralized plan.

The main innovation of the New System was the separation of investment funds from the state budget, *i.e.* the bulk of the investment savings was collected into a general investment fund by the central Investment Bank, which made microeconomic decisions regarding their distribution upon request of the individual enterprises, while macroeconomic decisions (how much

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for which sector and branch of industry) were made by the annual Social Plans. Thus some decision was shifted from the state bureaucracy to the bank bureaucracy, and the procedure became so complicated that in the end the decisions were guided by political factors.

As we have already said, the Reform demands that investment decisions be left to the enterprises. The free funds are concentrated and credits given by the banks on business principles. Therefore the General Investment Fund and other funds were discontinued in 1965, and their function taken over by the investment banks.

5. *Consumption and the standard of living.* The centralized system put standards of living and personal consumption on a very low level of priority. Administrative planning, low wages, moral stimulation rather than economic incentive for productivity, and a small span between the wages for skilled and unskilled labor—these were the main characteristics of the system. Only one exception must be emphasized: enlarged care for education and health, and an expansion of social insurance.

The decentralized system gave greater attention to consumption, which doubled from 1953 to 1963. Beginning in 1954, competition increased the choice and variety of goods, and this, plus the fact that imported goods were available, acted as a stimulus to employees to work more in order to be able to buy more. The stimulation of production by workers' management, income sharing, market economy and consumer credits also contributed to the increase in the consumption level. Changes took place among the consumers themselves. Over a million people shifted to towns and became urban consumers; a cultural revolution increased the level of education and stimulated new wants. The influx of foreign tourists and the large number of workers abroad (over 200,000) had their effect too.

The general line of policy was to stimulate production and productivity by higher incomes; this was counteracted from below by demands for equalization of income.

The Reform's main task was to link the level of living to that of productivity, and to raise both. These aspirations had to be suppressed temporarily because of the price increases of some agricultural products (meat, milk); the reduction of imports and forced exports of certain consumer goods; limitations on the disposable income in enterprises; and the pursuit of a deflationary

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policy. Compensation proposed by the Reform to offset income reduction had to be paid from the funds of the enterprises. All these measures intensified the problem of raising the level of consumption and increased pressure to carry out the Reform faster.

6. *Economic growth policy*. The centralized system had just one objective: to maximize investment while fixing an order of priority for the means of production over consumption, heavy industry over light, industry over agriculture. The rule was stiff: maximize growth at any cost, with no regard for optimization.

This obsession with growth continued in the decentralized stage of Jugoslav socialism. The rate of growth in the manufacturing industries was one of the highest in the world. Growth was still based on compulsory saving, with a threefold burden on existing fixed capital (*i.e.* on developed sectors): centralization of funds for depreciation, capital tax (6 percent) and the interest rate on long-term capital loans. The order of priorities, however, changed. After 1955, priority was given to those industries which could accumulate the greatest savings in the shortest time, mainly light and consumer goods industries. Decentralization of industries took place so that in each administrative district ("a little to everyone") industry had to accomplish a triple purpose: to create a working class or enlarge it; to provide fiscal income for the local administration; and to increase production. This led to the creation of a number of small and inefficient "political factories," built with credits provided from centralized funds—*i.e.* with other people's money. Thus the building of the "political factories" was the end result of the centralized investment fund. Had the investors had to do it from their own resources, they would have thought it over twice. Integration became the slogan of the next phase, but it, too, met with many obstacles, some subjective (*i.e.* resistance of the managers and local politicians). The merger of healthy and sick enterprises was often carried out for political reasons, regardless of reasons that were stronger.

The Reform demands that an end be put to this overall maximization of growth, and instead advances the principle of selective growth. Formerly the rate of industrial growth was 15 percent; the presently planned rates are between 7 and 10 percent, which is still very high. Many grandiose investment projects have been abandoned, and the whole federal investment commitment, which already centralized 80 percent of all available funds for the next five years, is being revised.

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7. *The price system and stabilization policy.* Low prices for capital goods, raw materials and food, high prices (increased by the turnover tax) for consumer goods, both imposed by the central government—such was the main policy of prices and income during the first period. This meant a régime of fixed, low wages which in turn provided labor services of low productivity; and yet because labor was cheap there was little incentive to substitute for it capital of higher productivity. Technical improvement was a matter of automonous decision, not induced by production costs. Thus in spite of heavy outlays for costly equipment and machines, often paid for with precious foreign currency, they frequently lay idle in sheds and fields because the system made them more expensive to use than labor.

In the decentralized system macro-income distribution was altered and market prices replaced fixed prices imposed by the government. Agricultural prices remained low and so did those of raw materials, semi-finished goods, power and transport. This was to stimulate industrialization and also to prevent abuse of the monopolistic position of these sectors. Other prices increased. The share of the gross national product taken for investment remained high (33.4 percent in 1964) and decisions to invest greatly surpassed the volume of production of investment goods, so that the prices of these increased 50 percent more than the general price index. Therefore, as early as 1957 limited price control was introduced. Inflationary pressure, caused by ever-increasing demand, had increased to such an extent by 1964 that galloping inflation threatened unless measures to stem it were taken and a stabilization policy introduced, curtailing, in the first place, investments.[3]

The Reform introduced a stabilization policy which explicitly deflated bank credits, reduced consumer credits, strengthened price control and severely curtailed spending (particularly on investment) at all levels of government—federal, republic and communal.

Planning also had to be changed. The decentralized system had reversed central, authoritarian state planning and introduced combined macro-microeconomic planning by annual and five-year federal, republic and communal social plans. The Reform abolished yearly social plans altogether, kept five-year plans as

[3] In 1965 the effect of the Reform was to reduce the investment share in the G.N.P. to 27.6 percent. (*Borba,* February 4, 1966.)

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"moral and political commitments" and relied primarily on enterprise plans.

8. *Foreign trade and the balance of payments.* From a complete state monopoly of foreign trade, the Jugoslav system moved to an open economy in three stages.

The centralized system was autarkic; it looked on foreign imports as a necessary evil to provide capital goods for which it had to pay with exports. The main interest was in amassing foreign currency; the domestic planned system of exchange of goods and of prices was considered completely divorced from the outside world. The decentralized system introduced first the commercial independence of enterprises on foreign markets. Foreign trading enterprises had to cover their expenses by their proceeds. At the same time, the volume of foreign trade began to increase rapidly. The idea that industrialization would make the country independent of foreign countries in the sense of less trade was seen to be erroneous; imports increased, not balanced by adequate exports. Multiple rates of exchange were introduced to cover the gap. But all these manipulated rates proved in the end to be ineffective and foreign debts increased rapidly.

Trading with Western countries was of vital interest for Jugoslav industries and for the food supply, to which the United States and other foreign aid and commercial credits, West and East, made significant contributions. The balance-of-payments deficit was to a great extent covered by foreign credits, international and commercial. Exports did not expand because of increased demand on the home market, lack of agricultural products and the level of prices abroad which made it difficult for Jugoslav exporters to compete. The centralized accumulation of foreign currency did not stimulate increased exports.

The Reform introduced the following changes. First, the multiple exchange rate has been replaced by a uniform rate based on 1,250 dinars to the dollar. Reorganization will make possible trade based on world market prices.[4] In foreign commerce, the main stress is now on liberalization. All quantitative restrictions will be

[4] The use of world market prices for international trade among socialist countries is not a new one. The Eastern bloc (C.E.M.A.) took world prices as a basis for exchange. The difference between the C.E.M.A. and the Jugoslav system is that the former uses average prices of some past years while the latter takes actual world market prices. The Jugoslav Reform takes them as a measure for domestic prices as well, while other socialist countries stick to their domestic planned prices, each of them having a different structure from the others so that they cannot be brought under a common denominator.

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removed. Customs duties, reduced from 23 to 11 percent, will remain as the chief form of domestic protection against foreign competition. A reserve fund of foreign currency will gradually have to be built up to $500,000,000 and then free convertibility will be introduced. In 1965, for the first time since 1945, Jugoslavia had an active balance of exports over imports. There was a satisfactory increase in invisible exports, especially from the tourist trade, the merchant fleet and remittances of workers from abroad.

It has now been recognized that the main Jugoslav economic problems cannot be solved within the country. This means completely abandoning any idea of autarky and accepting a policy of long-term structural integration of the Jugoslav economy into the world division of labor in place of merely short-term commercial operations. Instead of fear of competition, there will be a more self-confident policy of competitive interdependence which will pull the Jugoslav economy the hard but rewarding way toward progress.

III

To sum up, the Reform intends to achieve far-reaching results indeed. Its aim is no less than to build a model of a socialist system for a developed country, one which will be able to stand the competition of other developed countries and progress on its own merits, without the constant tutelage of government machinery. This is to be achieved by a process of what I would call the four Ds: Decentralization, De-étatization, De-politicization and Democratization. The process has been begun within the framework of a Communist ideology and a one-party system, but it would not be objective to deny that it has an effectively liberalizing and progressively humanizing character.[5]

How might the Reform affect other socialist countries? Looking at the problem, one could say, with a considerable amount of bold generalization, that the European socialist countries are now

[5] The concept greatly differs from that of the welfare state. The essence of the welfare state is to leave the production machine capitalist, with some marginal intervention in the public sector, and, by state taxation, to redistribute the income taken from the richer to the poorer consumers. The Reform in Jugoslavia denies this role of redistribution to the state (even to a socialist one) and endeavors to organize production on the basis of workers' self-management, in order to eliminate the roots of exploitation of man by man through income redistribution. It leaves decisions on income distribution to the workers who produce the income (on enterprise, local, regional, state and international levels), but takes the world level of productivity as the objective measurement.

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entering the second stage, building a decentralized New System of the kind that Jugoslavia is just abandoning. The basic features of this process are: the reintroduction of market prices; gradual emancipation of the socialist business enterprises from the state administration; the introduction of commercial criteria into foreign trade; disbelief in the omniscient and infallible central planner; material stimulation of the workers' productivity. They still remain firm on certain principles: predominance of the political factor in economic decisions; priority of production over consumption; disbelief in workers' self-government; and belief that the process of de-étatization and democratization represents a danger for socialism.

The Reform in Jugoslavia is overcoming these past postulates of socialist policy. There are not many rational elements to aid one in forecasting how long it will take other socialist countries to gain the experience which Jugoslavia has paid for very dearly; but my guess would be that it will depend on the pace and level of their development, and on the pressure of technical progress due to international competition. The new Jugoslav model may provide some stimulating ideas to socialist and Communist parties in developed countries; and developing countries—particularly those which have decided to build socialism—may become aware of some pitfalls in developmental policies.

Jugoslavia's acceptance of a model of a developed country, after hitherto presenting its economic system as an example for underdeveloped countries, is a big step, one that would be likely to meet with opposition in any country, let alone in such a complicated multinational state as Jugoslavia.[6] Opposition to the Reform would logically be expected from those who are least developed, who have to work most and longest to cross the borderline and achieve the level of developed lands; from those who used to get more from the central moneybag than they put into it; and from those who gained more from their political influence than from their industrial skill. The greatest advocates of the Reform would be those who are most developed, who put more into the central bag than they got out of it, and whose economic strength was greater than their political influence.

[6] In the 1961 population census, 7,800,000 people declared themselves as Serbs (41.6 percent), 4,300,000 as Croats (23.4 percent), 1,600,000 as Slovenes (8.8 percent) and 1,046,000 as Macedonians (5.3 percent). The Montenegrins numbered 514,000 (2.8 percent), the Moslems 973,000 (5 percent), and those who declared themselves just Jugoslavs 317,000. The Albanians numbered 915,000 and the Hungarians 504,000.

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These logical expectations correspond to reality. The first advocates of the Reform and the spearhead of it were the Slovene Communists. They were joined by the Croats, and the two now march together, and with them the Serbs of Croatia. The Reform's strongest opponents came from Serbia. The Communists from other Republics took varied attitudes, feeling probably not strong enough to compete with the larger Republics and expecting in the end to find their interests taken into account by either side.[7]

Jugoslavia has just reached the level of $500 annual income per head, which many economists consider to be the demarcation line between developed and undeveloped countries. So the model for underdeveloped societies would no longer work; it would pull the economy backward. The difference in the level of development in the 1960s shows that the average national income per head in the most advanced Republic, Slovenia, amounted to $935; in Croatia it was some 20 percent more than the Jugoslav average of $605. In Serbia it was $480, Bosnia $348, Macedonia $339 and Montenegro $330. These differences, taken objectively, would not be of such economic importance if it were not for the following reason: The two most developed Republics have crossed the threshold of development, while the others have not. This aggravates the psychological tension.

On the basis of this situation, there developed two opposite concepts, indeed two models of economic policy, both Marxist, both socialist; but one crystallized into an ideal type of a Communist recipe for an underdeveloped economy,[8] and the other into an ideal type for a developed socialist economic system.

UNDERDEVELOPED MODEL	DEVELOPED MODEL
Maximization of growth (no constraint)	Optimization of growth under constraint of profitableness
Autonomous investments decided by central planner	Induced investments decided by enterprises
Priority of production over consumption	Priority of consumption over production
Planned administrative prices	Market prices
Monocentric planning	Polycentric planning
Inflationary tendency	Deflationary tendency

[7] The Constitution of 1963 created a special federal fund to assist underdeveloped areas.

[8] Many of the articles printed in the edition "Yugoslav Economists on Problems of a Socialist Economy," *Eastern European Economics*, New York, I.A.S.P., Fall–Winter, 1963–1964, express the views of this group of economists.

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National income redistribution by the state	National income redistribution by the producers themselves
Administrative direction of flow of goods, labor and capital	Flow of goods, labor and capital by economic interest
Autarky in foreign trade	Integration in the international division of labor

A second source of discontent arises from psychological attitudes, aspirations and expectations more than from objective conditions. In areas that are less developed there can easily arise an exaggerated sense of poverty, frustration and injustice, resulting in impatient demands for compensation from the Federation in the form of grandiose projects of development. Among the more developed, on the other hand, a sense takes hold that they are giving much more than they are getting (exploitation), a fear that there will be a repetition of past oppression by the center, and—most sensitive of all—that their progress is being hampered by the less developed areas.

Now dress these collective and real interests in national symbols, put this new content into historical perspective, make it an emotional appeal for political action, and you have raised nationality feelings to a high state of tension. Socialism in Jugoslavia is not being built in a historical vacuum, and the Federation consists of fully developed nations which have cultural individuality and rich political traditions. This was fully recognized in 1946 and reconfirmed in 1963 by all the constitutions of New Jugoslavia. These nations have a constitutional "right to self-determination, including the right to secession" (Constitution of 1963, Principles, I) as the Leninist formula goes, and this is a condition *sine qua non* of the existence of Jugoslavia.[9]

When Jugoslavia was created in 1918 as a union of lesser-developed Serbia and Montenegro and the more economically developed South Slav parts of the Hapsburg Empire, the politically dominant élite of Serbia adopted this political equation: greater political power plus smaller economic wealth equals greater economic wealth plus smaller political power. Thus redistribution

[9] Here we have to go back somewhat in history. The pre-1918 Kingdom of Serbia was an underdeveloped but homogeneous and centralized country, without a developed capitalist system; the political, economic and cultural élite lived on the state and took the place of a capitalist class. The Croats, Slovenes and those Serbs who belonged to the Hapsburg Empire until 1918 were used to living in a multinational state. But their national aspirations and the development of their individuality had been achieved against the will of the Hapsburg state and in opposition to it. Therefore their élite did not consider it "normal" that social action should be taken through the state.

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of national income by political power was the main function of the state in Jugoslavia between 1918 and 1939; in it, therefore, the various nations could never achieve equal political rights. For this reason a doctrine of national unity was created, since in a single nation the ruling élite had no need to justify their refusal to share political power. This same political formula was transferred to new Jugoslavia, but under it the socialist system developed somewhat differently.

The four most important versions of Jugoslav unity are the following:

1. The romantic idea of Slav unity which will ultimately unite all South Slavs into one Great Nation, as expressed through history by the "best sons" of all the South Slav peoples, who must put all their resources together, like real brothers, in order to fulfill a great mission which simple uneducated people do not understand. This idea of a Jugoslav super-nation was finally rejected by the Eighth Congress of the Communist League in 1964:

> An expression of nationalism which must be checked is seen . . . in the mistaken idea that in our socialist development of society nationalities have been outlived, and that a unified Jugoslav nation should be created. Such beliefs are expressions of bureaucratic centralism and unitarianism and usually manifest themselves in a tendency to ignore the political, social, economic and other functions and responsibilities of republics and autonomous provinces.[10]

2. Another concept is that of technocratic unity, put forward in the name of science for optimizing technical progress in Jugoslavia as a whole. The decision regarding the optimum should be reached by rational scientific methods, and the state should allocate resources for it. To refute this idea the technocrats were reminded that Jugoslavia is not populated by abstract *homines technologici* or *economici,* but by human beings whose happiness is their own responsibility. Moreover, further objections should be made, as for instance, that in searching for an optimum, why stop at the frontiers of Jugoslavia? Modern technology does not require centralized decision-making; it makes a polycentric system of decision-making not only possible but preferable. The

[10] Resolution of the Congress, *Yugoslav Survey,* No. 20, January 1965, p. 2909. In his report to the Congress, Tito said: "Some people, even some Communists, think that nationalities have withered away . . . they confuse unity of the people with the liquidation of the nations and the creation of something new, something artificial, *i.e.* one single Jugoslav nation, which is somewhat similar to assimilation and bureaucratic centralism, unitarianism and hegemonism. The Jugoslav socialist integration is a new type of social community, in which all nations find their common interests." ("Osmi kongres SKJ," *Kultura,* Belgrade, 1964, p. 132.)

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computers are liberalizers, not centralizers. When the question is put, "What price shall we have to pay for federalism?" the echo is, "What have we to pay for centralism?" And the balance is not in favor of the latter. Thus Marshal Tito was right in refusing to identify technical progress with centralism; and Edward Kardelj, President of the Federal Assembly, refused to put order in opposition to democracy.[11]

3. The third concept of unity is the policy of equal stomachs. It appealed to socialist solidarity because of the idea that the central authority of the state should take the income and resources from those who "have" and distribute them among those who "have not." The Reform aims at a socialist society where, in order to "have," people must work and earn their income by their labor. Redistribution of income by the state means to take part of the income earned by one worker or group of workers and give it to another individual or group who has not worked for it. This solidarity may be the basis of a policy of social assistance, but it cannot stand as a basis for a socialist economic system.

4. The fourth main concept justifying unity is to be found in the field of foreign policy: whatever the internal conditions in Jugoslavia, the supreme interest of relations with the outside world demands unconditional unity; and this is a central function which requires the strengthening of the center.

To this one must reply that the policy of active and peaceful coexistence has eliminated all serious threat to Jugoslavia from abroad. The psychology of the besieged fortress, genuine or staged, is out of place. The real problem is the great difference in the standard of living between Jugoslavia and her Western neighbors, or Europe as a whole. To reduce this economic tension, the Reform has undertaken to liberalize foreign trade and to promote the structural integration of the economy into the world division of labor; GATT was joined, a certain coöperation achieved with C.E.M.A. and action taken to work with the European Economic Community and EFTA.

[11] *Borba*, December 31, 1965. Asked whether self-management does not hamper technical progress, Kardelj said that reluctance to accept "rational" solutions was the result of unhappy experience with strong administrative intervention. He took as an example the problem, long and passionately discussed in parliament, of electric power and its centralization. In refusing to agree that the state should order the centralization of the electricity system into a single unit, Kardelj said that those who use electric power should be responsible for building electric power stations. The Federation of Electrical Enterprises should not be vested with the authority of a government agency. Those who decide to build power stations at greater than optimal cost will have to pay dearly for it and bear the cost themselves.

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In conclusion—all the above concepts of unity have been used to justify a political distribution of income by an étatistic élite and are therefore not acceptable throughout Jugoslavia, but only at the center, which has always advocated other than democratic procedures.

The national tensions which increased in all the nations of Jugoslavia to such an extent that they became a central problem, first economic and then political,[12] were subject to analysis at the Eighth Congress of the Communist League.The line it took was that if there is a general phenomenon it must have a common cause. It found this cause in the system of bureaucratic centralism against which all the nations were reacting. In order to eliminate national tensions within the country, the first thing to do was to eliminate their common cause. Thus it was that the policy for reducing national conflict became closely linked to the policy of economic reform. The protagonists of the Reform are not provincial anarchists but stand above local nationalism; they are more "internationally minded" than the autarkic centralists. Their main idea is that the socialist economic integration of Jugoslavia is a long process which started in the liberation struggle of the Second World War, but is not yet accomplished; indeed, that its development depends on the extent to which true socialist relations exist, and on the degree to which the policy inaugurated by the Eighth Congress will be carried out.

It is commonly agreed that the Reform is not progressing at a very satisfactory rate. One of the reasons may be that the Federal Government finds itself in a difficult position, struggling with the overt or covert resistance of the high bureaucracy which on one occasion discreetly puts on the brakes, at another pushes the reform measures to unrealizable and absurd lengths. The heated debates in the federal parliament, exclusively composed of Communists, where bills are passed with a majority of 4 or 6, show how far the process of liberalization has gone. On the other hand, they manifest the strength of the opposition to concrete reform.

One must remember that the Reform is divided into two kinds of measures. First, extensive central control was strengthened

[12] Asked whether national tension was only question number two in Jugoslavia, Vladimir Bakarić said (*Borba*, March 6, 1966): "Today it is at least question number two. With the battle for the Reform we have to win the battle against nationalism as well. If we don't win this battle, then it might become question number one." He also said that the nationalities problem might even be sharper now because it had not been dealt with in proper time.

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(price control, credit restrictions, rate of foreign currency exchange) in order to clear the field for the further liberalizing steps. But since some success was achieved in the first stage in relieving the immediate critical situation, a twofold reaction has now set in. This came to the fore in the meeting of the Central Committee in February–March 1966. All participants were for the Reform; but some (mainly from Serbia) praised it and demanded that the first centralizing measures should be further pursued, while others (*e.g.* from Croatia) asked that more energetic measures be taken in pursuit of the main purpose of the Reform. In the complex tactics of the Reform—"to retreat in order to advance better"—some praised the retreat, others pressed for faster advance. Heed should be paid to the warnings of Boris Kraigher, the operational head of the Reform, that it may last for a long time, perhaps for a decade, and that the most difficult period, that of structural changes in the Jugoslav economy, is still ahead. Speeding up the Reform is of utmost importance. Failure of the Reform would deeply shake the faith of many people that Jugoslavia's problems can be solved by consent.

The two opposing views of the Reform within the Communist League have managed to gather behind them a considerable following outside the Party itself.[18] Will the policy of the League be to institutionalize emotional "national" appeals, thus fighting the issues of the Reform out in the open and furthering the process of democratization? Or will it close ranks, isolate itself and use its only available instrument, that of bureaucratic centralism, admittedly the cause of the present difficulties, thereby pushing national dissent underground and at the same time destroying the Reform from within? In my opinion there is no "once and for all" solution. These are problems of long duration and great amplitude. If it is true that the foreign policy of every state reflects its internal relations, then Jugoslavia should adopt the principle of active, peaceful coexistence to solve the problems of her own component nations.

[18] The Croat Communists have to be given credit for leading in the Reform. Nevertheless it seems to me that the handling of the psychological side of Croatian national dissatisfaction is not adequate, as some instances in Croatia have shown. On the other hand, Croatian nationalistic outbursts, staged or spontaneous, would just play into the hands of the anti-reformist centralists. Some Croats should remember the heroic silliness of Eugene Kvaternik whose revolt in 1871 was used as a pretext to prevent the reorganization of the Austrian Empire along federal lines.

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NATIONALISM VS. ECONOMIC GROWTH

By Jahangir Amuzegar

THE United Nations "development decade" will go down in history not as a period of spectacular economic growth but as one of sluggish and laggard progress, marred by socio-economic chaos, political upheavals, coups d'états and mass discontent with the entrenched establishments. Political upsets in Algeria, Syria, the Congo, Nigeria, Ghana and Indonesia have been some of the outstanding cases. Others less conspicuous and less internationally significant have occurred all over South America, Africa and Asia.

Many political analysts have been too ready to explain these overturns in terms of internal political shifts toward socialism or capitalism, the left or the right, the West or the East. Often they have linked them to power plays between the United States, the Soviet Union and Red China, with the outcome frequently interpreted as a "clear gain" for one and a "serious setback" for others.

Oftentimes, however, when a Western-oriented régime in a country receiving American aid is toppled by internal subversion or disguised foreign aggression, the presence or continuation of American aid is held responsible. On other occasions, when a similar pro-Western régime which has not been aided by the United States is overthrown by opposition from within or without, the absence or lack of sufficient U.S. support is considered the villain. In the one case, the United States and other Western countries are blamed for inadvertently or irresponsibly fomenting dissident elements by supporting an unpopular, illegitimate, dictatorial, militaristic and corrupt government; in the other case, they are blamed for failing to support progressive, democratic, liberal and occasionally anti-monarchical forces.

The purpose of this article is, first, to question simplified explanations of recent revolts in terms of ideological orientations or big-power machinations; second, to bring into sharper focus some of the more fundamental factors which may not seem immediately responsible and are perhaps more easily overlooked; and, third, to discuss certain conditions under which a developing country can combine an ideologically neutral course with progressive economic policies to achieve a measure of political stability over a relatively long time.

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II

The frequent socio-political upheavals in recent years (52 coups in a short span of ten years) fail to show any distinct political shift to the left or to the right. Nor do they reveal an easily recognizable connection with political rivalries among the big powers. Instead, they seem to manifest a fairly consistent pattern of internal discontent against intolerable social conditions and genuine frustrations resulting from too slow a climb up the economic ladder of progress and prosperity. Each coup, regardless of its outward appearance, represents essentially a desperate attempt to find new means of coping with the same stubborn, age-old problems. While the coup leaders attribute the unsatisfactory situation to the evils of the entrenched establishment, their real intention is to move up to a higher economic plateau and not sideways to the political left or right.

Brazil, Nigeria, Syria, Ghana and Indonesia in the first half of the 1960s present fascinating examples of political upheavals having essentially similar purposes, but apparently moving in quite different directions on the political spectrum. In Brazil, the military under the leadership of General Castello Branco ousted a conspicuously leftist government in favor of a middle-of-the-roader. In Syria, early in 1966, military forces under Major General Jadid toppled a relatively moderate régime in favor of one conspicuously further to the left. In Ghana and Indonesia, Generals Ankrah and Suharto took initial measures toward restoring greater political freedom. In Nigeria, the revolution of General Aguiyi-Ironsi in early 1966 pushed this "model" of African democracy toward more centralized public control and discipline. Revolutions in the smaller African and Latin American states have been even more confusing in their political orientation.

In the light of these experiences it seems reasonable to argue that the dramatic disorders of the recent past (and most likely the impending crises of the future) in the underdeveloped world are not the result of a philosophical choice between socialism, capitalism and other "isms." Such abstract political ideologies are generally incomprehensible to the rank and file and are only vaguely understood by their more articulate spokesmen, whose preference for a certain "ism" may be only an expedient means of getting the "in" group "out." If the existing order is "socialistic" and has proven incapable of satisfying the people's expecta-

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tions, then "capitalist" reformers become heroes (as in Soleiman Demirel's Turkey). If, on the other hand, the establishment is oriented toward "free enterprise" (as in postwar Iraq, Egypt, Syria) but problems remain unsolved, or excesses and inefficiencies continue, then the capitalists are pushed over.

Underlying most of the upheavals is dissatisfaction among the opposition groups with seemingly unbearable economic conditions, political misrule and social injustice. The opposition's dissatisfaction may be real or fancied. But in either case, it often has little to do with Western or westernized choices between planning and free enterprise, one-party system versus Western democracy, socialism versus conservatism. Instead, it is frequently symptomatic of frustrations caused by the failure to realize widely-held expectations of rosier times to come. Any detectable "ism" in these upheavals, if it is not realism or pragmatism, often turns out to be emotionalism and nationalism.[1]

Expectations, too, may be legitimate or wishful. But regardless of their true nature (and despite some official pronouncements to the contrary), they are not rooted in a greater desire for freedom, justice and democracy in the abstract Western sense, but seem based mainly on a desire for certain concrete, down-to-earth issues that are nationally relevant—such as improved standards of living, better jobs and greater self-respect. It is the postponed realization of these expectations that creates popular discontent and the ensuing military or civilian uprisings.

III

Obsessed by the exigencies of a passionate nationalism that demands the assertion of political independence, and forced to rely on the resources and generosity of the old imperialists and colonialists to achieve a semblance of economic viability, the newly-independent countries of Africa and Asia are often tossed on the horns of a tormenting dilemma which they can neither forget nor resolve. These slowly emerging nations are bent on catching up with their former colonial masters by following the same path to national salvation, *i.e.* rapid economic growth,

[1] A candid admission of the irrelevance of socialist dogma to the realities of life in a developing country is to be found in Mrs. Indira Gandhi's speech to the nation late in April 1966 when she said: "This government is fully committed to the objectives of a socialist and democratic society. But our socialism is one that is related to the reality of the Indian situation. It is not wedded to any dogma. What we want is a better life, with more food, employment and opportunities."

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aided by foreign resources without sacrificing hard-won political independence. Compared to this primary objective, everything else to them seems secondary.

The nationalism of the developing countries today, like that of their counterparts in the nineteenth century, is a protest against economic deprivation, social confusion and political dependence. But unlike a century ago, legitimate aspirations for a better life cannot be fulfilled through territorial expansion, commercial subjugation or gunboat diplomacy at the expense of other nations, countries or continents. The struggle has to be won by the combined efforts of the people themselves and a generous inflow of external assistance from their richer uncles. Accepting charity and maintaining pride, however, do not always go hand in hand. Indeed, the smaller the country and the scantier its resources, the greater, ironically, is the desire for having both nationalism and economic progress at the same time.

Most of the new nations have found great difficulty in coping with their development problems. They have had to solve their essentially short-run problems of providing employment for the increasingly urban and increasingly articulate labor force; enlarging public and private investments; finding extra revenues to combat increasing budgetary deficits and threatening inflation; and correcting institutional deficiencies in their land, tax and administrative structures. Simultaneously, they have had to prepare to deal with such long-run problems as increasing agricultural and industrial productivity; raising efficiency in the service industries (particularly the government); importing and adapting foreign capital and know-how—in sum, making ready for the day when they can stand on their own feet.

The social and economic obstacles to the solution of these problems, short and long-run alike, are familiar: basic poverty as evidenced by the low standards of food, health and literacy; shortage of domestic savings; small inclination on the part of private entrepreneurs to invest in long-term productive enterprises; limited markets; paucity of foreign private and public capital; and the continuing deterioration of external earnings. There are other and more specific obstacles in each case.

To the extent that the politico-economic salvation of an emerging country rests in its own resources, initiative, organization and leadership, it faces an inherently destabilizing dilemma: the necessity of choosing between irrational nationalism

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and rapid economic growth. The dilemma often presents itself in the choice between the grandiose, popular and prideful manifestations of independent nationhood, on the one hand, and the rigid, often painful and seldom popular dictates of efficient and rational economic development on the other. Passionate nationalism may dictate an outright rejection of outside assistance.[2] It may also bring about unduly extensive investments in nationally prestigious projects of questionable value from the standpoint of immediate economic growth. Instances would be Nkrumah's grandiose facilities for African conferences, Sukarno's immense building for meetings of an Asian rival to the United Nations or the perpetually-losing airlines of half a dozen poverty-stricken countries. In less obvious cases, the nationalists may press for heavier industrial investments than organizations such as the World Bank are willing to finance. And there is the perennial dispute between the aid-givers and aid-receivers over estimates of national defense needs.

To the extent, also, that the process of economic growth is to be helped by foreign assistance, there is the difficulty that foreign aid often comes with real or imaginary "strings" attached to it. This is bound to irritate some sensitive nationalistic nerves as a breach of national sovereignty. An example is the insistence by the United States on "self-help" as a condition for offering economic assistance, or the pressure for signing a status-of-forces agreement as a necessary condition for receiving military aid. The bulk of the foreign aid offered by the old established nations to peoples overflowing with national pride is thus badly handicapped before it starts.

The delicate task of the national leader as a promoter of internal growth under these circumstances lies in his ability to strike the proper balance between (1) the exigencies of domestic development schemes within the framework of national independence; (2) tolerance on the part of those who will be adversely affected by the necessary reforms; and (3) reasonably satisfactory progress toward the better and fuller life that has been promised. A few leaders have been able to achieve this feat, and a few may yet do so; but there is no standard recipe.

The pivotal elements of development—fierce nationalism, impatience for progress and the need for outside aid—may thus lead to dissatisfaction, opposition and revolt.

[2] As was the case in Syria in the early 1950s when that country refused Point 4 aid from the United States.

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The drama ordinarily begins when insatiable expectations beyond reasonable possibility of fulfillment meet insurmountable obstacles, and the whole development effort bogs down in nerve-wracking frustration. The resulting discontent finally erupts in a bloody or bloodless coup against the established order. Whether the revolt is of the military against the civilians (as in Algeria, Indonesia or Nigeria), of civilians against the military (as in Sudan and Ecuador) or civilians against civilians (as in Saudi Arabia), the essential cause usually remains the same: in the course of slow and painful socio-economic development the hero, however earnest, seldom succeeds in catching up with the villain, and by failing to achieve the unachievable he ends up with the boot. Audience and participants alike give their loudest cheers to the new hero or the pseudo-hero—the ambitious young militarist, the crafty old messiah or the plain charismatic demagogue—who promises to bring about the long-delayed heaven on earth. The seed of their downfall in turn is sown in the promises that they cannot fulfill. And the drama of showmanship versus statesmanship repeats itself.

IV

The question arising from the foregoing discussion is whether or not there is an escape from the game of musical chairs. The answer is yes, but not always and not for all developing countries. It depends on how reforms are conceived, presented and carried out.

In an analysis of different journeys toward socio-economic progress, Professor Hirschman lists the major ingredients of a reform as: a dormant crisis, shift of politico-economic power from one group to another, resistance on the part of the losers accompanied by violence, and the emergence of new problems that may aid (or hinder) the reform.[8] All major reforms in the Hirschman model are revolutionary in essence, with some revolutionary destructiveness; nationwide in their sweep, with some sectionalist logrolling; mutually agreed upon by opposing interests, with some mutual sacrifices; and involve shifts in allegiances resulting in some degree of political instability.

It is the contention of the present writer that a country with good development potential, farsighted leadership, continuity in governing institutions, and a patient population willing to pay

[8] A. O. Hirschman, "Journeys toward Progress." New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963.

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the full price of economic development can, even within the framework of Hirschman's analysis, achieve major socio-economic reforms without violent upheavals and with other unfavorable concomitants reduced to a tolerable minimum.

Among the emerging countries with these characteristics, Iran offers an interesting example. For well over a decade now, a curious assortment of dissident groups—Cassandras, self-appointed redeemers and other ill-wishers for the régime—have been predicting an imminent political crisis in the country, and the resulting downfall of the present establishment. Yet not only has Iran continued to enjoy relative political stability amidst unbelievably far-reaching socio-economic reforms, but it has managed to experience a fairly decent rate of economic growth. And, despite some well-publicized examples of stress and strain, the political fabric of the government and the socio-economic structure of the country have held together. In direct contrast to the Iranian situation, bloody revolutions, military coups and experiments with various kinds of socialism and capitalism among Iran's neighbors to the west and southwest have failed the tests of survival or success.

Iran's Six Point Reform Program[4] (which the Shah has called "white revolution" from the throne) and other measures such as administrative reorganization, improved taxation and the democratization of society, all seem to contain the kernel of Hirschman reforms. That is, they are revolutionary both in concept and in application; nationwide in coverage; more or less accepted by the majority of winners and losers alike; and responsible for significant changes in the composition of political institutions and political allegiance. The land reform program has affected in one way or another more than 95 percent of Iran's 50,000 villages. The Literacy Corps, consisting of more than 30,000 young secondary-school and college draftees, has taught more than 400,000 men, women and children in upward of 10,000 villages. Women have been given the right to participate in nationwide elections for the first time in Iran's history. Workers have been given varying shares of profit in their industrial establishments. The cornerstones for basic industries have been laid.

There has been resistance, to be sure. There have been riots,

[4] Land reform; nationalization of forests; sale of state-owned industries to the public; profit-sharing by workers in industrial enterprises; electoral reforms including franchise for women; and the establishment of a literacy corps out of military conscripts to teach in the villages.

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demonstrations, attempted assassinations and continued grumbling on the part of the big landlords, orthodox clergy, fanatic Moslems and those for whom nothing short of a Swiss democracy will do. But the feared resistance of landlords has been surprisingly slight. The Literacy and Health Corpsmen, despite some apprehension that they might agitate the villagers against the central government, have done their jobs faithfully and responsibly. The profit-sharing plan, contrary to the unfavorable predictions and thanks to its flexibility, has not stopped private (domestic or foreign) investments in the country. In short, the grave that was supposed to be dug by the reforms so far seems to have been a cradle for their orderly development.

There have been sacrifices, hardships, dislocations and shifts in allegiance, too, resulting in unfortunate and unnecessary rifts among national leaders, disunity among progressive elements and meaningless dissidence among the élite. Yet compared to the enormity of these revolutionary tasks (and matched against many less successful and far more costly experiences in other countries), these have not been an impossible price to pay.

Why has this been the case? What fortunate set of conditions has enabled Iran to avoid, or minimize, the heavy costs of its reforms? The answer lies in a combination of favorable internal and external factors which, while satisfying the requirements of what the Shah has called "positive" nationalism, also met the exigencies of a steady, though not spectacular, economic growth. First, the reforms were conceived and brought about from the top, instead of the middle or the bottom as is generally the case. Second, historical choice and foresight took the place of "historical necessity" and "the blindness of the ruling class." Third, economic hardships of the so-called "losers" (*e.g.* landlords) were smoothed out by the government's ability to compensate them out of its revenues from oil. Fourth, entrepreneurial decision-making by the villagers, and agricultural credits to the newly established coöperatives, were facilitated by a combination of domestic and foreign efforts. And, fifth, external aid, both financial and technical, provided the supporting links without playing the decisive role in the formation of the policies themselves, thus minimizing nationalistic resentments.

While the success of some of these measures has been grudgingly admitted even by the opposition, the Iranian experience could have been still more outstanding under still better circum-

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stances. Uncertainties about the results of the reforms have made some cautious capitalists reluctant to take risks in new productive ventures. The extra incomes of the new landowners and profit-sharers have gone into extra consumption instead of increased savings, thus reducing the size of private investment. The small number of trained villagers has delayed the creation of multi-purpose coöperatives. The speed with which the reforms have been put into effect has not met with the total approval of those who favored more extensive debates, deliberations and plain democratic bargaining. Admittedly, not all the agricultural laborers, sharecroppers and city workers have enjoyed equally the benefits of land reform or other schemes. To expedite the distribution of land among peasant cultivators, each peasant has been given the plot he previously tilled rather than an economically optimal lot capable of supporting a peasant family. Thus the relative shares of some cultivators may have been too large or too small from the standpoint of equity or economic efficiency.[5]

The reforms have also been hindered by exogenous factors. Toward the end of the 1950s, the Iranian economy faced, for the first time in its almost 40 years of continuous growth (with varying amounts of inflation), a recession of the Western and industrial variety caused by over-investment and excess capacity in certain vital sectors of the economy. Although the origin of this recession was unrelated to the reforms and was aggravated by a continued period of drought, its continuation into the '60s and up to 1964 did have adverse effects on the "white revolution." A good part of the government budget had to be devoted to sustaining the drought-stricken farmers in several parts of the country, and a good deal of aid had to be allocated to faltering industrial establishments. Another sizeable portion of the country's national resources had to be appropriated for the national defense budget in order to combat the actual and potential threats of agitators in and out of the country.

Yet despite pessimistic forecasts about the repercussions of these and other unfavorable events on the country as a whole, no crisis has so far materialized. The economy, from the middle of 1964 onward, has picked up enough speed to augur another

[5] The reformers have not had any illusions about the possibility of a regrouping of present small land-holdings and the emergence of new landlordism in the future. Future land-holdings, they argue, will follow a process of rational selection, and will be based not on heredity or feudal aristocracy but upon the strength of individual initiative, capability and entrepreneurship.

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upward trend. Increased foreign private investments, both from Europe and the United States, are indicative of foreign confidence in the favorable long-run economic prospects of the country. There are also indications that private hoarding is finding its way into productive investments once again.[6] Increased oil revenues continue to guarantee a steady rise in domestic investments. In fact, the buoyancy of public and private activities in the last few months has renewed the dangers of inflation once again.

The real threats to Iran's present economic prosperity and the success of its reforms do not stem from the lingering poverty of the peasants or the wretchedness of the urban proletariat or a crisis of confidence among the capitalist-entrepreneurs. One of the obstacles to Iran's continued stability and material welfare lies in the machinations and misleading propaganda of the disgruntled opposition, of whom the majority are not the underprivileged peasants and workers but rather comfortably-placed groups of intellectuals who crave greater political power, wealth and social status than they enjoy under the present régime.

These groups are by no means homogeneous. In fact, the only common bond among them is their opposition to the present system of reign *and* rule by the Shah. The so-called liberals among them advocate a wholesale embracing of Western goals and techniques, whether or not they are relevant to the Iranian situation. Many of these "liberators" raise their voices of opposition from safe havens in foreign countries. Some of them are fanatics of the right or left who wish to turn the clock back to the "golden" past or speed it impracticably forward. And there are naïve visionaries who wish to reduce the complex process of development to simple formulas and slogans—who want revolutionary changes without infringement of their own status; orderly transition without established institutions; legitimacy of one government over another without a legitimate base.

Another and perhaps more significant threat to orderly socio-economic development comes from some loyal groups who, in their aggressive and dynamic earnestness, may push forward too fast and commit the country beyond its rising resources, thus overheating the economy in a manner resembling the 1957–60 period and jeopardizing orderly growth in the years to come.

[6] The confidence of Iranian capitalists in the long-run politico-economic stability of the country is reflected in an enormous accumulation of private savings deposited in domestic banks during the 1960–64 recession, and a surprisingly small amount of capital flight from the country in the same period—as evidenced by the stability of foreign-exchange rates in the Iranian "free" market.

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If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the following conclusions may be reached. First, the so-called "flurry of takeovers" in developing countries in the first six years of the 1960s can hardly be shown to have followed a distinct ideological pattern either to the left or to the right. Whatever role the West or the East has played in bringing them about, foreign intervention can scarcely have been the determining factor either in the long-run survival of an otherwise faltering government or in the inevitable demise of a broad-based and ideologically entrenched régime. Second, from the standpoint both of mid-twentieth-century realities and in the perspective of postwar political history as a whole, the interplay of nationalistic pride, an unrealistic craving for rapid material welfare and the insufficiency or impropriety of foreign assistance can easily produce the preconditions for a political upheaval. And, third, a proper balance between national aspirations, economic sufficiency and carefully selected external assistance can stave off such volcanic eruptions indefinitely, or at least for a long time.

As an example of propitious circumstances, both internal and external, conducive to relative political stability, Iran is a good case in point. Compared to many a developing country, Iran has been fortunate in having fewer problems and more extensive resources to cope with them. The country has also been able to institute a series of significant reforms with less difficulty than many of her neighbors. By restraining exaggerated nationalistic ambitions, making fairly good use of domestic resources and securing foreign assistance from East and West, a fair rate of economic growth has been maintained. The opposition, so far, has been articulate but ineffective. In the snags that have developed so far, external factors (including the erratic nature of foreign aid) have had their share of the blame. In the future, however, any real threat to economic stability and growth is more likely to come from the effective doings (mistakes, excesses, overzealousness) of the chauvinists among the "in" groups, rather than the ineffective undoings (ramblings, denunciations and threats) of the "out" groups.

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TOMORROW'S AGENDA

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

EACH generation, it is often said, fights the wars of the preceding generation without knowing it. During the nineteenth century men died believing in the cause of royalty or republicanism. In reality, much of their sacrifice was rendered on the altar of the new nationalism. During the twentieth century men fought on behalf of nationalism. Yet the wars they fought were also engendered by dislocations in world markets and by social revolution stimulated by the coming of the industrial age.

Today, many Americans—and certainly most Communists—tend to see international conflict primarily in terms of the cold-war struggle between democracy and Communism. Inadvertently, some Americans thus accept, and project on the international scene, the basic Marxist-Leninist assumption that the decisive conflict of our age concerns the internal character of property relationships and the political organization of society, viewed in terms of the initial impact of the industrial revolution.

Yet these are no longer the basic issues facing mankind. The fundamental dilemmas to which we must respond are quite different and they cannot be analyzed properly in terms of the widely-accepted dichotomy of Western democracy versus totalitarian Communism. In the second half of the twentieth century the developed nations, given new scientific and social developments, will face a real threat to the continued existence of man as a spontaneous, instinctive, rather autonomous and even somewhat mysterious being; the less developed countries, because of overpopulation, economic backwardness and potential political disorder, will be challenged by a fundamental crisis of survival of organized society. Responding to these twin challenges will require a basic reordering of our perspectives.

II

This is not to say that the cold war no longer exists, or that the United States should opt out of it. That conflict continues and it still dominates international affairs, largely because the Communist states, although now in different ways, still subscribe to the apocalyptic belief that they are riding the crest of

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the future and that the world is destined to become Communist. In China this belief is proclaimed with ringing militancy, though it is not matched by action. The Soviet Union has muted its verbal militancy but still abets and encourages Communist efforts to gain political control over other societies. The Communist powers remain militant because of the vested interest of their bureaucratic élites in the dogmatic commitment to a utopian and universalist ideology derived from the nineteenth-century notion that the industrial revolution would follow a uniform global pattern.

The cold war thus continues, but it is no longer a "real" conflict in the sense that the issues involved are no longer historically relevant. The West has long since abandoned whatever hopes it had of "rolling back" Communism—and those hopes were neither very widespread nor ever translated into a systematic and persistent policy. Today, the predominant Western attitude is that Communism will gradually moderate itself, eventually approximating social democracy. That hope is often mixed with a strong dose of wishful thinking; even relatively minor changes in the Soviet Union, such as the Liberman reforms, are hailed as a turn by the Kremlin toward capitalism. Chinese Communism is seen as a more retarded phenomenon, but by and large the predominant expectation seems to be that after Mao's death China will follow the Soviet evolutionary path.

Accordingly, the Western posture toward Communism is not one of crusading militancy. The West does not expect to dismantle the existing social-political organization of the Communist states, but rather relies primarily on the erosive effects of time and the pressures for change within the Communist states themselves. It therefore does not pose a direct threat to the survival of Communism. Of course, the very existence of thriving Western societies challenges Communist ideology, and specific conflicts of interest between particular Western and Eastern powers can be represented by Communist ideologues as involving an inveterate desire to destroy Communism altogether. But this ideological attitude is more revealing about the persistence of certain Communist myths than about the realities of international politics.

Even more important to the argument that the East-West conflict no longer touches on the "real" issues of the second half of the twentieth century is the growing evidence that Com-

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munism itself has exhausted its revolutionary potential and that its further major expansion is unlikely. Communism clearly will not take over any advanced Western society. The Communist parties there are decaying and desperately seeking social anchorage. Some, like the Italian, see salvation in opening an "ecumenical" dialogue with the Catholics; some, like the French, seek a common front with the Socialists. In almost all cases, the process involves profound revision along social-democratic lines and an erosion of the revolutionary Leninist tradition. Nowhere in the developed world is there any evidence that a Communist party with a program modeled on the Soviet experience would stand the slightest chance of making an effective popular and electoral appeal. It could only do so by "out-social-democratizing" the Social Democrats.

Moreover, on the level of the direct confrontation, the Soviet Union learned most painfully in October 1962 that it is still hopelessly outclassed by the United States as a military power. This asymmetry is not likely to be altered in the near future. The expectation of economically surpassing the United States by 1970, so boldly proclaimed just a few years ago by the Soviet leadership, has now given way to recognition of the fact that for a long time to come the Soviet Union will remain a second-class economic power, with major shortages in food and consumer production. Rising nationality tensions in the Soviet Union—which may soon assume major proportions—are likely to limit further the Soviet capacity for playing a very assertive role in the world.

In the Third World, the evidence is not so clear-cut, but recent developments there also suggest that the cold war is losing its external and internal relevance. The days of posturing and the grandiloquent, non-aligned internationalism of Sukarno, Nkrumah and others are giving way to inward-oriented, non-aligned nationalism, concerned primarily with internal economic development. The new élites, particularly the younger generation of engineers, professionals, doctors, are preoccupied with tackling the social-economic problems of their countries and extremely suspicious of solutions which imply some ideological short-cut to social well-being. They advocate programs specifically designed for their own needs, and capital investment—not ideology—is what really interests them. The fate of Communists in Ghana, Indonesia, Algeria and Egypt shows how utopianism is giving way to pragmatic nationalism.

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This is not to say that the Third World has passed its crisis point—far from it, as will be argued below. But its future is not likely to be defined in terms of cold-war issues as we have known them during the last twenty years, and particularly not in terms of the Communist conception of the historical progression of mankind toward a Communist form of society.

III

The new issues that constitute the underlying reality of international politics today stem from a fundamental revolution in the more advanced countries of man's relationship to society (both social and political) and from a basic reordering of the international system into states that are developed and underdeveloped, increasingly affluent and impoverished, overwhelmingly powerful and relatively impotent. The first poses a challenge to the individual being; the second, to the survival of organized society. It would be disastrous if in the nuclear age statesmen responded to these twin challenges in terms of old conflicts that are no longer relevant.

The social revolution already in progress in the more developed states—above all in America—is likely to be shaped by the widespread adoption of automation and cybernation for social and economic purposes, and by the application of specialized sciences such as biochemistry and molecular biology to the genetic and personal development of man. Man's environment and man himself will more and more be subject to purposive control and manipulation. The consequence will be a fundamental transformation of our society.[1]

Our concepts of work and leisure will in all probability undergo a basic reversal. Within a mere few decades leisure may become a burden while creative work will be a privilege increasingly restricted to the gifted few. The relationship between employment and way of life will then have to be revised. The concepts of retirement and of unemployment will have to be readjusted to the new realities of an increasingly automated economy. This will bring about basic changes in the social functions performed by trade unions—which may object to further reductions in the work-week—and by governmental welfare arrangements. The

[1] See the projections assembled by T. J. Gordon and O. Helmer, "Report on a Long-Range Forecasting Study," RAND Corporation, September 1964. Also the statement, "Triple Revolution," *Liberation*, April 1964.

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clearly defined relationship between earning capacity and consumption will also be blurred, with perhaps a need to establish arbitrary standards to assure a minimum level of consumption.

In some ways even more far-reaching will be the changes affecting the individual himself. How will we preserve the integrity and freedom of man as an individual? As a physical being he will become more malleable, given the trends in medical sciences. As a personality, he will become increasingly subject to external manipulation, capable eventually of altering his behavior, his intelligence, his psychological state, his sexual life—in effect, himself. As man approaches the stage where he can "program" himself as he now programs his computer, he may find himself increasingly denatured. The simultaneous weakening of religious belief may create both stress and emptiness. In some respects the alienated anti-Viet Nam war demonstrators are a portent of things to come. Their attitude as well as their personal behavior are a manifestation of a psychological crisis inherent in modern society. Viet Nam provides an outlet for basic cravings and fears, and if that issue did not exist, some other one would provide an excuse for the expression of personal and political alienation.

Cumulatively, these social and individual changes—many of which will make for a better life—may present a potent challenge to the relevancy and effective operation of our democratic processes. Our institutions are based on the belief that man can and should govern himself. Yet the problems that are likely to dominate our lives in the decades to come may creep upon us without attracting sufficient advance notice and may not fit into the established modes of our political dialogue. The issues that should increasingly agitate the citizen will have little in common with variants of welfare democracy or dictatorial Communism. Rather, the concerned citizen will have to take a stand on such questions as the form, organization and degree of permissible social control in providing for mass leisure; the character of education for a society in which a great many will not need their education for employment because much of the labor will be taken over by machines; the scope of social welfare in conditions which increasingly assume relative well-being for all; the psychological consequences of seemingly purposeless lives, with the consequent possibility of widespread individual and social malaise; the source of ultimate decision concerning the sex, personality and even the intelligence of one's own offspring; the in-

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tegration on a national and even international basis of weather and climate controls.

These issues, to be sure, will still involve and perhaps even give new urgency to the old dilemmas of large versus small-scale social organization, of central versus local government, or of a proper balance between social responsibility and individual autonomy. The point, however, is that the discussion of them will require an entirely new frame of reference and perhaps even major changes in the political structure of our society. Neither the discussion nor the possible reforms—if they are to have meaning—can have much in common with the traditional concepts that still shape our domestic and external perspectives.

The problem is different, but no less urgent, with respect to the Third World. Present trends suggest that the next several decades may see a widening gap between the developed societies and the underdeveloped ones, not only in their ways of life but perhaps even in their perceptions of the meaning of life itself. If it is true that the developed societies—America first of all, but Europe and Russia in its wake—are about to undergo a major societal change, the chances are that the profound differences between them and the Third World will be further accentuated.

At the same time, the limited capacity of the new nations to deal with their problems of unemployment, overpopulation and even starvation may create conditions of chaos and contribute to a state of international anarchy. The widening gap between the two cultures and the growing frustration and hatred among the have-nots for the haves could also contribute to a mixture of racial populism, nationalism and international anarchism—the projection abroad of a nihilistic mood like that of the anarchists of some decades ago.

It could be argued that this threat to international stability will be minimized by the continuing revolution in weaponry that is contributing to the gap between the few powerful nations and the others, and certainly between the industrially advanced nations and the underdeveloped ones. The RAND study, cited above, itemizes likely weapons developments in the next few decades. They range from biochemical devices, orbiting weapons systems, directed-energy weapons and terminal air-launched anti-missile defenses to the mass-hypnotic influencing of enemy forces and the use of domesticated dolphins for anti-submarine reconnaissance! Allowing for a certain amount of military-science

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fictionalizing, the basic pattern is none the less one of increasing disproportion of power among nation-states.

However, instability in the Third World can easily affect relations among the developed nations, reviving expectations rooted in otherwise fading ideological assumptions. Moreover, the asymmetry of power does not preclude nuclear proliferation among the weak, and perhaps the eventual use of nuclear weapons in their own conflicts. Finally, instability and hatred for the rich among the poor, and the irresistible temptation to the rich to engage in tactical manipulation of these conditions, will further impede any effort to come to grips with the basic problems of the Third World, thus perpetuating and aggravating the imbalance.

The governing ideologies of the principal developed states simply do not provide adequate guidelines for meeting these challenges. Unlike the past, when social change was slow enough to permit concomitant adjustments in man's outlook, today's pace of change is so fast that contemporary ideologies can hardly adapt to—even less anticipate—the problems of tomorrow. We are thus witnessing the spectacle of several major ideologies struggling to encompass the implications of situations for which their systems of thought have made little or no allowance. Ideology is becoming a conservative and not a revolutionary force. The end of ideology may not yet be at hand, but the relevance of several ideologies seems to be ending.

Soviet Communism, for one, has become a sterile and conservative dogma. The Party is a brake on social progress and its response to many social dilemmas, such as alienation or antisemitism or delinquency, has been to pretend that they do not exist. The Catholic Church, having taken the historic step toward ecumenism in respect to religious doctrine, has yet to face the reality of overpopulation. Pragmatic American liberalism is finding it difficult to combine the responsibility inherent in America's global power with the role of precursor of global social revolution. As a result, it faces the danger of polarization, with conservatives emphasizing the global power and liberal-progressives emphasizing social responsibility, each side minimizing, possibly even negating, the other's objectives. Nationalism, in spite of the infusion into it of new social content, encourages license and excess by the élites of the new states and, in Western Europe, frustrates the more creative efforts to overcome the bitter legacies of national conflict. Moreover, the old ideologies (and the

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conflicts associated with them) are unresponsive to the fact that similar internal and external problems impose themselves on such otherwise ideologically different societies as the United States and the Soviet Union, or on India and China.

IV

The absence of an ideological tradition has often made America respond to contemporary challenges in an extremely short-range and excessively pragmatic fashion; we have over-concentrated on means and techniques at the expense of long-range perspectives. Yet paradoxically we have also tended to become wedded to particular formulas and concepts once they were formulated and crystallized.

Still, America has proved more adaptable than many other nations to changed conditions and novel circumstances. Thus we have accepted our inherent responsibility as the world's preeminent power, as well as the onerous task of turning international relations to the "real" issues facing mankind.

America cannot, as some would wish, ignore the cold war or abandon the obligations it has undertaken. A sudden, peremptory restructuring of the international balance of power would be destabilizing and dangerous. However, it is imperative that the cold war be seen primarily as a means of refuting the dogmatic ideological concepts of the Communists while gradually creating conditions such that some Communist nations—particularly the Soviet Union—begin to perceive the advantages of increased global coöperation among the more developed states.

A community of the developed nations must eventually come into being if they are to respond effectively to the crisis that the Third World now faces and will face with increasing gravity. Continued divisions among the developed states—particularly those derived from outmoded ideological concepts—will negate the efforts of individual states to aid the Third World, while in Europe itself they will contribute to a resurgence of nationalism.

That the Communist states are not immune to the process of change and to intelligent Western initiatives is attested to by the evolution of Jugoslav thinking and behavior. Less than twenty years ago, the Jugoslavs talked not unlike the Chinese of today, and it should be remembered that one of the reasons for the Stalin-Tito break was the Jugoslavs' pressure on the Soviets to adopt a more militant posture toward the West. Today, the

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Jugoslavs are leading all Communist states in economic reform, in the openness of their society, in ideological moderation. Recently they joined GATT and their membership in EFTA—eventually perhaps the Common Market—is a probability. While still committed to the notion of "socialism," their views on international politics are moderate and they have had a significant impact on Soviet thinking. In 1958, the Soviet leadership condemned the newly adopted revisionist Jugoslav program. By 1966 the Kremlin was liberally plagiarizing from it.

Similar trends are developing elsewhere in the Communist world. To be sure, they are opposed by entrenched bureaucrats, but in the long run the reactionaries seem to be fighting a losing battle. Social forces are against them and the conservative élites are everywhere on the defensive. It is doubtful that they can reverse—though they certainly can delay—the trend toward a more open and humanistic and less ideological society. The resistance of those régimes dominated by entrenched conservative bureaucracies would be further weakened if the West did more to discredit the cold war as a self-serving doctrine of the Communist rulers. President Kennedy's American University speech had some effect in that regard.

An even more complicated task is the one posed by domestic change in the developed nations. Here, too, America is the pioneer, history's guinea pig. Our democratic process traditionally has involved a response to crises. Many of our governmental agencies—for example, the urban and welfare departments—developed because social needs belatedly made themselves obvious to all. Increasingly, the emphasis should be on anticipating needs and thus on the development of institutions capable of dealing with rapid social change and mitigating its consequences. This may require major reorientation in the average citizen's perception of the world around him. Finally, it would be desirable to stimulate a broad public discussion on the role and character of the individual in the scientific age about to set upon us and perhaps even to subsume us. In doing so, new and more relevant issues will come to the fore, replacing the repetitive cant of outmoded ideological conflict.

Our success or failure in adapting our democratic institutions to these new conditions, while safeguarding the individual personality, may in large measure determine the role this country will be playing in the world by the end of this century.

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PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

By Lincoln P. Bloomfield

IF conflict in Rhodesia or Viet Nam—or half a dozen other places—should develop in a way that makes a United Nations peacekeeping force desirable and even urgent, what would happen? Could such a force be organized? Would the Soviet Union and France try to block action if the force were created by the General Assembly? Where would the troops come from? Would they be authorized to use their weapons? Who would pay for the undertaking?

In the ten years since the creation of the first United Nations Emergency Force, no better alternative to U. N. peacekeeping operations has been devised for avoiding escalation at two danger points: violent small-power quarrels, and internal disorders of the Congo or Cyprus variety which threaten to draw in powerful outsiders. Regional organizations may offer an alternative in the future, but for today, U. N. peacekeeping seems the most likely method of dealing with potential crises at such points as Kashmir, if a third round ensues; Rhodesia, Angola or Mozambique; South West Africa; Guyana; Aden and South Arabia; any one of a dozen African states that are far from being nations and may have chronic border disputes; or South Africa, where the potential for violence is unlimited. Though without any fundamental consensus on political values, and lacking the firm foundation of community agreement about law and order, the United Nations may once more be expected to act as if it were a form of government. Diplomats gathered in alarm some midnight may once again ask, as Adlai Stevenson said Adam asked when Eve hesitated for a moment after his proposal of marriage, "Is there someone else?"

There will be no one else, but the sad fact is that the most important ingredients of effective peacekeeping—firm political support, a workable directive and consistent revenues—are likely to be missing. Their absence reflects the insufficient sense of community in a divided world, and as long as that situation persists, Dag Hammarskjöld's cautious ground rules for UNEF will remain generally valid. These rules called for at least a tacit agreement among the great powers; for the consent of the "host" government to be obtained, however prostrate the host might

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be; for the force to be ad hoc in nature; and in general for the primary function of U. N. peacekeeping to be better comprehended by the word "police" than by the word "military."

Some elements of the ground rules have changed in the course of action. In the Congo, unlike Suez, the U. N. eventually reserved the right to decide the force composition without the detailed concurrence of a kaleidoscopically shifting government. Because British forces were already in position in Cyprus, they were absorbed into the U. N. force, without necessarily setting a precedent for great-power participation. In the Congo operation the U. N. developed a "sliding mandate" that in the end authorized the use of limited force.

It remains theoretically possible for a U. N. peacekeeping operation to be launched without the "host's" consent. The domestic jurisdiction barrier of the Charter has been crumbling since racial discrimination in the southern half of Africa began to be accepted by large U. N. majorities as a threat to international peace and security. But without United States financial and logistical support such operations seem remote, as does the possibility that any new U. N. mandate would authorize the initial use of force.

The chief difficulties today have to do with decision-making and financing. We do not know the thought processes that led Khrushchev to go along with U. N. peacekeeping efforts in Suez, Lebanon, the Congo and Cyprus, although undoubtedly one consideration was the generally favorable attitude of the Arab and African states. We can, however, comprehend the Soviet leaders' sense of outrage when in the late summer of 1960 they came to appreciate how damaging to their national purposes in central Africa a determinedly non-partisan U. N. operation could be. Above all, Moscow had not calculated that the U. N. Secretary-General could act as a genuine power factor in world politics, moving events in ways they could not control. Dag Hammarskjöld was thenceforth the target of savage attack and unrelenting opposition, as Moscow pressed for the same rules of control to be applied to the Secretariat as to all other international power structures into which the Soviet Union had entered. Soviet policy culminated in the adamant refusal to pay assessed shares of the cost of mounting the UNEF and Congo enterprises, retrospectively branded as "illegal."

It may be that if Moscow had stood alone its assault on peace-

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keeping would not have made significant political headway. Coinciding as it did with General de Gaulle's sweeping *recul* of the French position in all international organizations which smacked of supranationalism, including a refusal to pay France's share of the Congo bill, the Soviet drive was potently reinforced. Isolated doctrinaire rigidity acquired the force of a movement.

Not surprisingly, the United States was also having second thoughts about the decision-making process in the U. N. Washington has increasingly favored the Security Council, where it retains the veto, over the "swirling majorities" of the Assembly, to the point of making unofficial suggestions that the Military Staff Committee be revived for peacekeeping direction. Nevertheless, in view of the cold war and the still-vivid memory of Korea, it reserves the right to mobilize the Assembly, and if Peking should gain entrance, the 1950 Uniting for Peace procedures would probably prove indispensable. The United States has lately reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the Council, while upholding the Assembly's authority to act when the Council is paralyzed.

The American stand on collective financial responsibility for peacekeeping reflected a steadfast posture of support, despite the sobering possibilities of U. N. troops engaged in actual combat, or of a U. N. operation some day running contrary to American wishes. The United States was prepared to support Article 19 and the principle of collective responsibility in spite of the fact that it could not be sure of keeping its "blocking third" vote in the General Assembly. But with a few notable exceptions there was little support either for a showdown on this issue or for the U.N.'s financial needs in general. As the crisis wore on, it became evident that Washington's options were in fact acceptance of a badly fractured world organization or the humiliation of backing down. It chose to back down, but exacted a price in terms of American support. Others had insisted on exemption from financial responsibility for activities anathema to them; henceforth the United States reserved for itself the same option, "if in our view, strong and compelling reasons exist for doing so." The sobering reality was that in one vital sense the United States had accepted the Soviet-French conception of a United Nations in which any member could "opt out" when a majority, however constitutional, set it on a course counter to what that member believed were its fundamental interests.

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Even now, after the American retreat, there is total disagreement on how expenses should be apportioned. The Soviet Union insists that legal authority in this area lies only with the Security Council; Ambassador Goldberg assigns exclusive competence to the Assembly and supports apportionment in accordance with capacity to pay, with some kind of weighted influence for those countries that bear the principal load. (U Thant, perhaps because both Paris and Moscow were opposing his needed latitude in observing the Kashmir cease-fire, also strongly reasserted the Secretary-General's role as executive for U. N. peacekeeping—the role of "Secretary-Generalissimo," as some critics saw it in the most trying Congo days.)

Mandatory assessments are not the only way to pay for peacekeeping operations; the Yemen force was paid for by the two parties, the Cyprus force by voluntary contributions. Some proposals have called for centering the financial authority in the Council, as the Soviets and French wish, or for a mixed Council-Assembly decision. Canada has suggested fund-raising conferences such as those used for technical assistance. Other suggestions include special peacekeeping funds, an endowment fund, payment only by those who take part, and—the position favored all along by the Soviets—payment by the "aggressors" in each case.

The most interesting scheme has been generated by Ireland—one of that handful of small countries, predominantly Western, that has carried a disproportionate share of the burden of peacekeeping in terms of manpower, resources and inventiveness. The heart of the proposal is a reliable assessment system based on a special scale. In negotiating for the support of five co-sponsors, Foreign Minister Aiken reluctantly agreed to what became the proposal's most striking feature—the provision that only those of the Big Five who vote for a peacekeeping action need pay for it. In return for that unprecedented concession, they would still pay 70 percent of the bill for a field operation, while the 90-odd economically less-developed members would pay only 5 percent and the handful of developed countries other than the Big Five would divide up the remaining 25 percent. No member could be charged for more than 50 percent of the total.

The United States, consistent with its new position, has accepted this general principal of opting out as an "interim measure" (while reserving decision on the possibility of being as-

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sessed more than the one-third ceiling fixed by the Congress). This seems wise, permitting as it does peacekeeping operations that are approved by a substantial majority to be undertaken without precipitating a financial crisis each time.

The Soviet Union with characteristic intransigence has found the whole scheme "completely unacceptable." The majority being unwilling to do battle with Moscow, the Twentieth Assembly adjourned without acting on the Irish initiative (and without any trace of Soviet or French voluntary contributions). It remains to be seen whether the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, to which the Assembly consigned the proposal before adjourning, will act upon it.

Meanwhile the worsened climate jeopardizes the chances of even modest proposals for non-standing U. N. forces. There is still no reliable supply of units skilled in the techniques of peacekeeping (crowd control, civic action, intelligence observation) and drawn from politically appropriate parts of the world. The U. N. Secretariat does not have a staff adequate to plan the logistics, deployment and support of possible future operations. For the commanders who have to make U. N. peacekeeping operations work, life would be easier with contingency planning, focused on ways of providing a diversified and skilled command, on schedule, wearing the right weight uniforms (and perhaps skins of the right color), equipped with rifles of uniform caliber and with wheels on their vehicles of uniform size.

Often over the years, the Secretary-General has encouraged member states to earmark units within their national forces for ready availability. The list of countries responding to the most recent appeal contains no surprises. Canada, which has supplied virtually all the communications units for U. N. field operations to date, reported that for several years it has had a stand-by battalion specially trained for peacekeeping duties. The Netherlands earlier designated a unit of 600 marines, and subsequently a supply ship with four helicopters, patrol and scout ships, a light armored carrier, an armored infantry battalion, a medical company, a transport plane and three jet helicopters. Iran, Italy and New Zealand have earmarked units. Britain under the Labor Government has taken some steps that perhaps mark the end of its post-Suez sulks in the U. N. Substantial military units have been pledged, though on a highly contingent basis, and there are indications of a willingness to provide significant logistical sup-

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port. Perhaps most usefully, the British have led the way in contributing to a rescue fund to wipe out the existing deficit.

Consistent with their splendid record for enlightened international behavior, the Scandinavians have gone the furthest to build a more reliable international peacekeeping capacity. The parliaments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and Finland as well, have passed bills setting in motion a training program for approximately 1,000 men each, who could operate either jointly or separately. All four states now have officers working full time on technical planning, and their Defense Ministers meet twice a year. The training proceeds along the commonly accepted lines of riot control, communications and related skills (although Denmark does not normally train its soldiers in riot control, due to the persisting unpopularity of the regiment that put down Copenhagen's last riot, in 1895).

Earmarking, training and even organizing for prospective peacekeeping have thus increasingly acquired a do-it-yourself flavor. Initiatives that under different circumstances would be taken at U. N. headquarters have been taken outside the deadlocked U. N. setting. Several private conferences have been held among government and non-government specialists to help thinking and planning develop on an informal basis. The World Veterans Federation, accredited to the U. N. but privately supported, is undertaking to establish a clearing-house in Paris for the various efforts in international peacekeeping research and development.

The United States has not earmarked forces. A group of Republican Congressmen has proposed the creation of a small volunteer unit of 1,000 American servicemen to render "emergency technical support" for U. N. peacekeeping operations on a stand-by basis; it is styled the FIRST brigade (an acronym from "Forces for International Relief on Standby"). This notion of course runs the hazard of inviting an equivalent contribution by the Red Army (or perhaps eventually the Chinese People's Army)—which could end such neutral peacekeeping capacity as the U. N. has been able to muster. Still, it demonstrates a desire to contribute more to peacekeeping.

As the innovators of 1956 sensed, it probably continues to be true that the cause of peace will best be served by a maximum number of smaller, non-white countries that genuinely support the principle of responsible neutral behavior volunteering to

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supply disciplined, technically-trained personnel. More than any other single development, this can prevent the realization of the nightmare recently conjured up by Prime Minister Wilson: a "Red Army in Blue Berets."

II

No technical improvements in machinery can accomplish more than the peacekeeping function itself can do, especially in contributing to the resolution of conflict and the process of peaceful change. There is a growing awareness that the capacity to enforce a cease-fire, to suppress outbreaks of violence, to clamp a lid on explosive situations, to buy time, can have a negative effect, too. If no progress is made toward settling the dispute, peacekeeping may generate even more unmanageable conflict later. The lack of workable provisions for peaceful change stands indicted as perhaps the prime cause of major and minor wars in this century. The United Nations Charter recognized the problem but the U. N. has been far from solving it.

There are, of course, some conflicts for which no settlement is possible for an indefinite period. To keep a lid on the Palestine cauldron and thus to "buy time" has doubtless been the highest form of statesmanship. But when war broke out again in the fall of 1965 between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, it threw into vivid relief the direct relationship between continued violence and the paucity of means to achieve change through peaceful settlement. What was whispered of Palestine in 1948 and of Suez in 1956 was heard again: perhaps the fighting had been stopped prematurely.

U Thant in his 1965 Annual Report worried publicly that "the very fact that [these disputes] have become an accepted and semi-permanent part of the way of life in the areas has tended to . . . reduce the sense of urgency which might stimulate a search . . . for a basic and peaceful solution . . ." Adlai Stevenson was prophetic—but perhaps excessively hopeful—when he dubbed this "the Age of Cease-Fire and Peaceful Change."

The trouble is that settling disputes is an even more demanding task than pacifying them. One of the prime assumptions of those who believed in international organization was that measures for settling disputes would become habit-forming. No other area of multilateral diplomacy has been the object of such intensive and protracted study, from the League of Nations days to last year's

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White House Conference on International Coöperation. The concrete proposals to emerge from two generations of research are not terribly revolutionary. By and large they are sensible enough to commend themselves to any rational man. But the sad truth is that virtually none of the recommendations has been put into effect. The sense of progress in peacemaking in fact declines with the passage of time. Obviously something is very wrong, and obviously it is not going to be fixed by one more study of procedures for pacific settlement.

Several explanations account for this monumental shortfall between expectation and reality. Is it possible that the trouble does lie somewhere in the institutional structure and procedures of the U. N. and the World Court? This seems implausible, given the ready availability of the devices mentioned in Chapter VI, the Security Council, the (gradually disappearing) Panel of Mediators, and the plethora of recommendations already made. Perhaps the answer lies in the relative lawlessness of the age, the preference for the unilateral pursuit of remedies. Russia, China, Britain, France and the United States have all contributed at one time or another since 1945 to the idea that for the really important issues a state may use force, and *raison d'état* over-rides all else. This is a way to account for everyone's sins, including one's own. More to the point, the Communists and nationalist revolutionaries aim to change the status quo and overturn one or another part of the established order—precisely that which law, peacekeeping and cease-fire diplomacy tend to protect. And yet—is this age really any more lawless than those preceding? Hardly.

Perhaps the truest explanation lies in the understandable proclivity of overworked statesmen to focus on the present, to approach cases ad hoc, to concentrate on the demanding crisis of the moment, to apply preventive diplomacy only when violence threatens. For American leaders today, all else is preëmpted by Viet Nam. But last year it was Article 19, the year before that the test ban, the year before that Cuba, and the year before that Berlin. When Quemoy and Matsu were under the gun the United States considered it unthinkable to negotiate a more durable status for them, even while hinting that common sense required it. When the guns fell silent—or relatively so—attention immediately wandered elsewhere. So with the Suez Canal, the Kashmir plebiscite and half a dozen other "dormant" disputes.

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There is never a good time to plan ahead, always a good time to let sleeping dogs lie. Nothing can be done when the issue is acute; no one wants to do anything when it is quiescent.

Given this human tendency, and our particular pragmatic Anglo-Saxon style that generally discourages purposeful planning, it seems unhelpful to continue to urge other quarreling countries to have recourse to law and third-party procedures before they become subjects for peacekeeping. Some institutional reforms addressed to the central issue of peaceful change might be marginally useful, perhaps creating an equity tribunal, as some have suggested, or arranging to breathe real life into Article 14 of the U. N. Charter. They are at least worth study.

But to get at the core of the difficulty, the leading Western states with pretensions of being "law-abiding" probably would have to make a far more convincing demonstration than heretofore of their own *bona fides*. Perhaps they could agree to binding arrangements for compulsory arbitration or adjudication of all disputes that arise among themselves, including those affecting "national honor," or those judged unilaterally to be issues of domestic jurisdiction. Such a protocol among the like-minded could create a fragment of genuine international order. Without the responsible nations setting an example of purposive action, it will remain futile to hope that others will act as we would have them act.

III

All in all, a number of sobering conclusions emerge. First, on the assumption that U. N. peacekeeping will be invoked in the future yet will continue to rest on a fragmented political foundation, common sense favors arrangements that do not put the existence of the organization at stake each time such a task must be undertaken. One means of achieving this decoupling lies in procedures enabling the great powers to stand aside from a given operation, both physically and financially. In some cases, their political resistance may still be formidable, and if one of the superpowers is adamantly opposed the U. N. probably should not be the peacekeeping instrument.

The American reservation of the right not to pay for U. N. activities of which it disapproves was distressing to friends of the United Nations. In fact, however, such explicit decoupling of decision-making and paying of costs may contribute to the

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salvation of the organization. It could preserve the principle of apportioning expenses while avoiding the adoption of taxing policies enforceable only under a world government. At the same time, the possibility of finding independent sources of revenue for the U. N., through imposts on international mail or trade, or royalties on exploitation of resources beneath the sea or in outer space, should continue to be studied for the future.

The second conclusion is that the price of achieving genuine procedural reforms in U. N. peacekeeping would be to restrict to the Security Council the authority to launch such operations. This trade-off is unacceptable to the United States which, while having shed some unrealistic expectations about majority rule in the Assembly, wants an escape-hatch available in extreme situations, as well as the bonus of deterring the uninhibited use of the veto in the Security Council. So long as the United States supports emergency recourse to the Assembly, the Soviets and some others will also continue to oppose any significant strengthening of the Secretariat's capacity for contingency planning, stockpiling, training or other desirable preparations for peacekeeping.

Efforts outside the organization, limited as they are, should be encouraged. Work done now to assemble data, to encourage countries to earmark and specially train units, to plan the necessary logistics, and even to blueprint force structures and training programs, could one day prove vital for the success of one or another peacekeeping operation. And it cannot be repeated too often that American military assistance to underdeveloped countries might be far better invested if it emphasized the aim, already written into the legislation, of improving the capacity of international organizations to carry out peacekeeping functions. Such a shift in emphasis would strengthen those internal-security and civic-action functions that appear far more useful than the status-symbol types of weapons which with depressing frequency wind up being used against internal rivals or close neighbors.

The third conclusion is that the clear interest of the United States in supporting a U. N. capability for peacekeeping is tempered by the candid expectation that under some foreseeable circumstances we may interpret the action as running contrary to our interests. In the Dominican Republic in the spring of 1965 the United States resisted the Security Council's attempts to assert its competence (while France, with perhaps the merest *arrière*

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pensée, assumed the pose of champion of U. N. peacekeeping). Looking ahead, a punitive U. N. expedition aimed at stripping political power from the whites of Rhodesia (or perhaps later, South Africa) may present Americans with a painful dilemma. A theoretical capacity exists now for mobilizing U. N. peacekeeping machinery at the service of a passionate Afro-Asian majority —an eventuality which might overcome Soviet (or later Chinese) aversion to enforcement actions by the General Assembly. And if the ominous General Assembly vote on bases on December 22, 1965, is prophetic, it may be on the basis of a simple rather than two-thirds majority.

The role of the O. A. S. in the 1965 Dominican episode raises a final point that belongs on the agenda. As of today, regional organizations are an inadequate substitute for the U. N. in terms of capacity to mount and execute effective peacekeeping operations. One reason is that such organizations are characteristically incomplete, excluding Israel in the Middle East, the southern part of Africa in the case of the Organization of African Unity, even, one might say, Eastern Europe on the part of NATO. The O. A. S. operates in the shadow of one dominant country. The majority of Latin American states appear to have resisted recent American efforts to make an institution out of the figleaf the O. A. S. spread over American troops in the Dominican Republic. Even overlooking this recent history, collective operations of the sort the United States envisages run against the traditions and beliefs of most Latin American states, evoke fears of American intervention, and smack, whether justly or not, of counter-revolutionary purposes.

In Africa the O. A. U. continues to show itself incapable of replacing the U. N., however much some of its members would wish it to. Even so, several interesting things have been done in its two-year history: three disputes have already been settled under O. A. U. auspices, and in Tanganyika, Nigerian and Ethiopian troops replaced those Britain had earlier sent on request. In time, the so-far meaningless resolutions which the O. A. U. has voted for enforcement action against Portugal and South Africa might really be implemented. As for the Middle East, the Arab League actually did provide a mixed force of 3,000 to replace British units in Kuwait in 1961 (although it did not work any better than most other Arab League collective efforts). In NATO, Harlan Cleveland, the new U. S. Ambassador, called last fall for

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"new ways of relating the peacekeeping forces on duty within NATO to the flexible call-up system which the United Nations has been developing for peacekeeping duties elsewhere."

All things considered—including the likelihood that most regional organizations would employ such power as they developed against their own intraregional enemies—the wisest policy would be to begin now to work out formulas to encourage regional organizations to act in close coördination with the U. N. in the settlement of disputes, including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, observation, and even small-scale policing. The connection with the U. N. is extremely important both in terms of legitimacy and of vesting ultimate responsibility in the larger body of states neutral to the particular conflict. Yet there are valid reasons to strengthen the regional means, not only because this may be an inevitable development, but also because of the positive desirability of giving more effect to still-sensible provisions of Article 33 of the U. N. Charter, according to which regional agencies are expected to aid in trying to work out disputes before they become formalized as U. N. "cases." Such a division of labor might well contribute to making disputes more manageable.

Security, we were told in 1945, was indivisible. As of the late 1960s, however, our best bet may be to divide security up into smaller pieces in order to keep the larger structure from being overloaded. The 1970s may see a resurgence of regional arrangements whether we favor them or not. The task for the foresighted is to see that they perform constructively, so that peacekeeping may ultimately be synonymous with peacemaking.

In the end, the reasons why the world needs international peacekeeping, global or regional, for secondary and internal explosions, are akin to the reasons for America's policing the peripheries of the Communist heartlands. It is not because the U. N. is ideally equipped to do its job—clearly it is not—any more than American power is an ideal substitute for real collective security. However much their actions are flawed and justly criticized in detail, both fill a void in the absence of an effective world political authority. The price can be heavy in political, moral and human terms, but it is less than the price of uncontrolled violence, unpoliced disorder, unlimited war. On balance, it seems not too great to pay.

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GUARANTEES TO NON-NUCLEAR NATIONS

By Mason Willrich

SINCE the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, American arms-control policy has been dominated by efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. Proposals for a non-proliferation agreement—a treaty which would prohibit signatory states not already having nuclear weapons from acquiring them—have recently been put on the table by both East and West in the form of draft treaties, but beyond that little real progress has been made. Meanwhile, the growing nuclear capability of Communist China has led a number of non-nuclear countries to reassess their strategic security positions and to ponder whether they, too, do not want to manufacture nuclear weapons. To deter them, the nuclear powers have intensified their search for something to sweeten the non-proliferation pot.

The United States has held out the prospect of support against nuclear threats to countries which continue to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. On October 18, 1964, before the dust from the first Chinese nuclear explosion had settled, President Johnson declared that the United States would continue to work against "nuclear spread." He then said: "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."[1] The United Kingdom has also included in its negotiating position the possibility of some form of guarantee against nuclear attack for those nations willing to pledge themselves to a course of nuclear-weapons abstinence. To date, however, no nuclear power has been prepared to be specific about how such guarantees might work.

To guarantee the security of a nation without nuclear weapons against nuclear attack seems at first glance to be a reasonable, in fact minimal, price to pay to avoid proliferation. However, the deeper implications of nuclear guarantees need to be examined before we decide to move from the domain of the speechmaker, where the matter presently rests, to the kind of foreign policy upon which nations act.

First, we should clarify what we mean by a "national nuclear

[1] *Department of State Bulletin,* November 2, 1964, p. 610–614.

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weapons capability." It rests on the possession of nuclear weapons, means of delivery and the ability of the national government to make its own decision on the use of the weapons. None of these three elements can be ignored. An effective delivery system in particular may be more difficult to acquire in some cases than nuclear warheads.

The present non-nuclear nations seem to fall into two categories: those with sufficient technological expertise, industrial competence and economic base to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, once they have made the decision, within a reasonable period of time—say five years; and those which are simply not close enough to the nuclear "take-off point" to be a primary concern. Admittedly, however, the take-off point depends a great deal on a nation's willingness to make the necessary economic sacrifices.

There remains the possibility, too, that states may obtain a nuclear weapons capability with substantial outside assistance, ranging from technical and material aid to the outright transfer of nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles. The two major nuclear powers seem fairly well agreed to avoid giving assistance in making warheads. The Soviet Union is not happy with the results of having helped Communist China; and the United States is not likely to transfer nuclear warheads to the control of any other single nation, even though it will not at present agree to a non-proliferation treaty which forecloses the option of developing a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. Control over the transfer of nuclear-capable delivery systems is, however, complicated by the fact that many types of aircraft can be adapted to carrying either conventional or nuclear payloads, and there appears to be less agreement between the two powers in this matter. The United States has transferred outright to other countries both ground-to-ground missiles and aircraft, and the Soviet Union has at least transferred aircraft.

Communist China does not adhere to the philosophy of non-proliferation, but its own requirements will probably prevent it from offering substantial nuclear aid abroad, either warheads or delivery systems, in the near future.

II

In discussing various possible types of guarantees for non-nuclear nations we may find it helpful to break the problem into

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three components: first, possible variations in the nature of the undertaking; next, possible parties to the undertaking; and finally, strategic postures necessary to support it.

In regard to the undertaking itself, both form and substance must be carefully considered. A guarantee might take a variety of forms, from a unilateral statement of national policy to a solemn treaty commitment. Even though a unilateral declaration would not be legally binding it could doubtless be regarded as a definite "commitment" by the guarantor, especially, in the case of the United States, once domestic public opinion had solidified in support of the policy. But the non-nuclear beneficiary would not be likely to regard such a simple statement of policy as a sufficient guarantee of its security.

Even a binding treaty obligation is likely to lose some of its credibility over time, especially if the good relations between the states prevailing at the start are later impaired for one reason or another. And in any case, any treaty obligation which restricts a nation's freedom of action in matters touching its own security comes into doubt when that nation feels its security in jeopardy.[2]

In summary, the force of a unilateral policy expressed in sufficient detail to make clear that it will be a basis for future action should not be underestimated, nor should the binding character of a guarantee in treaty form be overestimated.

As for the substance of the guarantee, a key consideration would be the circumstances in which it could be invoked. Assurances of general military assistance are incorporated into various existing alliances. In the NATO treaty, for instance, assistance is to be given if an "armed attack" occurs "in Europe or North America." A parallel obligation under a nuclear guarantee could be to take action in case of "nuclear attack" against the territory of designated non-nuclear states or regions. This would mean that the guarantor would not be compelled to do anything until a nuclear attack had actually occurred.

For a potential victim, that would be little comfort. What would matter would be the strength of the deterrent against nuclear attack created by the probability or possibility of retaliation by the guarantor. But the circumstances which create reliability in the eyes of allies on the one hand, and credibility in the

[2] Thus both U.S. and Soviet proposals for a non-proliferation treaty permit any party to withdraw "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country." This provision also appears in Article IV of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

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minds of potential adversaries on the other, may not always be identical.

The nuclear aspect of the U.S. security guarantee under NATO is believable to many of our European allies partly because we have committed substantial numbers of troops in West Germany. It is rightly inferred that the United States would not expose a large number of its own men along the central European front without being willing to go all the way up the conflict escalator, if necessary, in defense of the region. At the same time, from our point of view, it is important that NATO be able to withstand a conventional assault by conventional means, in order to keep nuclear weapons in the last-resort category where they belong.

We should not over-generalize from NATO defense problems, but the NATO experience and others do suggest that nuclear guarantees cannot easily be divorced from the issues of conventional defense. To work as a non-proliferation inducement, a guarantee of security formally confined to cases of "nuclear attack" may well need to entail a further, implicit commitment.

The nature of that commitment is an important question. In the event of an armed attack in the NATO area, the United States is obligated to take "forthwith . . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." It is apparent that the military commitment is imprecise and the nature of the response is left largely to unilateral determination. In the SEATO treaty and several bilateral defense treaties the language of the guarantee is even weaker—the obligation on a signatory being merely to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The question arises whether, in light of these treaties, any potential guarantor power would be prepared to commit itself in advance to making a sufficiently well-defined response to justify a non-nuclear nation in placing full reliance on it.

A guarantee could range from unilateral to universal. One nuclear power could simply declare to the world, as the United States seems to have done, its intention to come to the aid of non-nuclear countries that are victims of nuclear attack. Or it might exclude certain countries—for example, the Communist countries —or be limited to a single designated country. A policy for the benefit of a particular non-nuclear nation may have some utility, especially if expressly addressed to an imminent nuclear threat. A unilateral declaration addressed to the world at large will prob-

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ably not be taken too seriously by anyone. In both instances, the absence of a definite treaty obligation would limit credibility.

A joint declaration by two or more nuclear powers would be one way of strengthening the guarantee. An example would be for the United States and the Soviet Union to guarantee jointly the security of non-nuclear nations against nuclear attack. This degree of Soviet-American coöperation has so far been well beyond reach, and the Soviet Union's problems with the Chinese, as well as its deep-seated mistrust of the U.S. nuclear posture, seem to preclude such an approach now. But it might become more attractive, especially as applied to countries outside the European area, as the Chinese nuclear menace grows and if the Southeast Asian conflict is moderated.

In the case of a non-nuclear nation which already has mutual security arrangements with a nuclear power, a specific nuclear guarantee might perhaps be viewed as adding to the strength of the overall defense commitment. However, not all non-nuclear nations would find a simple bilateral arrangement agreeable. Those nations not already in alliance with either the United States or the Soviet Union would consider a guarantee from either country an unacceptable departure from a non-aligned position. Here a joint guarantee, or possibly a guarantee "through the United Nations," might ease the problem.

It may be useful to revert at this point to President Johnson's statement of October 18, 1964, still the most explicit official U.S. position on the subject of nuclear security guarantees.[8] He described the circumstances which would invoke American support as "a threat of nuclear blackmail." The President added that "if they need our strong support . . . they will have it." A simple declaration of "strong support" may well be lost in the background noise generally pervading international diplomacy.

Since the American position is couched in sufficiently ambiguous terms not to disturb anyone, we should not expect it to have a measurable effect on the decisions of governments which possess the possibility of developing nuclear weapons.

A nuclear guarantee which involved the deployment of nuclear forces in a non-nuclear country might be more effective in dis-

[8] In a message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference on January 27, 1966, the President restated his policy in this respect, along with a general plea "to strengthen United Nations and other international security arrangements." *Department of State Bulletin*, February 21, 1966, p. 263. The pledge was again reiterated by the State Department in a statement of May 9, 1966, following Communist China's third nuclear blast.

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suading it from developing a nuclear capability of its own. Even though the guarantor power retained full ownership and control of those forces, some muscle would obviously be added to its guarantee. But such a course might also, it is true, raise strategic and tactical problems similar to those that have plagued NATO for over a decade.

This suggests a further question: what effects would nuclear guarantees have on existing alliance systems? The security of some of our closest allies already rests on a U.S. nuclear guarantee, backed up by extensive and elaborate deployments of both nuclear and non-nuclear forces. To a somewhat lesser extent our collective defense treaties guarantee the security of 28 other nations outside NATO.

New nuclear guarantees would probably have to be more specific than the existing loosely-worded alliance obligations, or alternatively would have to provide physical evidence of the undertaking in the form of deployed nuclear forces. But the stronger the nuclear guarantees given to states outside the alliance structure, the more likely it is to demoralize our present allies and lead them to make increased demands on us, or possibly to pay increased attention to General de Gaulle's nuclear thesis.

It is worth noting that the Soviet Union would probably arouse less dissent within the Warsaw Pact if it offered a nuclear guarantee to a non-member than the United States would find among its allies if it proposed comparable action. But for important reasons growing out of the conflict with China, the Soviet Union is less likely than the United States to entertain the notion seriously.

III

It remains to consider the potential effect of offering nuclear guarantees to specific countries which have a nuclear option. India, Israel and Sweden deserve first attention.[4] Each has the prerequisites, each has a serious security problem and none is under the collective security umbrella of either the United States or the Soviet Union, at least in any formal sense.

India, today a target for nuclear blackmail by Communist

[4] There are, of course, other countries which have an even greater potential nuclear-weapons capability than those listed, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and Japan. However, each of these countries is already under the U.S. security umbrella. Therefore, the relationship between a specific nuclear security guarantee and the incentives at work in these countries to acquire nuclear weapons will not be considered in this article.

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China, is of primary concern to those interested in keeping the nuclear club from expanding. It has a relatively advanced civil nuclear industry, including its own plant for separating plutonium from irradiated reactor fuels, and though its economy is in desperate shape it could probably stand up under the burden of a modest military nuclear program. India is clearly capable of providing itself with the warhead component.

India would not find it so easy to come by a delivery system. Moreover, although Communist China will be able to strike from its own territory at India's vitals with glorified V-2s, the reverse is not true for India. To make a nuclear strike at Peking or the industrial heartland in Manchuria, India will require a long-range delivery system—either long-range land-based missiles, bomber aircraft or medium-range sea-based missiles. Conversion of a portion of the Indian civil jet-transport fleet is, of course, a possibility, but any savings would be at the expense of an increase in vulnerability. With the added burden of the delivery system, the cost to India of exercising its nuclear option is substantially increased and should provide a powerful argument against a decision to "go nuclear."

The effect of India's decision on Pakistan also deserves consideration. Pakistan would hardly consider India's acquisition of nuclear armaments as a step toward peaceful relations. Pakistan shows little signs of giving up its ability to play both ends of the Sino-Indian conflict, and in the circumstances India cannot hope to obtain Pakistan's support for embarking on a nuclear-weapons program on behalf of all the nations south of the Himalayas. The potential snowball effect in South Asia of such a program is apparent.

Would a guarantee against nuclear blackmail help India decide to forego the chance of developing a nuclear capability? Since Communist China began setting off nuclear blasts, India has raised its price for making an unequivocal renunciation; it indicates that it wants considerably more than a simple guarantee. An undertaking "through the United Nations" to safeguard the security of non-nuclear nations is only part of its demand. Also included are an agreement by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to other powers, a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a freeze on further production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, coupled with substantial reductions in existing inventories. Moreover, India has not excluded Com-

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munist China from the list of required subscribers to a non-proliferation agreement. It seems clear that a "paper" guarantee will not be enough for India. Furthermore, any guarantee other than one by the United Nations, or conceivably one given jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union, would be unacceptable as contrary to India's commitment to non-alignment.

Israel's situation is different from India's in almost every respect. The technological and industrial comparison between Israel and the state which constitutes its chief threat is to a large extent the reverse of India's. Israel is clearly ahead of the United Arab Republic in terms of the base upon which a nuclear weapons capability can be built. Moreover, one or two nuclear warheads dropped on the Aswan Dam could submerge the whole lower Nile Valley. Israel may, indeed, view nuclear weapons as necessary insurance against the gradual dwindling of its present superiority in conventional forces.

In addition to cost, the basic deterrent to Israel's adoption of a nuclear weapons program is uncertainty about the reaction of interested powers outside the Middle East. The U.A.R. could be expected to respond with an outburst of righteous indignation and a demand for nuclear help. Conceivably the Soviet Union in these circumstances would make an exception to its adamant non-proliferation policy. If it were to step in and redress the nuclear balance in the Middle East, could Israel be certain what the U.S. reaction would be?

Israel has not fixed a price for its pledge to abstain from nuclear weapons. For some time, though, it has been interested in obtaining an assurance of security from the United States. From the Israeli point of view, even an American guarantee confined to assistance against nuclear attack might hold distinct advantages. So far, however, the United States has refused to make a commitment to one side in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The United States might accept a guarantee generalized to include all the nations of the Middle East. Such a guarantee might be given in coöperation with the Soviet Union. In such an arrangement Israel and the Arab nations alike would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and the United States and the Soviet Union jointly would guarantee all of them against nuclear attack. Steps to create such a "nuclear free zone" in the Middle East could be taken, if necessary, outside the framework of current negotiations on other non-proliferation measures. Political

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obstacles for both the Israelis and the Arabs are formidable; moreover, open coöperation with the United States in the Middle East is probably impossible for the Soviet Union at present. But the all-round gain in stability in the Middle East that would result from avoiding a nuclear arms race there justifies at least an effort to secure a breakthrough.

The issue for Sweden is whether its neutrality will be better served with or without nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Sweden would not attempt to mount a major nuclear force against the Soviet Union; its position relative to the Soviet Union is even more hopeless in a quantitative sense than India's to China. But unlike India, Sweden's medium-range land-based missiles could reach some vital targets in the Soviet Union. Sweden may also wish to keep its nuclear option open until it sees how West Germany's nuclear ambitions are to be satisfied or denied.

Not surprisingly, given Sweden's exposed position, it asks something in return for its signature to an agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons. Generally, Swedish officials have talked in terms of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In view of Sweden's traditional adherence to neutrality it is unlikely to welcome a security guarantee from the United States, and a guarantee from the Soviet Union would of course be rejected. A nuclear guarantee "through the United Nations" might be acceptable, but by itself it would hardly influence a Swedish decision whether or not to develop nuclear weapons.

IV

The initial U.S. declaration of "strong support" for non-nuclear nations against threats of "nuclear blackmail" was intended to help stabilize the political atmosphere in the wake of Communist China's first nuclear achievement in 1964. Its carefully guarded phrases, reiterated on several occasions and most recently after China's third nuclear test, have not disturbed existing U.S. security arrangements.

Efforts to develop and implement a more definite policy of nuclear containment continue to occupy a place of top priority in the Administration's arms-control policy. As the urgency and dimensions of the problem increase, the United States is trying hard to shift from talk to action.

The particular problem of guarantees to non-nuclear nations is inseparable from the broad issues of collective security in the

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nuclear age. Neither purely nationalist solutions, alliances for mutual defense nor world-wide international organizations offer satisfactory solutions. And a policy of nuclear containment, to the extent it is successful, simply buys time.

How the present members of the nuclear club conduct themselves will substantially affect the club's ultimate size. But the final decision on whether to expand the membership rests primarily with the non-nuclear nations. As they approach their decisions, the offer of nuclear security guarantees of the kind talked about at present would seem to have at most a marginal bearing. Hopefully, non-nuclear nations will be influenced more by considerations of cost-effectiveness than national prestige. Perhaps a rational assessment of the net gain in security to be derived from acquiring a national nuclear-weapons capability will be the strongest deterrent to proliferation. In the long run, the world will avoid the multiplication of centers of nuclear decision-making and the creation of many-sided balances of nuclear terror only if there is a profound change in attitudes toward the role of force in pursuit of national interests, and if there is a redefinition of those interests in relation to a larger community of nations.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHARING AND "THE GERMAN PROBLEM"

By W. B. Bader

IN the American effort to cope with the nuclear problems of the Alliance, one theme has been dominant: We must somehow devise for Germany "an appropriate part in the nuclear defense" of the West, as the joint communiqué of last December's Johnson-Erhard meeting put it. Due in large measure to this preoccupation, public debate about nuclear sharing within the Atlantic Alliance has left the universal impression that the central problem is how best to satisfy the German desire for further control of nuclear weapons. All but lost sight of is the crucial issue of how many and what kinds of nuclear weapons are required to defend Europe, who makes the decision to use them and how they shall be deployed.

Because it is now both economically and technologically feasible for Europeans to think about developing their own nuclear weapons program, it is only natural that there are differences within the Alliance over ownership and use of nuclear weapons. At the root of the problem is European awareness that there may be alternatives to complete dependence on the United States to deter the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. Of all the complex of issues stemming from these changing nuclear circumstances, however, none has proved more vexing than how best to offset the 700 medium-range ballistic missiles (M.R.B.M.s) that the Soviet Union has pointed at Western Europe. And no other issue illustrates so well the liabilities of allowing a European problem of the first order to be portrayed as a "German problem."

Over the past few years, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has acquired a number of pre-targeted nuclear systems—British V-Bombers and the Polaris missiles of three U.S. submarines now operating in the Mediterranean—capable of covering some of the missile sites in Western Russia which threaten Western Europe. But there is a gap in the target coverage; and that gap is now covered by non-NATO forces located outside continental Europe and beyond the control of SACEUR. In 1959, General Norstad, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, first stated SACEUR's military judgment that M.R.B.M.s were required for the defense of Europe. General Lemnitzer, his

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successor, has reaffirmed this need. Because the strategic necessity and political advisability of putting M.R.B.M.s in Europe has been seriously questioned on both sides of the Atlantic, however, no action has been taken on SACEUR's request. Nevertheless, many European political and military leaders have great confidence in SACEUR, and the Commander's expressed requirement for M.R.B.M.s has raised questions as to both the military effectiveness and the availability in a moment of crisis of the U.S. "external" forces targeted on the Soviet missiles. This uneasiness and apprehension have been stimulated and exploited by President de Gaulle, who argues that the credibility of our deterrent against a Soviet attack on Western Europe has declined since we became directly threatened by Soviet missiles.

The United States has taken the position that, although SACEUR's requirement for an M.R.B.M. defense is fully met by our strategic forces, we appreciate the problems of European political confidence caused by the NATO nuclear "gap." Consequently, we have sought in consultation with our Allies to devise a means of meeting this "need" which will also serve to dampen European interest in independent nuclear forces, eliminate the need for further "two-key" or bilateral nuclear weapons arrangements, and avoid the political and military disadvantages of deploying nuclear missiles on the continent of Europe. As to the last objective, it should be noted that for all the talk in Europe about the M.R.B.M. gap, there is little enthusiasm anywhere for land-based missiles in "their" country.

The various multilateral schemes considered by the United States, such as the M.L.F. (Multilateral Force), are attempts to fulfill the objectives of providing M.R.B.M. coverage without putting strategic missiles in Europe. The emphasis on collectively owned and managed nuclear forces is designed not only to discourage national nuclear efforts but to help create a framework or model of Atlantic partnership which could be of major importance to the future of European unity.

Although there are strong critics of this collective approach to the Alliance's nuclear problems, the objectives that the United States Government hopes to achieve through multilateral nuclear management—*i.e.* avoiding further bilateral nuclear arrangements and avoiding the emplacement of strategic missiles in Europe—are generally accepted by most Americans and Europeans. Nevertheless, in reporting the nuclear problems of the

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Alliance, the press seems almost entirely concerned with sterile exchanges of clichés about West Germany having a "finger on the nuclear button" and the feasibility of mixed-manning.

In such an atmosphere, any U.S. proposal for meeting what we consider to be the political, not military, need of giving the Europeans greater influence in nuclear matters was bound to encounter trouble. Our first such proposal, the ill-fated M.L.F., was undermined by a combination of the differences between the United States and most of its allies as to just how urgent the project was, its unfortunate image as an answer to the German "nuclear problem," and the deadly derision heaped on the mixed-manning idea. Any new proposals on nuclear sharing seem destined for the same fate unless we clarify for ourselves and our European allies just what requirement a collectively owned and managed nuclear force is designed to meet, and how urgent that need is.

In the public mind, the collective nuclear force concept is designed primarily to meet German aspirations to play a greater role in the nuclear affairs of the Alliance. This identification has been stimulated not only by the press but by the public and private concern of many United States officials that Germany will follow France along the path to a national nuclear force if its energies, ambitions and finances are not channeled into a collective force. The sense of urgency has caused attention to concentrate on this issue, rather than on the more fundamental problem of how best to deter the Soviet M.R.B.M. threat to Europe.

Our preoccupation with the German nuclear problem has reinforced suspicions throughout Eastern and Western Europe that the United States' real purpose in suggesting nuclear sharing within the Alliance is simply to provide a convenient way of giving the Germans nuclear weapons. Consequently, talk of nuclear sharing immediately turns to the issue of Germany and nuclear weapons, eliciting reactions varying from uneasiness to near pathological fulminations. Memories of German oppression are too tender and distrust of the German national character is too widespread to permit rational discussion of nuclear sharing within the Alliance if that discussion begins with a plea for German nuclear "equality."

Nevertheless, German and American officials who insist on the urgency of enlarging the German role in the nuclear field are apparently prepared to pay the political costs of a program of nuclear sharing advertised as a means of giving the Germans

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nuclear equality within the Alliance. These costs will include: increased French hostility, the risk that the Soviets will shatter whatever hopes remain that German reunification can be achieved, and the prospect that the East European countries now in a process of political and economic diversification will consolidate in the face of a German nuclear threat. Much of this reaction could be expected whatever form increased German participation took, but the United States' pressure for rapid solution and concentration on the purely German aspect of the larger problem of the nuclear defense of Europe are guaranteed to intensify and exacerbate the reaction.

West Germany's economic resurgence and evidence of growing political confidence, it is argued, indicate that Germany cannot be forever denied what nations of lesser stature can now obtain. Hence the United States and the "honest Germans" should move swiftly to give Germany a measure of nuclear participation before the forces of latent German militarism demand a national nuclear force *à la française*. Moreover, the argument goes, West Germany, as the most exposed country in Western Europe, is in the uncomfortable position of having to depend totally on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for its defense. Therefore, West Germans are particularly vulnerable to the Gaullist argument that the United States will not expose its own cities to nuclear destruction for the sake of Germany. As for the physical presence of some 200,000 American troops in Germany, these "hostages" to American fidelity could be withdrawn at any time.

F. W. Mulley, a British expert on defense issues and recently appointed Minister of Aviation, wrote in 1962:

> One may deplore the risks attendant upon a proliferation of nuclear powers but it is hardly surprising that France, for example, is seeking to join the nuclear club for reasons of prestige and in order to exert greater influence upon the affairs of the alliance. All of the arguments which led Britain to decide to develop her own nuclear weapons are equally valid from the French point of view for France herself, and *there is no reason why other members of NATO should not decide to follow suit.*[1]

The logic of this argument has been compelling, particularly to Washington. The spectre of a West Germany with an independent nuclear force apparently has so disturbed Washington that it has hardly been questioned whether the French or British experience has in fact any relevance for Germany. It is perhaps time that this question be asked.

[1] "The Politics of Western Defense." New York: Praeger, 1962, p. 79–80. Italics added.

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II

To be sure, West German advances in nuclear technology since 1958 have been impressive and help create the impression that the Germans are laying the foundation for a weapons program. Notable accomplishments in recent years include a program of nine power reactors scheduled for completion by 1969—including a 237-megawatt plant at Gundremmingen—a fuel fabrication plant, and a national investment in atomic energy programs that is now running over $200 million a year. In the ultracentrifuge field, German scientists were among the pioneers. However, little has been heard about German activity in this field since October 1960, when it was announced—amidst a flurry of newspaper comment—that henceforth the work would be classified.

The composite picture of West German prospects in the nuclear field is therefore one of increasing strength and diversity. In a very few years, if present plans are carried out, West Germany will not only become one of the leading commercial competitors in the nuclear field but will have the capacity to build a bomb in a very short time, and at little cost. But to say that Germany has a strong chance to become a leader in the nuclear power field is clearly not the same as saying that the Germans will press on to nuclear weapons if the United States fails to discover some way of sublimating this very natural drive. A look at West Germany's national circumstances may help to show this.

On the incentive side of the ledger, it is true that Germany would be in an extremely dangerous position if it were forced to defend itself against the Soviet Union with conventional arms alone. The vast open northern plain which carried German armies into Russia can also serve as a gateway for the Russians into West Germany. Because West Germany, either alone or even in concert with its Allies, could not hope to block this channel with conventional arms for very long, the incentive to acquire an assured nuclear-weapons defense is very high.

On the other hand, although West Germany is a large country by European standards, with a decentralized industrial and population pattern, its physical circumstances are not favorable for a nuclear weapons program. Adequate underground testing sites would be difficult to find, and the country is too small and crowded to satisfy the requirements for dispersal of a fixed missile system. And though West Germany has the technological and economic base to duplicate the nuclear weapons programs of

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France and Great Britain, does it have the political incentives?

Alone among the major powers in Europe, West Germany is a nation with a strong sense of national grievance. The reunification issue has a direct bearing on Bonn's position on the acquisition of nuclear weapons, as Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder indicated in July 1965 when he stated that West Germany was not prepared to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons until the Soviet Union consented to the reunification of Germany. He thus brought into sharp focus a major German incentive for creating the option of acquiring a nuclear capability but also for refraining from doing so. For the usefulness of the nuclear weapons issue in gaining reunification would almost certainly be shattered once Germany actually acquired weapons.

It is at this point that comparison with France breaks down. President de Gaulle needed nuclear weapons in being to pursue his objective of reasserting French influence on the Continent; Germany needs the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons to force progress on reunification. West Germany has serious reservations about a non-proliferation agreement not because it wants nuclear weapons but because the Germans do not want to be deprived of the threat of acquiring them.

To look at the other side of the coin for a moment, suppose West Germany did actually decide to build a nuclear force. If it were to be more than just a prestige symbol, if it were designed actually to threaten the Soviet Union, it would run a high risk of drawing a Soviet attack while still in the development stage. Few countries would have a more precarious ride to a nuclear capability than West Germany, exposed as it would be to a preemptive Soviet strike. At the moment it has five heavy fighter-bomber squadrons of Lockheed F-104s which could be used as delivery vehicles, but their chances of success against Soviet defenses would be very low indeed. West Germany would have to make a great investment in armaments even to come up to the standard of France's present nuclear force.

In summary, Germany's incentives to develop an independent nuclear force are clearly outweighed by the restraints imposed by its special circumstances. But this conclusion rests precariously on a structure of assumptions: that German policy will be rational; that our commitment to defend West Germany will retain some credibility; and that we will not sacrifice German reunification for an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Under these

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conditions, the Germans are not likely to want their own nuclear weapons, for they are surely aware that nothing would so permanently solidify the division of Germany. What they do want is the bargaining power that the *threat* of acquiring nuclear weapons may give them.

III

In the rush to give West Germans a voice in the management of nuclear affairs within the Atlantic Alliance, let us then ask again whether West Germany is really the France of tomorrow in respect to nuclear weapons. If their respective national circumstances are as different as they appear to be, then perhaps we should proceed more slowly before we inadvertently excite a nuclear appetite through creating uncertainty about the nature of our commitment to West Germany's defense and national goals. Equally important, we should move with all care and deliberation if we are not to prejudice the chances for a solution to the M.R.B.M. problem in Europe.

The problem of nuclear sharing seems destined to remain with us. Whatever satisfaction the critics of the M.L.F. may derive from the difficulties the Alliance has encountered in devising a formula for sharing nuclear weapons, they would be well advised to bear in mind that the basic issue—the nuclear defense of Europe—has not been resolved. Moreover, any decision on the nuclear defense of Europe will of necessity involve West Germany; and it has been argued here that any decision on the further involvement of Germany in the nuclear weapons field should take account of a number of factors often overlooked in the American approach to this emotionally charged issue.

First, national attitudes toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons are the end product of a highly complicated and often shifting array of national circumstances. To describe the process of nuclear spread as something infectious or organic is highly misleading. We are not dealing with a modern-day black plague slowly spreading its way across the continent of Europe. The doctrine that the arguments which led France to a nuclear weapons program are equally valid for West Germany is a very questionable one at best. West Germany is, of course, concerned about its non-nuclear status, but the arguments for or against nuclear weapons are clearly not the same as those which motivated France—either in kind or intensity.

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Second, and obviously related to the first point, we must realize that, unless the Soviet M.R.B.M. menace to Europe vanishes, Europe will have to have an M.R.B.M. response, be it land-based or sea-based, "one-key," "two-key" or many "keys" as in the multilateral solution. This is West Germany's nuclear problem, and one that is shared with the rest of Western Europe. What is argued here is not that a collective nuclear force is the best or only answer to this problem, but that if the nuclear sharing issue could be portrayed as what it really is—a European problem requiring careful and deliberate attention—not primarily a German problem demanding an "urgent" solution, then much of the irrational and destructive heat will go out of the Alliance's deliberations on where we go from here.

To this end, the emphasis in American pronouncements on nuclear sharing should center on the necessity of strengthening the military security and political unity of Europe—not on "satisfying" the Germans by giving them nuclear "equality," presumably equality with France and Britain. As a first step, we should resist any actions which give the impression that the United States and West Germany have the responsibility for drawing up the nuclear-sharing plans. This will be particularly true now that France has withdrawn its forces from NATO. Nothing would so prejudice the future of the Atlantic Alliance as for the United States, in the interest of somehow compensating Germany for France's defection, to rush in with a nuclear-sharing scheme devised in Washington and Bonn.

One way of emphasizing the multilateral nature of the nuclear problem is to use NATO's Special Committee established last year and composed of the Defense Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Canada, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. At the moment, this committee has a mandate only to discuss means of improving Allied participation in nuclear policy and planning and could not officially discuss nuclear sharing. None the less, it can serve the purpose of establishing an information base on nuclear affairs from which multilateral discussion of nuclear sharing will obviously profit. Whatever the means, it seems imperative to move the nuclear-sharing issue to NATO-wide discussions, thereby lessening the emphasis put on the German problem. And we can begin to put that problem in perspective by remembering that Bonn is not Weimar—nor is it Paris.

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A brief account of Finland's relations with the U.S., Britain and France from Finland's declaration of independence to the stabilization of relations.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE LIDDELL HART MEMOIRS: VOLUME I. 1895-1938. New York: Putnam, 1966, 433 p. $7.50.

A readable and illuminating first volume of memoirs by one of the most influential, though at times disregarded, strategic thinkers and military historians of our time.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF WAR. Edited by Michael Howard. New York: Praeger, 1966, 376 p. $10.00.

A symposium of essays on a wide variety of military themes, historical and strategic, appropriately presented as a *Festschrift* to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart.

AFTER NUCLEAR ATTACK: A DEMOGRAPHIC INQUIRY. By David M. Heer. New York: Praeger, 1965, 405 p. $15.00.

A study of the demographic consequences of two hypothetical nuclear attacks, one aimed at military and industrial targets, the other at military targets alone. Fatality rates ranged from 18 to 30 percent of the population—probably an underestimate.

THE MISSILE CRISIS. By Elie Abel. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966, 220 p. $4.95.

A journalist's well-informed and absorbing account of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis—two weeks on the brink of the ultimate holocaust.

ATOME ET BATAILLES SUR MER. By T. Sanguinetti. Paris: Hachette, 1965, 285 p. Fr. 12.50.

A French naval officer discusses the implications of nuclear power on sea warfare. The concluding chapter deals with the conversion of the French Navy.

RÜSTUNGSKONTROLLE IM WELTRAUM. By Georg Wilhelm Rehm. Bonn: Siegler (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1965, 129 p. DM. 35.

A substantially documented analysis of postwar efforts at arms control.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES. By Dennis S. Aronowitz. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1965, 222 p. $6.50.

A study conducted under contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

RAEDER, HITLER UND SKANDINAVIEN. By Carl-Axel Gemzell. Lund (Sweden): Gleerup, 1965, 390 p. Swedish Kr. 45.

An able study of German naval strategy, centering on Admiral Raeder, with particular reference to the plans and reasons for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.

THE LAST BATTLE. By Cornelius Ryan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966, 571 p. $7.50.

An absorbing account of the assault and capture of Berlin in 1945; much more than purely military history is included.

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OUTLOOK ON SPACE. By F. T. Evans and H. D. Howard. New York: Hillary House, 1966, 179 p. $5.50.

A non-technical introduction to the growing relationship between space research and international organizations.

COMMUNICATION PROCESSES. Edited by Frank A. Geldard and Others. New York: Pergamon Press (for Division of Scientific Affairs, Science Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 1965, 299 p. $14.00.

This fourth volume in the NATO Conference Series is a symposium considering a variety of communications problems and prospects: data presentation and transmission, language barriers, group communication, and the use of computers in communication.

General: Economic and Social

EAST-WEST TRADE AND UNITED STATES POLICY. By Mose L. Harvey. New York: National Association of Manufacturers, 1966, 175 p. $4.00.

A former member of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department, writing for the National Association of Manufacturers, stresses the political aspects of trading with the Communist countries. Leaning somewhat against the widespread tendency to think that liberalization by itself will produce significant results, he tries to devise ways of making trade an effective instrument of foreign policy. The results are open to argument, but this is a major contribution to the subject.

GOLD AND WORLD POWER: THE DOLLAR, THE POUND, AND THE PLANS FOR REFORM. By Sidney E. Rolfe. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 276 p. $6.95.

Far less political than the title promises, this book provides a very clear discussion of the U.S. balance of payments, the British economy's place in the world, and the proposals for international monetary reform. The author, a business economist, leans toward more flexible exchange rates as the way out.

THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR AS AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY. By Robert Z. Aliber. New York: Praeger, 1966, 169 p. $6.00.

Tightly-written discussion of existing international monetary arrangements and a range of possible alternatives. Mr. Aliber, an economist at the University of Chicago, poses a set of policy choices for the United States, all of them likely in his view to make the dollar more important as an international currency because of the underlying strength and unique position of this country.

THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: SIX PROCEDURAL STUDIES. By Richard B. Lillich. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965, 222 p. $7.50.

Within a legal and procedural framework, these studies have some interesting things to say about the protection of American private interests against acts of foreign governments and the pursuit of subsequent claims. Finding existing law and practice inadequate, the author suggests some stronger lines of approach for the future.

U.S. PRODUCTION ABROAD AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: A SURVEY OF CORPORATE INVESTMENT EXPERIENCE. By Judd Polk and Others. New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1966, 200 p. $3.50 (for Associates), $17.50 (for non-Associates).

Begun as a study of the balance of payments of a number of American companies,

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this turns out to be a very suggestive analysis of the relations of private investments to the domestic economy, raising questions that go well beyond conventional approaches.

TRADE, GROWTH, AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GOTTFRIED HABERLER. By Robert E. Baldwin and Others. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965, 267 p. $8.50.

One of the most esteemed American teachers of international economics is honored by theoretical and practical papers by some of his distinguished students and associates.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY IN U.N. DIPLOMACY. By Kamal M. Hagras. New York: Praeger, 1965, 171 p. $15.00.

In the half of the book that is on the subject, an official of the U.A.R. gives a straightforward account of the conference proceedings and results. Twelve analytical pages based partly on a questionnaire to participants stay close to the surface.

HANDBUCH DER FINANZWISSENSCHAFT: BAND 4. Edited by Wilhelm Gerloff and Fritz Neumark. Tübingen: Mohr, 1965, 406 p. DM. 58.

International finance, double taxation, reparations, foreign aid and the finances of international organizations are the subjects of this last volume of a standard reference work.

EUROPE AND THE DOLLAR. By Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966, 297 p. $7.50.

Seventeen papers by one of our most interesting and fecund economists. This is the first appearance in English of several and a few have not been published before.

ATLANTIC AGRICULTURAL UNITY: IS IT POSSIBLE? By John O. Coppock. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations in coöperation with the Food Research Institute, Stanford University), 1966, 238 p. $7.50.

Reduction of the conflicts among the agricultural policies of the Atlantic countries would bring some economic gains, but Mr. Coppock believes the chief advantage would be the removal of an irritant that troubles all their relations. He charts a course away from price supports and the attendant trade barriers and emphasizes national action more than detailed international bargaining.

THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR POWER. By J. A. Hasson. London: Longmans, 1965, 160 p. (New York: International Publications Service, distributor, $8.75).

Essays directed toward a methodology for evaluating nuclear power, its costs, its role in economic welfare and the question of choice among alternative fuels.

THE PEACE CORPS: KINDLERS OF THE SPARK. By Edna McGuire. New York: Macmillan, 1966, 224 p. $3.95.

The story of a three-month "pilgrimage made to see the Peace Corps in action"—in Ecuador, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, India and Malaysia. As the subtitle indicates, the observations are very positive.

POPULATION GROWTH—THREAT TO PEACE? Edited by William E. Moran, Jr. New York: Kenedy, 1965, 192 p. $4.50.

A Catholic-sponsored symposium on the world's population growth, its implications, and what can or should be done about it.

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The United States

PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT: THE CRUCIBLE OF LEADERSHIP. By James MacGregor Burns. Boston: Houghton, 1965, 366 p. $5.95.

The author of several major works on American politics and political figures here turns, somewhat less successfully, to a study of the Presidency itself. One of his aims is to "help fashion a theory of the American Presidency"—a stiff order.

THE MAKERS OF PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN POWER GROUPS AND THEIR IDEOLOGIES. By R. Joseph Monsen, Jr. and Mark W. Cannon. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 355 p. $6.95.

This study is directed to public policy at the national level, and considers the various formal and informal power groups—business, labor, agriculture, Negroes, public school teachers, intellectuals, and the civil and military bureaucracy.

1933: CHARACTERS IN CRISIS. By Herbert Feis. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966, 366 p. $7.50.

As Economic Adviser of the State Department, Mr. Feis was carried over from the Hoover to the Roosevelt Administration. Close enough to the problems to understand them thoroughly and high enough to know what the great folk said and did about them, he gives us a most interesting and valuable account of the efforts at liaison between the incoming and outcoming administrations, the departure of the dollar from gold, the collapse of the London Conference and related economic problems.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BEYOND UTOPIANISM AND REALISM. By Donald Brandon. New York: Appleton, 1966, 295 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.95).

A critique of U.S. foreign policy and attitudes in the present century, stressing the Realist and Utopian approaches, and advocating the tradition of "prudential judgment."

THE ETHICS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS. By Erwin D. Canham. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966, 93 p. $2.50.

Lectures by the editor of *The Christian Science Monitor* dealing with "diplomacy," "business affairs" and "the minds of men."

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE: A STUDY OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES. By Harold A. Hovey. New York: Praeger, 1965. 306 p. $15.00.

Written from public sources by a former Pentagon aid official, this book is useful primarily as a comprehensive history of military assistance programs. It concludes that military aid should be more sharply separated from economic aid considered by Congress in relation to the domestic military budget.

THE PROMISE OF AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL INQUIRY. By John Morton Blum. Boston: Houghton, 1966, 206 p. $4.00.

An American historian undertakes, in these essays, "to define American aspirations and to measure American achievements in terms of men who exemplified the best and the less-than-best in the national past."

MISSION WITH LeMAY: MY STORY. By General Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 581 p. $7.95.

This autobiography—with assists by MacKinlay Kantor—is perhaps more revealing of the personality and life of the former Air Force Chief of Staff and

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creator of SAC than of the military history he experienced before, during and after World War II.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL. By Robert H. Ferrell. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1966, 326 p. $7.50.

This is Volume XV in the series "The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy."

POLITICS IS ADJOURNED: WOODROW WILSON AND THE WAR CONGRESS, 1916–1918. By Seward W. Livermore. Middletown (Conn.): Wesleyan University Press, 1966, 324 p. $7.50.

A study of the causes underlying the Republican victory in the Congressional election of 1918—a fateful event that undermined Woodrow Wilson's position as war leader.

The Western Hemisphere

CANADA: AN APPRAISAL OF ITS NEEDS AND RESOURCES. By George W. Wilson and Others. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1965, 453 p. $7.50.

A valuable and statistic-crammed study, prepared by a team of Canadian economists.

PETROLEUM: CANADIAN MARKETS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE POLICY. By Alan R. Plotnick. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965, 172 p. $6.00.

A close examination of domestic and foreign markets for Canadian oil, now and in the future, and some exposition of Canadian and U.S. national policies.

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICAN WARS, 1932–1942. By Bryce Wood. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 519 p. $11.00.

A well-documented, informative and scholarly diplomatic study of the Chaco War, the Leticia dispute and the Marañón conflict. In noting the failure of the United States to prevent violence, given its "narrow view of the range of its obligations," the author relates the general inability to resolve these disputes to the formation of the Organization of American States.

NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA. By Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan. New York: Free Press, 1966, 229 p. $6.95.

A concise and clearly written study, supplemented by a carefully selected bibliography, of contemporary Latin American nationalism. Written by two respected scholars, this thoughtful work is of particular value in its examination of the varying impact nationalism has had upon specific Latin American countries.

ESPÉRANCE EN AMÉRIQUE DU SUD. By Jean Toulat. Paris: Perrin, 1965, 330 p. Fr. 15.

Optimistic reflections by a French priest concerning the future of South America, based on a hurried trip through most of the capitals and main cities.

NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: DIVERSITY AND UNITY. By Gerhard Masur. New York: Macmillan, 1966, 278 p. $5.95.

In this informative study of contemporary nationalistic trends in Latin America, the author views the principal issue as one of finding a "satisfactory basis for harmonious coexistence throughout the hemisphere."

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HACIA LA INTEGRACIÓN ACELERADA DE AMÉRICA LATINA: PROPOSICIONES A LOS PRESIDENTES LATINOAMERICANOS. By José Antonio Mayobre and Others. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965, 195 p.

Four prominent Latin American economists—José Antonio Mayobre, Felipe Herrera, Carlos Sanz de Santamaría and Raúl Prebisch—survey the state of Latin America's common markets.

A LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET? By Sidney Dell. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1966, 336 p. $8.80.

In this analysis of the problems facing efforts at regional integration, the author notes that only far-reaching reforms in land tenure, tax structure and distribution of income can insure the success of Latin America's common markets.

ENTERPRISE IN LATIN AMERICA: BUSINESS ATTITUDES IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY. By Albert Lauterbach. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966, 207 p. $6.75.

A somewhat general and haphazard analysis of business attitudes in Latin America, drawn from interviews and personal conversations with businessmen in Latin America.

MEXICO: MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT PLANNING. By Robert Jones Shafer. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966, 214 p. $4.25.

A detailed, scholarly study of the role played by the Mexican Government in shaping the country's economic structure to revolutionary objectives. The author traces the means by which government planning has strengthened democracy and hastened the economic development of contemporary Mexico.

LABOR MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CASE STUDY OF PUERTO RICO. By Stanley L. Friedlander. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965, 181 p. $6.00.

A theoretical analysis, buttressed with statistics, on the effects of emigration upon Puerto Rico's development. The not unexpected conclusion is that emigration has been beneficial to the island's people and its economy.

EYE ON CUBA. By Edwin Tetlow. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966, 291 p. $5.95.

A British journalist assesses the mounting human costs of the Cuban Revolution. Basing his views upon frequent visits to the island since 1959, the author feels, in view of increasing difficulties and the more somber attitudes of the people, that Castro "might have passed his zenith."

ACCIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA: EVOLUTION OF A MODERN POLITICAL PARTY IN VENEZUELA. By John D. Martz. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 443 p. $12.50.

This factual and objective study traces the origins and rise to power of Venezuela's national revolutionary party. The author concludes that Acción Democrática "is no longer Venezuela's only modern party, however, and the battle to remain the country's leading party is therefore more difficult than before."

NEW PERSPECTIVES OF BRAZIL. Edited by Eric N. Baklanoff. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966, 328 p. $7.50.

Ten Brazilianists representing varied disciplines survey somewhat unevenly the

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country's socio-economic, political, demographic and cultural bases. The essays by Professors Chardon and Lopes are of particular interest.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES. NO. 27: SOCIAL SCIENCES. EDITED BY EARL J. PARISEAU. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965, 515 p. $20.00.

Prepared in the Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress, the latest volume of this invaluable, annotated Latin American bibliographical series covers social sciences, 1963–1964.

Western Europe

THE EUROPEAN IDEA. BY LORD GLADWYN. New York: Praeger, 1966, 159 p. $5.00. (London: Weidenfeld, 25/).

A political tract dedicated to the hope that the European idea can yet be translated into political reality. The former British Ambassador to Paris recognizes the many obstacles and argues that Britain must help build a supranational Europe in partnership with America. Important reading for Englishmen and Americans alike.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS (SEPTEMBER 1952–SEPTEMBER 1962). BY GUY VAN OUDENHOVE. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1965, 268 p. Gldrs. 29.50.

A pioneering study by a Belgian political scientist of the European Parliament and of the emergence of supranational parties in that body, established first by the Coal and Steel Community and transformed by the European Economic Community.

COMMUNISM IN EUROPE: CONTINUITY, CHANGE, AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. VOLUME 2. EDITED BY WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966, 439 p. $12.50.

This collective volume covers recent developments in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Sweden and Finland.

ENGLISH HISTORY 1914–1945. BY A. J. P. TAYLOR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 708 p. $9.75.

A comprehensive, important and highly readable history, by one of Britain's ablest and most controversial historians.

THE HABIT OF AUTHORITY: PATERNALISM IN BRITISH HISTORY. BY A. P. THORNTON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, 402 p. $7.50.

A thoughtful and suggestive study of the long-nurtured belief in authority shared by Britain's rulers and ruled. A well-known student of British imperialism analyzes this history of successful paternalism from the Norman Conquest to the present.

CHURCHILL: TAKEN FROM THE DIARIES OF LORD MORAN. THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, 1940–1965. Boston: Houghton, 1966, 877 p. $10.00.

In May 1940 Lord Moran became Winston Churchill's personal physician. These diary entries, covering the subsequent two decades, have been the object of some criticism as being by their nature in doubtful taste. Still, they do provide significant information about a central historical figure of our century.

COLOUR AND THE BRITISH ELECTORATE, 1964. EDITED BY NICHOLAS DEAKIN. New York: Praeger (for the Institute of Race Relations, London), 1965, 172 p. $5.00.

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The electoral campaigns in six constituencies with a relatively large colored population are sensibly analyzed by different authors, determined to see what the impact of colored immigration is on British politics.

THE THREE LIVES OF CHARLES DE GAULLE. By David Schoenbrun. New York: Atheneum, 1966, 373 p. $6.95.

A breezy and anecdotal biography, by a veteran reporter who admires his subject.

LE DESTIN SECRET DE GEORGES POMPIDOU. By Merry Bromberger. Paris: Fayard, 1965, 349 p. Fr. 15.

A well-known French journalist writes the first and fascinating biography of de Gaulle's Prime Minister and possible successor, who would inaugurate an era of "smiling Gaullism."

HISTOIRE DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANÇAIS. By Jacques Fauvet. Paris: Fayard, 1964–65, 2 v. Fr. 37.25.

The editor of *Le Monde* has written the first comprehensive history of the French Communist Party, concentrating chiefly on its role in French politics.

MEMOIRS 1945–53. By Konrad Adenauer. Chicago: Regnery, 1966, 477 p. $10.00.

Adenauer's recollections of his aims and policies in the first eight years after Germany's collapse. The book, carefully translated, contains many documents and constitutes an important historical source for Atlantic diplomacy in that period. The Chancellor's personality and the intricacies of German politics are only rarely illuminated. (German edition, "Erinnerungen 1945–1953," Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965, 589 p. DM. 24.80.)

FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS: DAS LEBENSBILD EINES POLITIKERS. By Hans Frederik. Munich-Inning: Humboldt Verlag, 1965, 293 p. DM. 14.80.

A journalistic account of the stormy and often questionable career of Germany's most controversial politician.

DIE SPD NACH HITLER. By Theo Pirker. Munich: Rütten, 1965, 360 p. DM. 18.

A short history of the Social Democratic Party since 1945, written by a former left-wing member who in 1961 resigned in disillusionment with what he considered the party's weakness and lack of direction.

ANPASSUNG ODER WIDERSTAND: DIE SCHWEIZ ZUR ZEIT DES DEUTSCHEN NATIONALSOZIALISMUS. By Alice Meyer. Frauenfeld: Huber, 1965, 227 p. Swiss Fr. 18.50.

A candid, well-documented and absorbing study of Swiss reactions to Hitler's Germany, and of the struggle between the advocates of accommodation and resistance. The book has evoked great interest in Switzerland and marks an important contribution to our understanding of wartime Europe.

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE IN THE ECONOMY OF MODERN ITALY. By George H. Hildebrand. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 475 p. $11.95.

Out of their dismal postwar situation, the Italians produced a remarkable recovery and expansion. With a mastery of his material that reflects the years this book was in the making, Professor Hildebrand explains and analyzes how it was done—and what remains undone. An important contribution to the history of postwar Europe.

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Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INTERPRETATION. By Alfred G. Meyer. New York: Random House, 1965, 494 p. $5.95.

A serious effort "to present a general picture of the entire Soviet system and to acquaint the student with its most important components, including institutions, practices, processes, and the very vocabulary of Soviet government and politics."

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS. By Raymond L. Garthoff. New York: Praeger, 1966, 276 p. $6.50.

A leading student of Soviet military affairs here traces the continuities and discontinuities in the place and role of Russian and Soviet military policy. Includes some comparative information on Communist China.

SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES. By Harold J. Berman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, 501 p. $11.95.

A translation of the 1960 codes of criminal law and procedure in the largest of the Soviet Republics, as amended to 1965, with an extended introduction by a leading American student of Soviet law.

THE TEACHERS AND THE TAUGHT IN THE U.S.S.R. By William Benton. New York: Atheneum, 1966, 174 p. $4.50.

A personal discussion of education, science and indoctrination, based largely on Mr. Benton's visit to the Soviet Union in 1964, his fifth to that country in the last decade.

MOSCOW SUMMER. By Mihajlo Mihajlov. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965, 220 p. $4.50.

The internationally debated report of a Jugoslav teacher on a visit to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1964.

LENINGRAD 1941: THE BLOCKADE. By Dmitri V. Pavlov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, 186 p. $4.50.

An account of the three-year siege of Leningrad by the Soviet chief of food supplies for the city during the blockade. A useful contribution to this epic story.

NIKITA SERGEJEWITSCH CHRUSCHTSCHOW. By Wolfgang Leonhard. Lucerne: Bucher, 1965, 191 p. Swiss Fr. 19.80.

A knowledgeable student of Kremlin politics writes of Khrushchev's rise and fall. Profusely and effectively illustrated.

NIKITA SERGUEEVITCH KHROUCHTCHEV. By Christian Pineau. Paris: Perrin, 1965, 286 p. Fr. 15.

A brief political biography by a former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, also the author of works for children.

THE RISE AND FALL OF STALIN. By Robert Payne. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965, 767 p. $10.00.

A massive but quite unsatisfactory biography; Mr. Payne might advantageously slow down his rate of output.

STALIN'S RUSSIA: AN HISTORICAL RECONSIDERATION. By Francis B. Randall. New York: Free Press, 1965, 328 p. $6.95.

An essay in reconsideration of the Stalin era that starts with the challenging statement, "Stalin was probably the most important man who ever lived." The

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author concludes that he was also "one of the two or three worst men who ever lived."

SOVIET CHESS. By D. J. Richards. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 201 p. $4.00.

A most interesting effort both to analyze the ideological background of Soviet chess and its remarkable achievements in recent years, and to study Soviet chess as an "illustration of the workings of the Soviet mind."

THE MERCHANT OF REVOLUTION: THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER ISRAEL HELPHAND (PARVUS) 1867–1924. By Z. A. B. Zeman and W. B. Scharlau. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 306 p. $7.20.

An important and well-documented study of the fantastic career of Helphand-Parvus, a Russian-German socialist thinker, revolutionary and businessman, who during World War I advised German governmental agencies on how to weaken the Russian Empire internally and who transmitted German subsidies to Lenin's Bolshevik organizations.

THE NEW EASTERN EUROPE: THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA AND AFTER. By J. F. Brown. New York: Praeger, 1966, 306 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.25).

A survey of developments in non-Soviet Eastern Europe during and since the Khrushchev era; treatment is topical, except for a chapter on Rumanian and Albanian nationalism.

BEITRÄGE ZUR WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK UND WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG. By Karl C. Thalheim. Berlin: Duncker, 1965, 440 p. DM. 56.60.

The range of subjects covered over 35 years is wide, but the postwar papers concentrate on the economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

OSTEUROPA KEHRT ZURÜCK. By Thomas Ross. Vienna: Molden, 1965, 359 p. Schillings 148.

A German journalist reports on the recent winds of change in the Communist states of Eastern Europe, with respect to the command economy, the Party apparatus, the village and intellectual life.

SUOMALAISEN POLIITIKON MUISTELMAT. By T. M. Kivimäki. Helsinki: Söderström, 1965, 314 p. Fmk. 14.

The engrossing and valuable memoirs of Professor Kivimäki, who served Finland in a number of high posts: prime minister, minister of interior, of justice, and ambassador to Germany during the war years.

PRO BALTICA: MÉLANGES DÉDIÉS À KAAREL R. PUSTA. Edited by Jüri G. Poska. Stockholm: Comité des Amis de K. R. Pusta, 1965, 244 p.

Articles on recent Baltic history commemorating the late Estonian statesman and diplomat, Kaarel R. Pusta.

KLEINE GESCHICHTE POLENS. By Gotthold Rhode. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1965, 543 p. DM. 25.40.

A concise but valuable general history by a leading German historian.

The Middle East

ISLAM IN THE MODERN NATIONAL STATE. By Erwin I. J. Rosenthal. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966, 416 p. $10.50.

The confusion and crisis of contemporary Islam brought on by the secular in-

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filtration of the West and all its works are described and analyzed in this major study by a senior British orientalist. Required reading for serious students of Islam and of the contemporary Muslim world.

NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD. By Hisham Sharabi. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966, 176 p. $1.95 (Paper).

A concise and well-done handbook of contemporary politics in the Middle East and North Africa by the author of "Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century."

BREAD FROM STONES: FIFTY YEARS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. Edited by John S. Badeau and Georgiana G. Stevens. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, 133 p. $3.00 (Paper, $1.50).

Twelve essays reflect the experience harvested by the Near East Foundation during its half-century of devotion to technical assistance and rural development overseas.

OIL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By David Hirst. New York: Praeger, 1966, 127 p. $6.00.

The nature, extent and causes of Arab distrust of the Western oil industry; together with suggestions for improvement—directed at the oil companies, on which "the onus of understanding lies."

CRUDE OIL PRICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Helmut J. Frank. New York: Praeger, 1966, 209 p. $15.00.

Sweeping changes in recent years have fundamentally altered the oligopolistic nature of the Middle Eastern oil industry. Professor Frank discusses price developments reflecting the new situation, and assesses oil company price policies and practices.

THE KUWAIT URBANIZATION: DOCUMENTATION, ANALYSIS, CRITIQUE. By Saba George Shiber. Kuwait: Kuwait Government Printing Press, 1964, 643 p. K.D. 9.

A very large and unique "paperback," which records the development of modern Kuwait with the multifold assistance of maps, drawings, photographs, sketches, charts and 29 appendices. The author, trained at M.I.T. and Cornell, is architectural and city-planning adviser to the Government of Kuwait.

South and Southeast Asia

THE CONSCIENCE OF INDIA: MORAL TRADITIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Creighton Lacy. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, 323 p. $7.50.

An intriguing, highly readable and valid description of how the basic ideas of the past influence the present. Dr. Lacy is Professor of World Christianity at Duke University.

KRISHNA MENON: A BIOGRAPHY. By T. J. S. George. New York: Taplinger, 1965, 272 p. $5.00.

Mr. George, editor of *Searchlight* in Patna, uses diaries and papers left by Menon's immediate relatives to provide the background and early life of India's controversial statesman, and personal interviews and other sources for later years. The author freely concedes that his sympathetic biography is not a definitive one, mainly because his subject, in line with his character, was of absolutely no help in its writing.

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DUSK AND DAWN IN VILLAGE INDIA. By Zahir Ahmed. New York: Praeger, 1966, 144 p. $4.50.

An Indian's view of life in Telingana, a village in the eastern section of Hyderabad, over the 20-year period of transition to independence.

FOREIGN AID AND POLITICS IN NEPAL: A CASE STUDY. By Eugene Bramer Mihaly. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 202 p. $6.75.

An interesting analysis of what went on between 1951 and 1962 in a country that has received aid from the United States, the U.S.S.R., China, India, Israel, Switzerland, Western Germany, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the U.N. and its agencies and the Ford Foundation. Depressing as the story is, we need more studies of this sort if we are to understand what can and cannot be done with foreign aid.

SIKKIM: HIMALAJASTAAT ZWISCHEN GLETSCHERN UND DSCHUNGELN. By Blanche Christine Olschak. Zurich: Schweizer Verlagshaus, 1965, 219 p. Swiss Fr. 22.50.

A magnificent production by a Vienna-born Tibetologist who, through photographs and text, shows life, society and politics in this nation bounded by 400 million Indians and 650 million Chinese.

THE SHAN STATES AND THE BRITISH ANNEXATION. By Sao Saimong Mangrai. Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, 1965, 319 p. $4.00.

A former Chief Education Officer of the Shan and Kayah states relates the story of the British occupation of this area from 1885 (the deposition of Thibaw, last king of Burma) and the subsequent annexation of his kingdom to British India. He uses unpublished documents in the India Office in London, official publications and other sources.

MALAYSIA. By Victor Purcell. New York: Walker, 1965, 224 p. $6.50.

The late Professor Purcell, one of the most highly regarded Southeast Asia scholars, places emphasis in this work on the history and on the natural, social, cultural and economic features of Malaysia. He brings politics into the picture only when necessary.

THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN ASIA. By D. E. Kennedy. New York: Praeger, 1965, 308 p. $7.50.

An assessment of the strategy and consequences of counter-insurgency, mainly in the Philippines, Malaysia and Viet Nam, by a Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Melbourne. The author also discusses at length Sino-Soviet-American hostilities and their bearing on security.

VIETNAM: BETWEEN TWO TRUCES. By Jean Lacouture. New York: Random House, 1966, 295 p. $5.95.

A correspondent for *Le Monde,* whose solid background on Viet Nam dates back to 1945, views the current conflict as a political one, started locally, and soluble only by the settlement of local issues. (French edition, "Le Vietnam entre Deux Paix," Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1965, 269 p. Fr. 15.)

THE NEW FACE OF WAR. By Malcolm W. Browne. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965, 284 p. $5.00.

Mr. Browne, covering Viet Nam for the Associated Press since 1961 (and winning a Pulitzer Prize for it), prefaces his book by stating the possibility that

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the war in Viet Nam may be lost. He goes on, with somber impressiveness, to explain how and why Americans must fight, militarily, politically and in many other ways, a new kind of war in which experiences gained in earlier wars simply do not apply.

THE LONG, LONG WAR: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MALAYA AND VIETNAM. By Brigadier Richard L. Clutterbuck. New York: Praeger, 1966, 206 p. $5.95.

A recipient of the Order of the British Empire for service in Malaya from 1956 to 1958, now on duty in Singapore, traces the military and political techniques used to defeat Communist insurgency in Malaya, showing how its pattern is repeating itself in Viet Nam.

JAPANESE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS. By Harry J. Benda and Others. New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1965, 279 p. (Detroit: Cellar Book Shop, distributor, $8.50.)

Translations, mainly from the Japanese but a few from Dutch and Indonesian, of 83 primary documents dating from 1941 to 1944, showing how Indonesia was ruled under occupation. The editors caution that the Japanese destroyed many of their own records, and that the whole story will have to await the ferreting out of materials from other sources.

THE RISE OF INDONESIAN COMMUNISM. By Ruth T. McVey. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the Modern Indonesia Project), 1965, 510 p. $10.00.

A solidly documented history of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) from its birth in 1914 to 1927, showing its place in Indonesian political movements and its influence on colonial government policy. A very important work resulting from research in five countries and in various languages.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

COMMUNIST CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS. By Harold C. Hinton. Boston: Houghton, 1966, 527 p. $10.50.

Professor Hinton, of George Washington University, uses official Chinese sources (recognizing possible distortions and omissions in them) and, selectively, secondary sources to trace Communist China's foreign policies in all major areas, as well as China's status in international Communism. He discourages the idea of improvement in China's foreign relations during the tenure of Mao and his immediate successors. A postscript dated October 1, 1965, states his opinion that Communist China's attention will be focused more on Asia and less on Africa and Latin America.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL. By Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins. New York: Praeger (for the East Asian Research Center and the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University), 1965, 191 p. $7.50.

A coöperative effort with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to identify and clarify factors affecting the formulation of Communist China's policies toward arms control and disarmament issues. Conclusion: "Peking's current interest in arms control measures is extremely limited."

CHINESE POLITICAL TRADITIONS. By Franklin W. Houn. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965, 130 p. $3.75.

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Professor Houn (Hou, Fu-wu), of the University of Massachusetts and concurrently Hoover Institution research associate, was born and educated in China, arriving in the United States in 1948. He does not share the widespread view that the Communist monolithic system on the Mainland is a continuation of traditional socio-political concepts.

PARTY POLITICS IN REPUBLICAN CHINA: THE KUOMINTANG, 1912–1924. By George T. Yu. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966, 203 p. $6.00.

A scholarly survey of the development of the Kuomintang from the founding of the Republic in 1912 to 1924, when the Party was reorganized Soviet-style at the First Party Congress.

THE FIRST YEARS OF YANGYI COMMUNE. By Isabel and David Crook. New York: Humanities Press, 1966, 288 p. $6.75.

The authors, long residents of China, now teach English at Peking's Foreign Language Institute. Their story, based on a year's residence in the commune, tells how it came into being in 1958, how the Communist Party operates it, and how it developed during the natural disasters of 1959–61. They insist that communes arose from popular response to needs, not to Peking edicts; that they are a success, and preferable to coöperatives.

INDEX TO SU-LIEN YIN-MOU WEN-CHENG. Edited by David Nelson Rowe and Sophia S. F. Yen. Hamden (Conn.): Shoe String Press, 1965, 400 p. $12.50.

An index, with entries arranged according to transliteration by the Wade-Giles system, to the important 11-volume collection documenting Soviet activities in China in the Republican period, showing how infiltration entered into almost every aspect of life and society in China.

WHO'S WHO IN COMMUNIST CHINA. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1966, 754 p.

Biographies of 1,200 leading personages important to nearly all aspects of Communist China's life and politics, brought together from the Union Research Institute's very extensive files. Cut-off date is generally July 1, 1965, with later material added when possible. Chinese characters included for biographies, institutions and other names. Appendices include rosters of membership in Party and government organizations and lists of ambassadors and envoys. Very useful.

GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN HONG KONG, 1841–1962: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY. By G. B. Endacott. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964, 263 p. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, $6.00.)

A well-documented history of this British community which has lived under a Crown Colony form of constitution since 1843.

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. Edited by Herbert Passin. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, 174 p. $3.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A timely and important discussion of Japanese-American social, political and economic relations as they have developed over the last two decades. Based on a recent American Assembly.

QUIET DECISION: A STUDY OF GEORGE FOSTER PEARCE. By Peter Heydon. Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965, 271 p. $12.50.

A former private secretary to Sir George Pearce uses his own personal recollec-

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tions, unpublished papers and newspaper and Hansard reports to write of a man of humble birth whose life still influences the Australian political scene. Sir George was one of the founders of the Labor Party in Western Australia, in the Senate from 1901 to 1937 and a Defense Minister.

THE MODERN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. Edited by Victor S. Barnes. Sydney: Horwitz-Grahame; Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1965, 1,199 p. $25.00.

A tersely-worded but useful work covering Australia, New Zealand and Papua-New Guinea.

ANTARCTICA. Edited by Trevor Hatherton. New York: Praeger, 1965, 511 p. $18.50.

A substantial collaborative study covering the activities of the various nations in Antarctica, the Southern Ocean, the continent itself and the South Polar atmosphere.

Africa

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NEW AFRICA. By I. William Zartman. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966, 175 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.45).

A first-rate analytical examination of the international relations of African states. The author combines historical perspective with a systematic assessment of the problems of national interest and security, alliance relationships and conflicting ideologies, patterns of regional unity, and the influences on foreign policy emanating from the process of development.

AFRICA: THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS. Edited by Herbert J. Spiro. New York: Random House, 1966, 212 p. $2.25 (Paper).

An interesting collection of essays on various aspects of contemporary African political development, most of which were originally prepared for the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in October 1963.

NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM. By Kwame Nkrumah. New York: International Publishers, 1966, 280 p. $7.50.

Most of this volume consists of detailed descriptions of the financial and ownership structure of international big business in Africa, the aim of which is to expose the sinister dynamics of neo-colonialism and especially the dominant role of American capital and U.S. Government agencies. This most recent statement of Nkrumahism combines fact and fancy into an ideology which is unlikely to enter its "last stage" for some time to come.

THE PASSING OF FRENCH ALGERIA. By David C. Gordon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 265 p. $6.75.

An able historical analysis of the Algerian struggle for identity. For 30 years the assimilationist vision and finally the brute force of France stood in the way. Since independence, French opposition has been transformed into generosity, but within Algeria disparity and division remain.

L'ALGÉRIE: NATION ET SOCIÉTÉ. By Mostefa Lacheraf. Paris: Maspero, 1965, 346 p. Fr. 18.80.

A collation of essays written over a ten-year span by an Algerian scholar and nationalist. The volume is thus both a reflection of and an introduction to the revolutionary history of modern Algeria.

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L'ÉGYPTE EN RÉVOLUTION. By Claude Estier. Paris: Julliard, 1965, 253 p. Fr. 15.

A French newspaper editor takes stock of the Nasser régime, its achievements and its failures, and of the fact that Egypt has "finally emerged from its millennial torpor and assumed a vanguard role among the developing nations."

NASSER'S EGYPT. By Peter Mansfield. Baltimore: Penguin, 1965, 221 p. $1.25 (Paper).

A compressed, balanced and readable discussion by a British journalist with long experience in the Middle East.

SUDAN TRANSPORT: A HISTORY OF RAILWAY, MARINE AND RIVER SERVICES IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN. By Richard Hill. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 188 p. $6.75.

An informed, historical account of the establishment, growth and administration of the railway, steamer and port services which have played a major part in the economic development of the Republic of Sudan.

AFRICA'S GOLDEN ROAD. By Kwesi Armah. New York: Humanities Press, 1966, 292 p. $6.00.

Drawing upon his experience as Ghana's High Commissioner in London, Regional Secretary of the C.P.P. and Minister of Foreign Trade, the author of this "political testament" surveys the struggle for independence, the operation of one-party democracy in Ghana and Guinea, the goal of Continental Union Government and the role of African states in the world.

THE NEW ELITE IN ASIA AND AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDONESIA AND GHANA. By Thom Kerstiens. New York: Praeger, 1966, 282 p. $12.50.

An interesting effort to analyze comparatively the origins of new élites in Indonesia and Ghana during the colonial period, their contribution to the growth of nationalism, and their role after independence.

A LIFE OF AZIKIWE. By K. A. B. Jones-Quartey. Baltimore: Penguin, 1965, 272 p. $1.25 (Paper).

The career of one of Nigeria's outstanding nationalists and first President is traced against the background of the turbulent transition from empire to commonwealth in this informative though drily written biography by a professor at the University of Ghana.

AFRICAN TIGHTROPE: MY TWO YEARS AS NKRUMAH'S CHIEF OF STAFF. By Major-General H. T. Alexander. New York: Praeger, 1966, 152 p. $4.95.

In addition to his illuminating account of the political strains underlying the Africanization and modernization of Ghana's armed forces, General Alexander critically discusses his experiences in the Congo.

LE CONGO EN QUESTION. By Roger Verbeek. Paris: Éditions Présence Africaine, 1965, 223 p. Fr. 11.10.

Mr. Verbeek offers some penetrating reflections on his first-hand experiences in the Congo. Bitterly condemning the cultural debasement inherent in colonial rule, he argues, with Fanon, that true emancipation and decolonization must entail the rejection of Europe.

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KING LEOPOLD'S LEGACY: THE CONGO UNDER BELGIAN RULE, 1908–1960. By Roger Anstey. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations, London), 1966, 293 p. $7.20.

A scholarly examination of the origins and nature of Belgian rule in the Congo and of its social, economic and political impact.

CONGO 1964: POLITICAL DOCUMENTS OF A DEVELOPING NATION. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 589 p. $12.50.

This volume of annotated political documents, compiled in French by the Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politique (C.R.I.S.P.) in Brussels, is the sixth in an annual series offering a comprehensive survey of Congolese affairs.

KENYATTA'S COUNTRY. By Richard Cox. New York: Praeger, 1966, 203 p. $5.95.

A foreign correspondent of *The Sunday Times* of London provides a vivid and competent account of the political transformation of Kenya since independence.

THE MAKING OF TANGANYIKA. By Judith Listowel. London: Chatto and Windus, 1965, 451 p. 50/. (New York: London House and Maxwell, 1966, $7.50).

A highly readable political history of Tanganyika, beginning with the growth of the Arab slave trade and German colonization and extending through the achievement of independence.

ZAMBIA. By Richard Hall. New York: Praeger, 1965, 357 p. $8.50.

This useful, comprehensive study examines the cultural and geographic setting of Zambian history, the establishment and impact of colonial rule, the rise of African nationalism, the abortive efforts at federation, the consolidation of independence, and the decisive influence of the Copperbelt on Zambia's economic and political development.

HISTOIRE DU NIGER. By Edmond Séré de Rivières. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1965, 310 p. Fr. 33.

Surveying the physical and cultural inheritance of Niger since prehistoric times, this study describes in detail the history of the peoples of Niger from the early medieval kingdoms through the period of twentieth-century colonial rule.

HISTOIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU SUD. By Louis C. D. Joos. Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1965, 343 p. Fr. 18.50.

A general survey of South African history from the fifteenth century to the present, designed to acquaint the interested French reader with the historical roots of contemporary political dilemmas.

SOUTH AFRICA'S HOSTAGES: BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND SWAZILAND. By Jack Halpern. Baltimore: Penguin, 1965, 495 p. $2.25 (Paper).

The historical background and political problems of Britain's three High Commission Territories in southern Africa.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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